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SUMMARY
Based on theories of adjustment to chronic illness, cognitive and emotional 
processing of traumatic events, and meaning- making in the context of stress and 
coping, this study explored two factors believed to influence psychological 
adjustment to breast cancer. The main variables of interest was existential meaning 
(defined as the existence of purpose, and personal meaning in life) and emotional 
expressivity (characterized by the outwardly display of emotions). The aim was 
twofold: First, to test whether high levels of existential meaning or expressivity 
(moderators) could weaken the effect of adverse psychological responses to breast 
cancer (intrusive thoughts) on psychological adjustment to it. Second, to test 
whether the higher the intensity of the adverse psychological responses to cancer 
(e.g., intrusive thoughts, helplessness), the lower a patient’s existential meaning or 
emotional expressivity levels (mediators), which would, in turn, be associated with 
higher levels of psychological maladjustment. One hundred and fifty three women 
with breast cancer, five years on average after diagnosis of their disease, were 
recruited from the breast clinic of an Athenian public cancer hospital, during their 
follow- up. They completed interview and mail surveys that assessed their level of 
existential meaning, emotional expressivity, and approach to coping. Main results of 
the study show that (a) as unwanted, recurrent, and uncontrollable intrusive thoughts 
and memories about breast cancer become more disturbing, psychological 
adjustment becomes poorer, (b) as sense of existential meaning, coherence and 
purpose in life become stronger, psychological adjustment to breast cancer is 
enhanced, (c) existential meaning partially mediates the relationship between 
psychological responses to breast cancer and psychological adjustment to it. 
Implications of these findings for future research, theory development, and clinical 
practice are discussed.
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DEFINITION OF MAIN TERMS
Existential Meaning: Existential meaning as a psychological construct has been
defined as "the cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose in one's
existence, the pursuit and attainment of worthwhile goals, and an
accompanying sense of fulfillment" as well as "a person's feeling that his or
her life is meaningful; a cognitive notion that the person's individual
existence is meaningful, and the motivation to attain both the affective
experience and the cognitive perspective" (Reker & Wong, 1988, p. 217).
When faced with a crisis such as a breast cancer diagnosis, patients are likely
to question the order, coherence and purpose of their existence and the
meaning of this diagnosis for their lives (Coward, 2000). Finding meaning
under such circumstances can involve changing one’s fundamental belief
systems or goals, which may entail the rebuilding of shattered global beliefs
(about justice, order and fairness of the world, about personal deservedness,
about the comprehensibility and controllability of the world, and about
♦
purpose in life), or drastically altering goal hierarchies (by revising old goals, 
abandoning them, rearranging priorities, or finding goal substitutes). 
Existential meaning has also been referred to as "personal meaning" (Wong, 
1998). The lay term for existential meaning is purpose in life. For the 
present study, existential meaning was measured with the Personal Meaning 
Index, one of two indices of the Life Attitude Profile- Revised (LAP-R) 
(Reker, 1999). Existential meaning is operationally defined as having life 
goals, having discovered a satisfying life purpose, having a mission in life, 
having a philosophy of life that gives existence significance, having a 
framework that allows the patient to make sense of her life , and having a
logically integrated and consistent understanding of self, others, and life in 
general (Reker, 1999).
Emotional Expressivity: Denotes a general disposition toward the outward display of 
different emotions across various channels, regardless of emotional valence 
(positive or negative) or channel of expression (facial, vocal, or gestural) 
(Kring, Smith, & Neale, 1994). Emotional expressivity is operationally 
defined as displaying emotions to other people, being able to cry in front of 
other people, being unable to hide the way one is feeling, or thinking of 
oneself as emotionally expressive.
Coping with cancer (coping style): For purposes of the present study, the
operational definition of the Mental Adjustment to Cancer (MAC; Watson et 
al., 1988) was found applicable. The construct of coping styles is used to 
describe “the cognitive and behavioural responses the patient makes to the 
diagnosis of cancer” (p. 203). According to these authors, there are five 
aspects to coping style: "(1) fighting spirit; (2) avoidance; (3) fatalism; (4) 
anxious preoccupation; and (5) helplessness/ hopelessness (Watson et al., 
1988). However, only the first three aspects of this construct have been 
suggested to be pure indicators of coping, while the last two aspects of it 
may represent cognitive appraisals and emotional reactions to cancer 
(Anagnostopoulos, Kolokotroni, Spanea, & Chryssochoou, 2006).
Psychosocial adjustment: Psychosocial adjustment in a cancer patient denotes a 
process of continued active involvement and functioning in daily life, 
minimal role disruption, and the ability to regulate emotional distress and 
dysfunction (Nicholas & Veach, 2000). Psychosocial adjustment is 
influenced by person, situation, and life context variables. Psychosocial
adjustment will not be directly measured in this study, yet there is a direct 
relationship between quality of life and mental functioning (which is 
measured) and psychosocial adaptation (Celia, 1998; Holland, 1998).
Psychosocial maladjustment: Psychosocial maladjustment refers to the condition of 
being unable to adapt properly to one’s environment with resulting emotional 
instability (WordNet, 2001), and signifies poor or inadequate adjustment 
(Merriam- Webster Dictionary, 2007), indicated by either impairment in 
social or occupational functioning, or symptoms of marked distress such as 
anxious or depressed mood, that are in excess of a normal reaction to a 
psychosocial stressor such as a chronic illness (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). For the present study, maladjustment in cancer patients 
was measured by the mental health component of Short Form-36 (Ware et al., 
2003) and was operationally defined as displaying low vitality (fatigue and 
low energy levels), poor social functioning (extreme or frequent interference 
with normal social activities due to physical or emotional problems), more 
role limitations due to emotional problems (e.g., problems with work or other 
daily activities as a result of emotional problems), and poor mental health 
(capturing feelings of nervousness, unhappiness, and sadness)
Intrusive symptoms: A type of commonly reported responses to traumatic stressors 
(such as the diagnosis of a life- threatening illness) involving recurrent 
recollections or imagery of a traumatic event, flashbacks of the event, 
unwanted thoughts about it, strong waves of feelings about the traumatic 
event, especially when the individual is exposed to stimuli, that serve as 
reminders of the original trauma, and recurrent distressing dreams during 
which the event is replayed (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). Intrusive
xiv
symptomatology is part of the post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an 
anxiety disorder that includes persistent reexperience of a traumatic event, 
persistent avoidance of reminders of the event, emotional numbness, 
persistent symptoms of increased arousal (e.g., irritability, trouble sleeping), 
and significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Psychological responses to cancer: For purposes of the present study, psychological 
responses to cancer included intrusive thoughts and symptoms, as well as 
cancer- related appraisals (uncontrollability beliefs regarding the inability to 
handle the situation, being at a loss, giving up, being hopeless) and emotions 
(feelings of upset, worry, fear, apprehension). Cognitive appraisals and 
cancer- related emotions were measured by the helplessness/ hopelessness 
and anxious preoccupation scales respectively (Watson et al., 1988).
Mastectomy: Complete removal of the breast to prevent growth and spread of the 
tumor (Dollinger et al., 1997). During modified radical mastectomy, the 
entire breast tissue is removed, along with some of the axillary lymph nodes. 
Another surgical technique, simple mastectomy, refers to the removal of the 
entire breast, with preservation of both pectoral muscles and the axillary 
nodes.
Lumpectomy: Removal of the lump in the breast (a small volume of the breast tissue 
containing the tumour) and some of the surrounding healthy tissue (Dollinger 
et al., 1997). It is the most common form of conserving surgery, aimed at 
minimizing the risk of local recurrence while leaving the patient with a 
cosmetically acceptable breast.
xv
Recurrence: The return of cancer, at the same site as the original (primary) tumour or 
in another location, after the tumour had disappeared (National Cancer 
Institute, 2007).
xvi
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
In this chapter, an overview of the research problem is presented and studies that are 
directly relevant to the current investigation and have lent it empirical and 
theoretical justification are cited. Arguments that explain the rationale for the 
stipulated research hypotheses and the study are included. The contribution that the 
proposed study makes to theory and practice is also described.
Background to the Problem
Breast cancer is the most prevalent site of cancer for women. In Europe, more than 
360,000 women are diagnosed each year with breast cancer, while 129,000 women 
die of the disease (International Agency for Research on Cancer [IARC], 2004).
Still, many thousands of women (as well as a small number of men) continue to have 
to deal with the effects of a previous breast cancer diagnosis. Breast cancer 
treatment commonly has a profound effect on a woman's body ranging from 
disfiguration to nausea, alopecia, fatigue and pain (Ray & Baum, 1985). In the 
social realm, a diagnosis of breast cancer may limit a woman's ability to participate 
in social activities (Oktay & Walter, 1991) and cause strain in relationships (Bolger, 
Foster, Vinokur, & Ng, 1996). In the psychological and spiritual realm, abreast 
cancer diagnosis may shatter a woman's sense of control and safety, force her to 
question her future, put her in fear of pain and suffering, and, ultimately, threaten 
her life (Ray & Baum, 1985). Moreover, the experience of cancer diagnosis, 
treatment, progression, or recurrence can be considered as a traumatic event capable 
of eliciting symptoms consistent with post- traumatic stress disorder (Green et al., 
1998). These symptoms can include recurrent and intrusive thoughts or images,
avoidance of reminder thoughts and activities, numbing (detachment, restricted 
affect), and increased arousal (hypervigilance, decreased concentration, irritability). 
Increased cancer- related traumatic stress symptoms are related with greater distress 
(Cordova et al., 1995) and poor psychological adjustment (Matsuoka et al., 2002).
The threat breast cancer poses to a woman's life has consistently diminished 
due to advancements in medical oncology (Holland, 1998), better knowledge about 
risk factors and improved early screening methods (Dollinger, Rosenbaum, &
Cable, 1997). Unlike 20 years ago, length of life after a breast cancer diagnosis is 
not the single most important treatment concern anymore (Celia, 1998). With five- 
year survival rates between 27% (when cancer has spread out of the breast to other 
distant parts of the body such as lung, liver, or bones) and 98% (when cancer is 
localized, has not spread to any surrounding tissues and there is no evidence of 
cancer cells breaking out of the part of the breast in which it started), most breast 
cancer patients can expect to live for a longer period of time beyond the time of 
diagnosis and treatment than ever before (American Cancer Society, 2007). With 
increase in survival rates, scientific attention has begun to turn from quantity of 
survival to considerations of its quality and factors that influence long- term 
psychosocial adjustment to cancer (Spencer, Carver, & Price, 1998).
Adjustment is a multidimensional construct that encompasses a patient's 
preservation of functional status, perceived quality of life in several domains (e.g., 
psychological, social, vocational, sexual), mastery of disease- related adaptive tasks, 
absence of psychological symptoms or disorders, and low negative affect (Stanton, 
Collins, & Sworowski, 2001). Increasingly, researchers are considering positive 
indicators of adjustment. Maintaining a positive emotional state, and retaining a 
sense of meaning and purpose in life (Coward, 2000) are only a few of the aspects
integral to adaptation. As such, these factors have claimed an increasingly important 
role in patient care. However, compared to research into other domains of 
adjustment, there is comparatively little empirical research on the concepts of 
meaning in life and emotional expressivity for breast cancer patients (Coward, 2000; 
Ell, Mantell, Hamovitch, & Nishimoto, 1989; Vickberg et al., 2001).
Statement of the Problem
Even though there have been significant advances in the study of psychological 
issues related to cancer over the past decade, researchers seemingly have not been 
responsive to particular issues of importance to patients in their overall adjustment to 
cancer. According to qualitative and clinical accounts by patients, two neglected 
issues are patient’s emotional expressivity (Stanton et al., 2000) and patient's sense 
of life satisfaction and perceived level of existential meaning (Coward, 2000).
Regarding the former issue, expressing one’s emotions regarding a stressful 
or traumatic experience, can be thought of as a way of reducing the distress 
associated with intrusive cognitions. However, two conceptualizations of emotional 
expression exist. Emotional expression can be considered as a dispositional 
tendency or as a coping strategy. In the first case, dispositional expressivity has been 
defined as a tendency to display one’s emotions outwardly (Kring, Smith, & Neale, 
1994). Internal barriers, or constraints, to emotional expression may inhibit 
cognitive processing of stressful events, thus leading to heightened intrusion- related 
distress, and poor adaptation. According to Zakowski, Valdimarsdottir, and 
Bovbjerg (2001), dispositional expressivity exerts a buffering effect on the 
relationship between intrusive thoughts and psychological distress, such that women 
who are less emotionally expressive may be more likely to be distressed by their high
intrusive cognitions about breast cancer. Moreover, dispositional expression of 
positive emotions has negatively been associated with psychological distress, while 
negative emotional expressivity moderated relations between intrusive thoughts and 
distress in patients with cancer (Quartana, Laubmeier, & Zakowski, 2006). In the 
second case, emotional expression is considered as an emotion- focused coping 
strategy, directed toward managing emotions surrounding a stressor. Use of coping 
through emotional expression has been associated with lower psychological distress 
and thus with better psychological adjustment to breast cancer (Stanton et al., 2000). 
In either cases, emotional expressivity in the context of cancer can be regarded as a 
form of patients’ communication with others, in order to reduce the dissonance 
created by traumatic events surrounding the cancer experience (between fundamental 
beliefs regarding personal control, safety, self- worth, and current information 
inherent in the trauma). Communication with supportive others can enhance 
cognitive processing by enabling patients to contemplate and discuss trauma- related 
thoughts and feelings. Discussing traumas with supportive others and disclosing 
emotions to them might help patients to maintain or reestablish a coherent 
worldview, an increased sense of control over negative emotional responses and 
might promote adjustment (Lepore, 2001).
Regarding the latter issue of existential meaning, throughout the course of the 
illness, breast cancer patients face many challenges that can lead to meaning 
questions, such as "why me?", or “what are the implications of the illness 
experience for my life?” (Loscalzo & Brintzenhofeszoc, 1998). Due to the impact 
of a disease as serious as cancer, patients may struggle more with issues of meaning 
and the purpose of their lives after diagnosis than individuals who have not had to 
face a life-threatening illness. Existential issues such as the threat to life, the
meaning of life, the meaning of illness, and the impact of cancer on loved ones are 
only a few examples of commonly experienced concerns of cancer patients along 
the continuum of the illness (Rowland, 1989). These concerns tend to be related to 
and parallel the course of the physical illness; thus, it is not uncommon for cancer 
patients to experience times of high hope as well as times of deep despair, 
depending on the progression of the illness (Rowland, 1989). Even though 
existential issues appear to be an integral part of the illness experience, empirical 
investigations of the construct of existential meaning and breast cancer are rare 
(Vickberg et al., 2001). In existentialist terms, meaning has been defined as "the 
cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose in one's existence, the pursuit and 
attainment of worthwhile goals, and an accompanying sense of fulfillment" (Reker 
& Wong, 1988, p. 217). Furthermore, the authors specified that meaning is "a 
person's feeling that his or her life is meaningful; a cognitive notion that the 
person's individual existence is meaningful, and the motivation to attain both the 
affective experience and the cognitive perspective" (p. 217). As cancer is 
presumed to threaten and possibly alter a person's life perception or sense of 
meaning, this meaning factor then becomes an important aspect in the overall 
adjustment process.
The theoretical foundation for inclusion of existential meaning into a model 
of psychosocial adjustment to breast cancer is threefold: First, theories of illness and 
trauma response explicate the effects of illness on the patient's sense of meaning and 
purpose in life (Janoff-Bulman & McPherson, 1997; Ryff & Singer, 1996). Second, 
Park and Folkman (1997) expanded the transactional theory of stress and coping 
proposed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) to include meaning-based coping as a 
factor. This expansion is an attempt to integrate coping theory with a person's
broader meaning-based framework for conceptualizing and appraising events.
Third, existentialism as a psychotherapy orientation purports that a lack of 
existential meaning could lead a person into despair, especially when faced with 
suffering and death (Yalom, 1980). A diagnosis of breast cancer almost inevitably 
would force a woman to face potential suffering- if not death- and, in turn, trigger a 
reflection on existential issues, such as the meaning of life.
Qualitative accounts have shown that to be the case. In several studies, 
dealing with meaning issues was identified by breast cancer patients as an integral 
part of psychosocial adjustment after the cancer diagnosis (Coward, 2000; Pelusi, 
1997). In fact, studies have shown that a high level of existential meaning was 
associated with greater psychological well-being (Reker & Chamberlain, 2000) and 
higher quality of life in patients (Vickberg, et al., 2001; Wong & Fry, 1998). 
External (such as an illness diagnosis) and internal events (such as depression) 
influence a person's sense of well-being as well as his or her sense of existential 
meaning (Reker & Chamberlain, 2000; Wong & Fry, 1998). This influence process 
apparently can lead to either a loss of meaning, a consolidation of previous levels of 
meaning, or significant gains in a sense of meaning and life purpose (Coward, 2000; 
Reker & Chamberlain, 2000).
The theoretical foundation for inclusion of emotional expressivity into a 
model of psychosocial adjustment to breast cancer is twofold: First, social- 
cognitive processing models of adjustment to cancer have included discharge of 
emotions and social sharing as important determinants of adjustment (Lepore,
2001). Second, expanding the theory of stress and coping proposed by Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984), emotional expression and disclosure can be added to operate as 
buffering factors in the relationship between cancer- related distress and adjustment
(Smyth & Pennebaker, 2001). Research has shown that to be the case. Individual 
differences in the expression of negative emotion appear to be associated with 
distress levels and psychological adjustment among patients with cancer (Quartana 
et al., 2006).
Researchers are interested in the psychological adjustment construct because 
high scores on this construct denote better physical and mental well- being and 
quality of life. With breast cancer diagnosis, patients' initial distress is high and 
psychological well-being is low (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999). Other studies have 
shown that a significant number of breast cancer patients experience clinically 
significant symptoms of anxiety and depression (Holland, 1998). In regard to the 
relationship between psychological responses to breast cancer (and especially 
intrusions) and adjustment, one study (Komblith et al., 2003) found that 20 years 
after the initial treatment, the prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms 
in response to having breast cancer was high (15% of survivors reported two or more 
such symptoms occurring moderately to extremely often, involving persistently re- 
experiencing the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma, 
numbing of responsiveness to the external world, and hypervigilance). Researchers 
have also found that recurrent intrusive thoughts and images (associated with 
mutilation, hair loss, pain, nausea) have a significant influence on psychological 
adjustment to breast cancer. Cancer- related traumatic stress symptoms (such as 
intrusions) predict poorer mental health status and thus poor adjustment (Golden- 
Kreutz et al., 2005). The likelihood of having intrusive memories, that refer to the 
patient’s own experiences of having cancer (such as being given the diagnosis), or to 
the illness or death of a relative or friend, is strongly related to being depressed, 
while intrusive memories are also associated with coping with cancer (Brewin,
Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998a). Other cancer- related responses 
such as helplessness/ hopelessness and anxious preoccupation have also been 
associated with poor adjustment to cancer and lower quality of life. Schou, Ekeberg, 
and Ruland (2005) found that a hopeless/ helpless response to breast cancer 
(characterized by feelings of giving up and pessimism) was associated with poorer 
global health- related quality of life and decreased emotional and social functioning. 
Moreover, Cotton, Levine, Fitzpatrick, Dold, and Targ (1999) found that a helpless/ 
hopeless response to breast cancer and an anxious preoccupation with cancer 
(characterized by feelings of devastation, fear, and worry) were associated with 
lower health- related quality of life. Generally, researchers are in agreement that a 
cancer diagnosis lowers a patient's level of functioning and interest has now shifted 
more toward studying the actual pathways to adjustment.
From a review of the literature on psychological adjustment in breast cancer 
patients, it appears that researchers have recognized the need to study multiple 
aspects of adjustment in conjunction (Schnoll, Harlow, Brandt, & Stolbach, 1998a). 
The emphasis placed on models of psychosocial adjustment gives credence to the 
recognition that adjustment is multifaceted and complex (Nicholas & Veach, 2000). 
Most of the adjustment models have utilized the quality of life construct as an 
appropriate outcome measure (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999; Schnoll et al., 1998a; 
Stanton et al., 2000). However, only a few researchers have given attention to the 
variable of existential meaning (Vickberg, Bovbjerg, DuHamel, Currie, & Redd, 
2000), which points to a lack of empirical research in this area. Not only could the 
adjustment construct encompass a person's sense of life satisfaction and meaning, 
there is also additional theoretical support for the inclusion of this variable into pre­
existing models of psychosocial adjustment to breast cancer. Theories of health and
illness, such as the ones by Ryff (1989; 1995) and Janoff-Bulman and McPherson 
(1997) as well as coping theories (Antonovsky, 1987; Park & Folkman, 1997) and 
existentialist psychotherapy theory make a convincing case for the inclusion of 
existential meaning when the focus is on understanding overall adjustment to an 
illness, such as breast cancer. Therefore, existential meaning should be included 
into models based on theoretical accounts and psychological adjustment concerns. 
The present study responded to this lack of research on existential meaning by 
examining two psychosocial adjustment models that addressed the meaning level of 
breast cancer patients. Moreover, emotional expressivity was examined in relation to 
adjustment. However, since the construct of coping has been suggested as exerting 
important influences on adjustment to chronic illness (Stanton et al., 2001), and has 
been employed as an additional predictor variable in models of psychosocial 
adjustment to cancer (Schnoll et al., 1998b), this construct was also included in the 
models.
Purpose of the Study
Theories of illness (Ryff, 1995) and coping (Park & Folkman, 1997) emphasize that 
a person's "mind health" and sense of meaningfulness of life (Ryff, 1995) influence 
the way this person approaches a stressful situation and how this person's 
adjustment is impacted by a stressor. Thus, an individual who has a high sense of 
meaning and purpose in life is believed to approach stressors in an adaptive way with 
the goal of future life satisfaction and positive outcome for mental and physical 
health (Wong, 1998).
Even though patients with breast cancer have consistently reported struggles 
with meaning, very few empirically derived models of psychosocial adjustment to
breast cancer have incorporated a meaning variable (Vickberg et al., 2001). The 
same holds true for emotional expressivity. Few studies have included an 
expressivity variable in a tested psychological model of adjustment to cancer 
(Zakowski et al., 2001). This current study tests moderated effects of existential 
meaning and emotional expressivity on the relationship between intrusive thoughts 
(predictor) and psychological adjustment to breast cancer (outcome). In addition to 
this, two structural mediation models considered to reflect a woman's psychosocial 
adjustment to cancer are also developed and tested. The present models are an 
expansion of a previously developed model by Vickberg et al. (2001) but with 
particular attention given to the way a woman's sense of existential meaning and 
expressivity pertain to her psychological adjustment. The two models tested in the 
current study involve: the primary conceptual model with psychological adjustment 
being directly influenced by both existential meaning (and expressivity) and 
psychological responses to cancer (intrusive thoughts, helplessness/ hopelessness, 
anxious preoccupation), and the alternative model with psychological adjustment 
being influenced by existential meaning (and expressivity), which in turn are 
hypothesized to be influenced by psychological responses to cancer. In these 
models, psychological responses to cancer served as an independent variable, while 
psychological adjustment to cancer served as a dependent variable. Coping was 
considered to be a standard intervening variable in these models, based on Lazarus 
and Folkman’s (1984) stress and coping theory.
Two models were deemed necessary for this study due to the ambiguous role 
that existential meaning appears to have in relation to psychological responses to 
cancer (Park & Folkman, 1997). In the primary model, the construct of 
psychological responses to cancer was hypothesized to influence psychological
adjustment through a direct path to it. In the alternative conceptual model, 
psychological responses to cancer and psychological adjustment would not be 
directly related. Therefore, existential meaning (and expressivity) were thought to 
mediate and subsume the effects of psychological responses to cancer. Both models 
were theoretically driven by a previous explication of the relationship between 
psychological responses to cancer and meaning proposed by Park and Folkman 
(1997) or between intrusive cognitions, emotional expressivity and adjustment 
(Zakowski et al., 2001).
Importance of the Study
Since breast cancer patients frequently report concerns over emotional disclosure and 
meaning and purpose in life as a result of their illness (Loscalzo &
Brintzenhofeszoc, 1998), meaning issues need to be given more consideration in 
order to truly understand and help breast cancer patients adjust to their illness.
Health professionals can play a crucial role in this adjustment process by 
researching issues such as meaning, expressivity, and adjustment. With the advent 
of positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), interest has increased 
in the study of well-being, meaning, and purpose in life. Ideally, findings from both 
psycho-oncology and positive psychology could be combined and used to improve 
breast cancer patients' adjustment and overall quality of life. Suffering from breast 
cancer can be a life-changing experience for the affected women. Good 
psychological care for breast cancer patients needs to include both an awareness of, 
and a responsiveness, to, patients' existential concerns sparked by having a serious 
and potentially life-threatening illness (Coward, 2000). Health professionals are 
trained to address adjustment issues in their patients (American Psychological
Association [APA], 2007). One of these adjustment issues could be the adjustment 
to a life-threatening illness, such as breast cancer. More research on the variables 
influencing this adjustment process, such as research on existential meaning and 
expressivity in the present study, will benefit health professionals working with 
breast cancer patients by increasing knowledge, insight, and understanding of 
factors influencing this adjustment process. Ultimately, the more health 
professionals know about the adjustment process to breast cancer, the better they can 
intervene with and provide psychological treatment for breast cancer patients.
CHAPTER 2
Psychological Adjustment to Chronic Illness
This chapter provides a review of the literature on psychological adjustment to chronic 
illness. The definition of this construct is first presented, together with the indicators of 
adjustment to chronic diseases. Psychological theories and models of adjustment to 
chronic illness are then described, with a focus on those theories that encompass the 
main variables of interest (existential meaning and emotional expressivity). Relevant 
studies are reported and critiqued so that sufficient logical and empirical support to the 
assertions made regarding adjustment to a chronic illness such as breast cancer is 
provided.
Definitions and Concepts of Adjustment: Adjustment and Adaptation to Chronic 
Illness
The concepts of psychosocial adjustment and psychosocial adaptation share much. In 
fact, their use is often indistinguishable in the literature on disability and coping with 
crisis situations. Before their differentiating and overlapping features are addressed, a 
brief historical review of these concepts is provided.
In one of the earliest efforts to analyze psychosocial adjustment to disability, 
Dembo, Leviton, and Wright (1956) equated successful adjustment with a "coping" 
framework. In contrast, the inability to achieve successful adjustment was regarded as a 
reflection of a "succumbing" framework. The coping framework was predicated upon 
the following characteristics: (1) emphasizing what the person can do, (2) assuming an
active role in shaping one’s life, (3) recognizing personal accomplishments, (4) 
successfully managing negative life experiences, (5) reducing limitations through 
changes in the physical and social environments, and (6) participating in and enjoying 
valued activities.
Wright (1983) paralleled acceptance of disability with psychosocial adjustment 
as evidenced in the domain of one's value system. Acceptance, or adjustment, was 
equated with ability to minimize actual or perceived losses that stem from a disabling 
condition and ability to retain the value of existing abilities (Keany & Glueckauf, 1993). 
Wright (1983), accordingly, proposed four revaluation changes that limit devaluation of 
self and broaden acceptance of loss. These changes included (1) enlargement of the 
scope of values, or recognition of the existence of values other than those directly 
affected by the disability; (2) subordination of physique relative to other values, or 
decreasing the relative importance of physical appearance in comparison to other 
personal abilities and values; (3) containment of disability effects, or limiting the 
deleterious impact of disability spread to nonaffected areas; and (4) transformation of 
comparative-status values to asset values, or replacing external-based (i.e., standard, 
normative) abilities and qualities with internal-based (i.e., inherent, intrinsic) values and 
qualities.
Other theorists have suggested models of adjustment to chronic illness or 
disability from clinical observations or research data. For example, Hamburg and 
Adams (1967), in discussing coping behaviors manifest by persons with severe physical 
disabilities, observed the following behaviors as indicative of successful psychosocial 
functioning: (1) keeping distress within manageable limits, (2) maintaining a sense of 
personal worth, (3) restoring relationships with significant others, (4) increasing
opportunities for recovery of physical functioning, and (5) increasing likelihood of 
achieving personally valued and socially acceptable life goals.
Shontz (1975) perceived psychological adjustment as a final stage in his temporal 
model of response to disability. He further argued that adjustment was a function of the 
congruence between the subjective world of the person and the external environment. 
The better the fit between the psychological framework and the external reality, the 
better the degree of adjustment. Successful adjustment, therefore, necessitated two 
separate processes. On the one hand, internal perceptions led to actions that maximized 
available environmental opportunities. On the other hand, the environment must be 
adapted to facilitate efficacious behaviors. Adaptation was viewed by Shontz (1975) as 
that dynamic, mutual accommodation of both subjective experience and external 
environment. The evolving process of adaptation required the individual to show 
sensitivity to the environment as typically evidenced by one's internal mental state, 
knowledge of available resources, and interpersonal skills.
Roessler and Bolton (1978) regarded adjustment to disability both as a state or a 
goal and as a process consisting of a succession of situations requiring specific solutions. 
Based on their review of the existing models of adjustment to disability, they advocated 
a comprehensive, synthesized model that they called a "behavioral coping" model, 
which incorporated such elements as survival ability, potential assets, person- 
environment congruence, and positive striving. According to this model, maladjustment 
was regarded as failure to resolve problems in living, while successful adjustment 
reflected the ability to manage one's environment and efficiently use problem-solving 
skills. DeLoach and Greer (1981), in a similar manner, argued that adjustment 
comprised self-acceptance, responsible behavior, appropriate social techniques, and
successful coping strategies. They offered no insight into the interrelationships among 
these domains, nor did they discuss the specific psychosocial and coping efforts 
associated with successful adjustment to disability.
Clinicians and researchers (see, for example, Jacobson et al., 1990; Pollock,
1986) also failed to draw a distinction between the concepts of adjustment and 
adaptation. Pollock (1986), for instance, perceived adaptation to chronic illness and 
disability as a complex process involving both internal and external factors. Ultimately, 
however, she asserted that adaptation refers to the degree to which the person adjusts 
(i.e., functions successfully) physiologically, psychologically, and socially to the chronic 
condition. Jacobson et al. (1990) offered a more comprehensive definition of adjustment 
to chronic illness. They viewed adjustment as referring to those affective and behavioral 
changes made in response to the immediate external environment, to developmental 
stages, and to long-term situations. They further suggested that adjustment could be 
measured by variables, including (1) self-esteem, (2) psychological symptoms, (3) 
behavioral problems, (4) demonstrated skills in educational and social situations, and (5) 
attitudes regarding the chronic illness.
Stanton, Collins, and Sworowski (2001) identified five related conceptualizations 
of adjustment to chronic disease: (a) mastery of disease- related adaptive tasks such as 
successfully dealing with the hospital environment and treatment, (b) preservation of 
functional status, (c) perceived quality of life and appraisals of satisfaction or well­
being in several life domains, (d) absence of psychological disorder or symptoms, and 
(e) low negative affect or high positive affect. Increasingly, researchers are considering 
positive indicators of adjustment, such as maintaining positive mood and retaining 
purpose in life. These conceptualizations reveal that adjustment encompasses multiple
components that cross interpersonal, cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioural 
domains, that are interrelated.
In concert with these theoretical formulations, psychosocial adaptation to chronic 
illness and disability can be regarded as an evolving, dynamic, general process through 
which the individual gradually approaches an optimal state of person-environment 
congruence manifest by (1) active participation in social, vocational, and avocational 
pursuits; (2) successful negotiation of the physical environment; and (3) awareness of 
remaining strengths and assets as well as existing functional limitations. Adjustment, on 
the other hand, may refer more specifically to a particular phase (i.e., set of experiences 
and reactions) of the psychosocial adaptation process. As such, adjustment is the 
clinically and phenomenologically hypothesized final phase- elusive as it may be- of the 
unfolding process of adaptation to crisis situations including the onset of chronic illness 
and disability. It is alternatively expressed by terms such as (1) reaching and maintaining 
psychosocial equilibrium; (2) achieving a state of reintegration; (3) positively striving to 
reach life goals; (4) demonstrating positive self-esteem, self-concept, self-regard, and the 
like; and (5) experiencing positive attitudes toward oneself, others, and the disability 
(Jacobson et al., 1990; Livneh, 1986; Roessler & Bolton, 1978; Wright, 1983).
As is evident from this cursory discussion, psychosocial adaptation will be 
manifested differently depending on the type of chronic illness or disability and its long­
term implications. For example, adaptation in the case of more stable, non-life- 
threatening conditions, such as amputation, is vastly different from that associated with 
unstable conditions, such as multiple sclerosis, or deteriorating, life-threatening 
conditions, such as cancer of the liver.
Types of Chronic Illness
The term chronic illness refers to a wide variety of diseases which have in common that 
they are of a long-lasting nature. From a psychological point of view, the extended 
course without the perspective of cure may be of interest, possibly affecting patients' 
willingness and ability to perform behaviors related to managing illness and adhering to 
medical prescriptions. It may be important to discriminate between different categories 
of chronic illness beyond medical diagnostic distinctions. Attempts in this direction are 
scarce, however. Disease characteristics such as predictability, contagiousness, and 
posing a threat to life have been proposed as factors possibly affecting illness 
management and support from relatives and friends (Felton & Revenson, 1984). For 
example, cancer and AIDS, which confront the family of the patient with crisis and 
possibly even threaten their own health (in case of AIDS), may provoke decreased, 
sometimes even 'negative', support, resulting in victimizing the patient (Bishop, Alva, 
Cantu, & Rittiman, 1991; Manne, Taylor, Dougherty, & Kemeny, 1997). Another 
characteristic of interest relates to controllability of disease, referring to the actual 
possibilities of influencing the symptoms and course of the illness by performing self- 
care behaviours, such as maintaining a healthy diet or adjusting medication intake 
according to activity. Typical diseases which are controllable by the patient (at least to 
some extent) are diabetes and asthma, requiring performance of self-care routines (both 
medication and health habits) on a daily basis. Actual control may increase feelings of 
perceived control, but it may also impose a high burden on self-management routines, 
confronting the patient with his or her responsibility to take good care of the illness 
(Eitel, Hatchett, Friend, Griffin, & Wadhwa, 1995). Typical uncontrollable diseases are 
neurological disorders such as multiple sclerosis, with an unpredictable course and few
opportunities for patients to influence symptoms (Felton & Revenson, 1984; Fournier,
De Ridder, & Bensing, 2002). Uncontrollability of illness may result in feelings of 
helplessness, although it has been suggested that there may be adaptive benefits to 
surrendering control in the face of uncontrollable chronic illness (Reid, 1984). Although 
the issue of actual illness control is important in discriminating between types of chronic 
diseases, most studies show that there is a remarkably low association between actual 
control and perceived, subjective control. Moreover, such studies show that perceived 
control is a stronger predictor of adjustment than actual control (Helgeson, 1992; Taylor, 
Helgeson, Reed, & Skokan, 1991).
Although no scientific definition of the concept of chronic illness exists, many 
researchers agree that chronic illnesses typically involve diseases of a long-lasting nature 
without prospect of cure. In addition, most chronic illnesses are characterized by a 
progressive course, which means that the physical condition of patients gets worse as 
years go by. Due to improved public health and to better medical control over acute 
infectious diseases such as influenza, tuberculosis, measles and polio, and to the 
increased life expectancy of the population associated with it, during the twentieth 
century chronic diseases have become important health risks in Western societies (e.g. 
Glasgow et al., 1999; MacKeown, 1979). Reliable epidemiological data from European 
countries are scarce, but available figures demonstrate that amongst the most prevalent 
chronic diseases are various forms of cardiovascular disease (coronary heart disease, 
stroke and heart failure), rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, asthma, and different types of 
cancer (WHO, 1994). For example, figures on diabetes prevalence show that about 3 to 
10 per cent of the population in European countries are afflicted by this condition (King 
& Zimmet, 1988). Asthma, on the other hand, is more variable across countries, with a
high prevalence in the United Kingdom and a much smaller prevalence in other 
European countries (European Community Respiratory Health Survey [ECRHS], 1996). 
Estimates of European figures on the prevalence of cancer and heart disease can only be 
derived from mortality statistics (Boyle, 1992). Unfortunately, such figures are difficult 
to compare across countries as they are related to country-specific differences in 
screening and registration procedures (Ruwaard et al., 1994). It is expected that in the 
near future the prevalence of diabetes (due to increased unhealthy diet and associated 
obesity - Seidell, 1995; Zimmet, 2000) and breast cancer and ovarian cancer (due to 
increased use of hormone suppletion therapy in menopausal women) will rise (Boyle,
1992). In contrast, it is expected that lung cancer will decrease in the future, at least in 
the north European countries, because of the decreased smoking behaviour in men; for 
women, however, the prevalence of lung cancer is rising (Ruwaard et al., 1994).
Taking all chronic conditions together, it is estimated that at any given moment 
50% of the population suffers from a chronic illness requiring some form of medical 
intervention (Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996). Most chronic illnesses occur in older adults; 
and as the average age of the population increases, so does the prevalence of chronic 
illnesses. It is estimated that people aged 60 years and older have, on average, 2.2 
chronic conditions (Rothenberg & Koplan, 1990). Most chronic illnesses have a late 
onset, but some, such as asthma and diabetes, may even manifest themselves in young 
children (Suris & Blum, 2001). It is estimated that about 35% of young adults aged 18 
to 44 years have at least one chronic condition (Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996). Because 
chronic diseases are ones with which people often live many years, medical management 
of these chronic disorders is costly and accounts for 75% of US health spending 
(Hoffman, Rice & Sung, 1996).
Adaptive Tasks in Chronic Illness
Other research on features of chronic illness corroborates the importance of subjective 
evaluations of disease characteristics and proposes the concept of 'adaptive tasks' as a 
relevant construct for studying psychological aspects of chronic illness (Bensing, 
Schreurs, De Ridder, & Hulsman, 2002; De Ridder, Schreurs & Bensing, 1998; Moos & 
Schaefer, 1984). The concept of adaptive tasks refers to the subjective evaluation of 
disease-related stressors which challenge adjustment, and comprises such stressors as 
dealing with pain and incapacity, dealing with hospital environment, developing 
adequate relationships with health-care staff, establishing and assimilating the meaning 
of the situation, acknowledging personal significance of the situation, preserving 
emotional balance, preserving a satisfactory self-image, maintaining a sense of 
competence and mastery, sustaining relationships with family and friends, and preparing 
for an uncertain future (Dunkel-Schetter, Feinstein, Taylor, & Falke, 1992; Moos & 
Schaefer, 1984). The majority of psychological studies on chronic illness have 
employed a disease-specific framework, elaborating on the typical medical (disease- 
specific) demands associated with illness as important factors in adaptation. However, 
there is some evidence that adaptive tasks are similar across a wide range of chronic 
illnesses, although the relative importance of such tasks may differ due to variation in 
medical demands (Heijmans et al., 2001). Some researchers have therefore proposed 
that a disease-generic framework, highlighting the common psychological demands of 
chronic illness, may offer a promising perspective for studying the psychological aspects 
of chronic illness (Glasgow, Strycker, Toobert, & Eakin, 2000; Heijmans et al., 2001; 
Stanton, Collins & Sworowski, 2001). Besides similarities in adaptation processes
across diseases, another reason for maintaining a generic view on the psychological 
aspects of chronic illness relates to the fact that many patients suffer from more than one 
chronic condition at the same time (known as 'comorbidity') (Rothenberg & Koplan, 
1990), which inevitably challenges the validity of a disease-specific approach. Taken 
together, research on a wide variety of chronic illnesses has failed to identify clear 
categories of chronic illness according to objective disease characteristics. Subjective 
evaluations of disease are important for understanding the way patients adjust to illness 
and are similar across a wide range of chronic diseases. The following sections, 
therefore, will not include discussion of separate diseases but will focus on 
psychological issues which are common to a number of chronic diseases.
Indicators of Adjustment to Chronic Illness
Immediately following medical diagnosis of chronic illness, patients are often in a state 
of crisis characterized by emotional distress and finding that their habitual ways of 
coping do not work (Moos & Schaefer, 1984). As a result, patients may experience 
feelings of anxiety, fear, depression or even denial (Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996). 
Eventually, the crisis phase of chronic illness passes and patients enter a phase in which 
they make efforts to adapt to the new situation. Depending on the way they handle this 
phase and depending on progression of disease, most patients eventually reach a state of 
adjustment. Attempts to delineate a set of stages of adjustment have proven 
unsuccessful as disease stage is related inconsistently to adjustment (e.g. Van't Spijker, 
Trijsburg & Duivenvoorden, 1997). However, a number of studies suggest that, for 
most patients, the crisis of illness diminishes within a year following diagnosis (e.g. Cox 
& Gonder-Frederick, 1992).
Quality o f Life
Adjustment to disease can be assessed in multiple ways. A typical measure derived 
from medical practice is health-related quality of life, which is generally assessed by 
measures of daily functioning (i.e. the ability to conduct daily personal and role-related 
activities). The widely used Rand 36-item Health Survey (Ware, 1993), for example, 
assesses physical functioning, social functioning, role limitations due to physical 
problems, role limitations due to emotional problems, mental health, vitality, pain and 
general perceptions of health. Such functional measures of adjustment are relevant in 
the context of medical treatment, but do not capture adequately other indicators of 
adjustment, such as satisfaction with life or well-being (Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996). The 
basic assumption of psychological theories of well-being is that the successful pursuit of 
meaningful goals plays an important role in development and maintenance of 
psychological well-being (Brunstein, 1993; Ditto, Druley, Moore, Danks, & Smucker, 
1996; Scheier & Bridges, 1995). As chronic illness may jeopardize accomplishment of 
goals, well-being may also be threatened. Therefore, several investigators in the field of 
quality-of-life research have emphasized the role of personal goals and related constructs 
in patients' perceptions of their quality of life. According to Caiman (1984), for 
example, quality of life measures the gap between the individual's hopes, expectations 
and ambitions and his or her present experience of reality. The central element in this 
definition is that self-reported quality of life is assumed to involve some subjective 
evaluation of goal attainment. Distinguishing different conceptualizations of quality of 
life is relevant as patients' reports on good adjustment tend to differ depending on the 
type of measure of quality of life which has been used. Studies employing a functional
measure mostly indicate rather poor quality of life of chronically ill patients, especially 
in domains related to physical functioning (e.g. Schlenk et al., 1998). Studies employing 
a goal-related measure, however, show that quality of life of chronically ill patients is 
remarkably similar to quality of life reported by healthy people. Some studies even 
demonstrate a positive effect of being ill (Folkman, 1997; Petrie, Buick, Weinman, & 
Booth, 1999; Sodergren & Hyland, 2000). For example, Collins and colleagues 
(Collins, Taylor, & Skokan, 1990) reported that 90 per cent of cancer patients in their 
study named at least some beneficial changes in their lives as a result of the cancer, 
including an increased ability to appreciate each day and the inspiration to get on with 
important life tasks, putting more effort in their relationships, and more awareness of 
other's feelings and more sympathy and compassion for others. Such findings may be 
dismissed as an artifact demonstrating the existence of defence mechanisms in 
chronically ill patients, such as denial of their condition (Croyle, Sun, & Hart, 1997), but 
the consistent observation of positive reactions seems to contradict such an 
interpretation. Moreover, the so-called response shift phenomenon (Sprangers & 
Schwartz, 1999) has been proposed as an explanation for reported positive reactions to 
chronic illness, implying that, during the course of illness, patients may learn to adopt 
new standards and values about important things in life in response to their altered life 
condition. Such reactions may occur because chronically ill people re-order their 
priorities and find meaning in other activities in response to illness. Another explanation 
for the apparently positive adjustment to chronic illness is that it only affects specific 
domains of functioning instead of creating complete maladjustment. For example, 
Andersen, Woods and Copeland (1997) found that cancer is more likely to produce 
'islands' of life disruption in specific realms and at specific points in time than to confer
a risk for global dysfunction. Regardless of why they occur, these positive reactions 
seem to serve a beneficial function in emotional recovery and imply that we should 
attend to the protective effects of positive biases in adaptation (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Emotional Distress
Other indicators of adjustment involve assessments of negative emotional impact such as 
anxiety or depression. A number of studies conclude that people with chronic illness in 
general maintain adequate psychological functioning, although a significant minority of 
patients may be at risk for anxiety or depression (Cox & Gonder-Frederick, 1992; 
DeVellis, 1995; Ell & Dunkel-Schetter, 1994). Although anxiety in chronically ill 
patients may be an expression of a tendency towards anxiety which already existed 
before illness onset, typical illness-related situations may also increase the experience of 
anxiety. Examples of such situations are waiting for test results, invasive procedures, 
side-effects of treatment, dependency on health professionals, and uncertainty about 
disease course (e.g. Jacobsen, Bovbjerg, & Redd, 1993). Depressive reactions are also 
more common among chronically ill patients. A number of studies on different chronic 
diseases have reported that about 30 per cent of patients show symptoms of depression 
(e.g. Clark, Cook, & Snow, 1998; Dickens, McGowan, Clark- Carter, & Creed, 2002).
It has been suggested that depression is a normal reaction related to the first stage of 
illness confronting patients with crisis and loss, but there is little evidence to support that 
view (Wells, Rogers, Bumam, & Camp, 1993). Unfortunately, not much is known about 
the course of depression over time to determine whether depression is a normal response 
to loss. Flowever, some evidence exists that high levels of depression in chronically ill 
patients are especially found in patients with a family history of affective disorders.
Also, disease severity has been linked with increased levels of depression, as well as the 
absence of coping resources such as adequate social support from family and friends 
(Manne et al., 1997). Unfortunately, the assessment of depression in chronically ill 
patients can be problematic, as many physical signs of depression, such as fatigue, 
sleeplessness or weight loss, may also be an expression of the disease itself (e.g., Clark, 
Cook, & Snow, 1998). At this point, there is no standard to discriminate between 
'normal' depressive reactions to illness and reactions which should be treated with 
psychological interventions.
Contributors to Adjustment to Chronic Illness within Existing Psychological 
Theories and Models of Adjustment
Psychological studies on chronic illness are generally guided by models of stress and 
coping which either focus on the role of stress and moderators of stress in the onset and 
course of illness, or highlight adaptation to stress caused by being chronically ill (Cohen, 
Kessler, & Gordon, 1995; Cohen & Lazarus, 1979; De Ridder & Schreurs, 1996;
Stanton et al., 2001; Maes, Leventhal, & De Ridder, 1996). These models are derived 
from more general conceptual frameworks regarding adjustment to stressful experiences, 
and typically highlight the role of stressors as possibly affecting health outcomes, well­
being and adjustment. The impact of stress is believed to be mediated by cognitive 
appraisals of the stressor and the personal and social resources available to assist coping 
with stress. Therefore, coping resources, coping strategies, as well as the personal and 
social context of stress are important areas of psychological research on chronic illness 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Moos & Schaefer, 1993; Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996). In 
addition, an important area of research is also concerned with clarifying the role of
biological pathways between stress on the one hand and health outcomes on the other 
hand. To date, such models incorporate hormonal, or immunological aspects of 
adjustment (e.g., Andersen, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1994; Baum & Poluszny, 1999). 
Compared to other social sciences dealing with chronic illness, such as behavioural 
medicine or medical sociology, psychological models of chronic illness have equally 
adopted a so-called biopsychosocial view of chronic illness (Engel, 1977), in which 
psychological as well as social and biological factors play a role, but with more 
emphasis on the psychological processes associated with it. Of particular interest to this 
study were five theories or models that explicitly addressed issues of existential meaning 
for suffering patients. These theories ranged from coping and meaning theories (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984; Park & Folkman, 1997), to cognitive adaptation (Taylor, 1983), and a 
trauma perspective (Horowitz, 1986; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
The Transactional Theory o f  Stress
Probably the most influential of all psychological models of illness is the transactional 
stress model of Lazarus and Folkman (1984). Lazarus and Folkman saw the state in 
which resources were overtaxed or lacking as creating stress and leading, in turn, to 
mobilization of appraisal and coping processes. Individuals; cognitive appraisals of the 
potential for harm (i.e., threat appraisal) and benefit (i.e., challenge appraisals) arising 
from the encounter (i.e., primary appraisals), as well as appraisals of their ability to 
control or manage the situation’s demands (i.e., secondary appraisal) catalyze the 
initiation of coping strategies. Although their emphasis was clearly on appraisal and 
coping, they saw people's personal and social resources, as setting the stage for these 
processes. The degree to which individuals appraise something as threatening, and the
coping choices they make, are largely determined by the resources they have to answer 
the threat or challenge. The cognitive appraisals and coping strategies engaged in 
response to a stressor, substantially determine adaptive outcomes in emotional and 
social, and somatic realms (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Diagram of personal and environmental influences on adjustment to 
chronic illness.
The Model o f Global and Situational Meaning in the Context o f Stress and Coping 
Park and Folkman (1997) expanded coping theory by suggesting a tertiary coping 
mechanism, meaning-based coping. The meaning implicated in meaning-based coping 
consists of both global and situation-specific meaning. Global meaning refers to 
"people's basic goals and fundamental assumptions, beliefs, and expectations about the 
world" (Park & Folkman, 1997, p. 116) and is akin to the construct of existential 
meaning. On the contrary, situational meaning "refers to the interaction of a person's 
global beliefs and goals and the circumstances of a particular person-environment 
transaction" (p. 121). The authors believed that both types of meaning are implicated
when individuals are faced with challenging life events and are forced to re-appraise 
these events. This re- appraisal takes place on a meaning level, first on a situational 
basis and then on a more global basis. In the model of global and situational meaning in 
coping, an event leads from initial appraisal of the situation to appraised situational 
meaning and an attempt to make situational meaning congruent with global meaning. In 
case situational and global meaning diverge, the person will make attempts at alleviating 
the distress caused by the situation. According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and Park 
and Folkman (1997), the following mechanisms are available to a person in this 
situation: problem-focused coping, emotion-focused coping, reappraisal of meaning, and 
changes in situational and/or global meaning. Park and Folkman introduced the term 
"meaning-making" (p. 124) to denote the process of situationally and globally 
appraising a stressful event. Whereas global meaning is more stable, situational 
meaning may change on a daily basis. Successful coping with a situation such as breast 
cancer depends on how discrepancies between situational and global meaning are 
resolved by an individual. The ultimate goal of meaning-making coping is to lead to 
congruency between situational and global meaning, which precipitates either the 
acceptance or resolution of the original stressful situation. If the attempt at achieving 
congruent situational and global meaning is unsuccessful, the person tends to ruminate 
and re-attempt previously employed coping processes or strategies.
An example of this process could be the woman diagnosed with breast cancer 
who (rightfully) appraises the diagnosis as life-threatening. Potential threat to life 
becomes the woman's appraised meaning of the situation. If this patient believes in a 
just and ordered world (her global meaning), her situational and global meaning are not 
congruent anymore, which will lead her to experiencing distress. This distress tends to
spark various coping responses ultimately aimed at changing either her initial appraisal 
of the situation (life-threatening illness) andI or her global meaning ("life is not fair", or 
"bad things do happen to good people"). If the woman can make those changes in her 
meaning perspectives, she can come to accept her illness and adjust psychologically. 
Should she be unable to match her appraisal of the situation with her worldview, she 
will continue to experience distress and potentially anxiety and depression (Holland, 
1998). In this example (and in the model of coping as such), global and situational 
meaning are clearly interrelated. One of the implications from the interrelation is that 
when people are faced with a stressful situation such as having breast cancer, both their 
situational and their global meaning are affected. In the model by Park and Folkman 
(1997), meaning propels coping and both coping and meaning are intricately linked to 
the outcome of a stressful situation. Therefore, meaning needs to be regarded as an 
essential factor in a person's coping with and adjustment to illness. In a follow-up 
article on this new model, Folkman and Greer (2000) included meaning-based coping as 
a third type of coping behavior. According to the authors, meaning-based coping is 
implicated when problem-focused and emotion-focused coping both have yielded 
unfavorable resolutions. Meaning-based coping fulfilled a mediating role between 
distress and positive emotion in the proposed model.
In summary, from a coping perspective, meaning-making and coping are linked in 
their mediating role between stressors and psychological outcome. Research on 
meaning-based coping is scarce aside from the theoretical model by Park and Folkman 
(1997). These authors not only provided a theoretical framework for future study of 
meaning in relation to coping but encouraged an inclusion of the meaning construct in 
empirical research on the coping process.
The Theory o f  Cognitive Adaptation
Taylor (1983) has developed the theory of cognitive adaptation to threatening events, 
such as a life- threatening illness. This theory is based on the assumption that people 
possess unrealistically positive views of themselves to enhance their well- being. It 
posits that mildly positive self- relevant distortions enable individuals: (a) to search for 
meaning in the experience and develop an optimistic outlook, (b) to regain mastery over 
the event, and (c) to restore their self- esteem in response to stressful events, such as a 
diagnosis of cancer. The search for meaning involves the need to understand why this 
event occurred (which is addressed through causal attributions) and what its impact has 
been (which is addressed through construing positive meaning from the experience). 
Causal analysis helps individuals understand, predict, and control their environment. On 
the other hand, understanding the implications of the event for one’s life, may lead to a 
new attitude toward and reappraisal of life, reordering of priorities, rethinking the 
significance of one’s social relationships, restructuring one’s life along more satisfying 
lines, positive self- change, and self- knowledge.
Regaining a sense of mastery involves cognitive control strategies, such as 
positive thinking and meditation, as well as behavioural control strategies, such as 
making dietary changes designed to decrease the likelihood of cancer recurrence, 
acquiring information about the disease so one can participate in and be knowledgeable 
about one’s care, or attempting to control treatment side- effects.
. Restoring self- esteem involves downward comparisons between oneself with 
others who are less fortunate in order to bolster self- enhancement, or upward 
comparisons with others who are doing better in order to learn how to cope more 
effectively. In addition, she found that those patients who were able to find meaning in
the experience, felt a sense of control, and restored self- esteem, were emotionally better 
adjusted than those who lacked these attributes (Figure 2).
These positive illusions, or mild distortions of reality, of self- enhancement and 
finding meaning, unrealistic optimism, and exaggerated perception of personal control, 
were considered beneficial in bringing about psychological adaptation and protective of 
mental health (Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000).
Control expectations
Finding meaning
Optimism and self­
esteem restoration
Psychological Adjustment
Figure 2. Diagram of components of the process of cognitive adaptation to 
threatening events.
Social- Cognitive Processing Models o f  Emotional Adjustment to Illness 
According to Lepore (2001), life- threatening illnesses such as cancer, can be classified 
as traumatic life events, that can profoundly and sometimes irrevocably alter patients’ 
lives. Cancer, in particular, can dissolve people's everyday assumptions about life. It can 
cause people to question core beliefs they hold about themselves, their relationships with 
others, and their future- beliefs that help people to maintain a sense of self- worth, 
predictability, coherence, and control in the world (Janoff- Bulman, 1992). By
challenging individuals' preexisting mental models of themselves and the world, cancer 
can take a major psychological toll. According to cognitive- processing theories, 
emotional distress associated with traumas is largely due to the discrepancy between 
people's mental models of themselves or the world and the meaning inherent in a trauma 
(Epstein, 1991). Confronting, contemplating, and reevaluating aversive, trauma- related 
stimuli may facilitate emotional adaptation by helping people to integrate novel, trauma- 
related information into preexisting mental models (Horowitz, 1986; Janoff-Bulman,
1992; McCann & Pearlman, 1990; Parkes, 1971; Rachman, 1980; van der Kolk & van 
derHart, 1991).
One way that patients may reduce dissonance created by traumatic events 
(between mental models and current information inherent in the trauma) is to initiate 
communication. A positive or supportive environment can enhance cognitive 
processing by enabling patients to contemplate and discuss trauma- related thoughts 
and feelings. Supportive others can suggest new and positive perspectives on a 
traumatic experience, provide information on how to cope, or encourage patients to 
accept their situation. Discussing traumas with supportive others and disclosing 
emotions to them might help patients to maintain or reestablish a coherent 
worldview, and increased control over negative emotional responses. Moreover, 
thoughts about cancer may be less distressing to patients with adequate social outlets, 
they may be in a better position to achieve cognitive and emotional resolution. In 
contrast, an unsupportive social network should impede cognitive processing and 
adjustment. Litz, Orsillo, Kaloupek, and Weathers (2000) have argued that lack of 
ability to experience or express emotions may be a marker of emotional numbing, 
that is in turn an emotional deficit associated with posttraumatic stress disorder.
Thus, low emotional expressivity and emotional numbing may be regarded as 
indicators of chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, where the patient tries to 
minimize the feelings associated with traumatic memories or exhibits conditioned 
“psychic analgesia” in response to uncontrollable and unpredictable aversive stimuli.
Kennedy- Moore and Watson (2001) have provided an additional social- 
cognitive theoretical framework for understanding how emotional expression can 
alleviate distress. These authors have noted the paradox of distress expression, where 
expression of negative feelings is both a sign of distress and a possible means of coping 
with that distress. They suggest that emotional expression is a means of processing and 
communicating information about the relationship between the self and the environment. 
Expression can enhance psychological well- being by helping patients to perceive their 
feelings as less frightening or unbearable, by fostering acceptance of painful feelings and 
by diminishing the frequency or emotional impact of intrusive thoughts about stressful 
events such as the illness experience. Moreover, expression can enhance patients’ well­
being by facilitating insight through construction of narratives about experience and 
articulation of feelings, and better recognition, elaboration, clarification and 
understanding of their inner subjective states. Expression can lead to new appraisals of 
past or present circumstances, or may enable patients to perceive some benefit from their 
suffering, achieve personal growth, gain a new appreciation for their own resilience in 
response to the trauma, and create meaning out of experience. Expression can affect 
interpersonal relationships, as well, and can elicit social support, comfort and 
reassurance, thus promoting psychological adjustment to illness.
Theories o f  Posttraumatic Stress
Horowitz (1976, 1986) is a pioneer in the field of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) due to his long-standing interest in the processing of thoughts, images, and 
moods related to loss and trauma. His theory has roots in psychodynamically 
informed observations of normal and abnormal bereavement reactions, and in a long 
tradition emphasizing people's development of individual assumptive worlds. 
Horowitz argued that when faced with trauma, people's initial response is outcry_ 
at the realization of the trauma. A second response is to try to assimilate the new 
trauma information with prior knowledge. At this point, many individuals 
experience a period of information overload during which they are unable to match 
their thoughts and memories of the trauma with the way that they represented meaning 
before the trauma. In response to this tension, psychological defense mechanisms are 
brought into play to avoid memories of the trauma and pace the extent to which it is 
recalled. For example, the individual may be in denial about the trauma, feel numb, 
or avoid reminders of it. However, the fundamental psychological need to reconcile new 
and old information means that trauma memories will actively break into consciousness 
in the form of intrusions, flashbacks, and nightmares. These consciously experienced 
trauma memories provide the individual with an opportunity to try to reconcile them 
with pretrauma representations.
It becomes apparent that, according to Horowitz, there are now two 
opposing processes at work: One to defend the individual by the suppression of 
trauma information and one to promote the working through of the traumatic 
material by bringing it to mind. Therefore, the individual oscillates between 
avoidance and intrusions of the trauma. This oscillation allows the traumatic
information to be worked through, and as this happens, the intensity of each phase 
decreases. In particular, longer term structures in memory representing the self or 
future goals can be adjusted so that they are consistent with the new data, at 
which point, trauma processing is considered to be completed. Failure to process 
the trauma information is proposed to lead to persistent posttraumatic reactions as the 
information remains in active memory and continues to intrude and be avoided.
Horowitz's work contains numerous important observations and has rightly been 
very influential. In particular, he was one of the first theorists to emphasize the impact of 
trauma on wider beliefs about the self, the world, and the future and to consider how 
recovery might involve far-reaching cognitive change. Recognizing this broader 
perspective and its ability to explain the breadth of beliefs and emotions encountered in 
PTSD, his theory was described as "social-cognitive" by Brewin, Dalgleish, and Joseph 
(1996). Areas not treated in any depth by his theory include the difference between 
flashbacks and ordinary memories of trauma, individual variations in trauma response, 
peri-traumatic reactions, the role of environmental factors such as trauma cues and social 
support, and how to distinguish remission of symptoms due to successful recovery from 
remission due to successful avoidance (e.g., Brewin, 2003; Litz, 1992).
Another model of traumatic information processing is Ehlers and Clark’s 
cognitive model. Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed that pathological responses to 
trauma arise when individuals process the traumatic information in a way that produces a 
sense of current threat, either an external threat to safety or an internal threat to the self 
and the future. The two major mechanisms that produce this effect involve negative 
appraisals of the trauma or its sequelae and the nature of the trauma memory itself.
Expanding on the work of Foa and Rothbaum (1998) and Jones and Barlow 
(1990), Ehlers and Clark identified a wide range of relevant negative appraisals. Some of 
these are focused on the traumatic event and signal overgeneralization of danger (e.g., 
"Others can see I am a victim") or negative appraisal of own actions (e.g., "I deserve 
that bad things happen to me"). Other appraisals focus on sequelae, such as the 
PTSD symptom of numbing ("I'll never be able to relate to people again"), other 
people's reactions ("They think I am too weak to cope on my own"), and life prospects 
("My body is ruined"). The different types of appraisal, variously involving danger, 
violation of standards by self or others, or loss, explain the variety of emotions reported 
by patients with PTSD.
Among factors that increase the likelihood of negative appraisals are thought 
processes during the trauma and prior beliefs and experiences. Ehlers and Clark 
identified a specific frame of mind they termed 'mental defeat'. This reaction, 
emphasizing the inability of the person to influence their fate, is a risk factor for such 
self-appraisals as being weak, ineffective, or unable to protect oneself. Prior experiences 
of traumatization, weakness, or helplessness also increase the risk of appraising oneself 
as unable to act effectively, as being extremely vulnerable to danger, as being the target 
of others' hostility, and so on. As well as discussing various ways in which appraisals 
can interact with the nature of the trauma memory, Ehlers and Clark developed a 
detailed account of the importance of maladaptive strategies or processes in 
maintaining the post traumatic stress disorder. Among the maladaptive cognitive 
styles, the persistent use of rumination in the form of intrusions was included.
Limitations of the Literature on Adjustment to Chronic Disease
Although the gap in the literature on adaptation to life- threatening disease will be 
described and reviewed in detail in the next Chapter 3, a short account of the limitations 
of the literature on adjustment to chronic disease would be useful at this point. The 
psychological theories and models of adjustment to chronic illness presented by now, 
have included existential meaning and emotional expressivity as important predictors of 
adjustment. However, little is known about the mechanisms for the effects of these 
predictors of adjustment to chronic disease. For example, it remains to be established 
whether negative appraisals of the illness- related trauma or adverse psychological 
responses (e.g., intrusions) to it exert their effect directly on adjustment, or they 
influence adjustment through existential meaning or emotional expressivity. In the 
former case, meaning and expressivity could act as moderator variables, so that for 
patients who have high levels of meaning or expressivity, adverse psychological 
responses (e. g., intrusions) and adjustment may be positively related. In the latter case, 
meaning and expressivity would act as mediator variables, which would transmit a 
portion of the effect of a prior variable (e.g., intrusions) onto a subsequent one (e.g., 
adjustment). Examining mediated and moderated relationships in adjustment to chronic 
disease would have important implications for intervention. Thus, it is imperative that 
moderated effects be distinguished from mediated ones.
CHAPTER 3
Psychological Adjustment to Breast Cancer
This chapter provides a review of the literature on psychological adjustment to 
breast cancer. Epidemiological characteristics of breast cancer, together with 
medical variables (such as disease staging and prognostication) that affect the 
impact of breast cancer are first discussed. The psychological impact of breast 
cancer and certain predictors of adjustment to breast cancer (such as intrusive 
thoughts, existential meaning, emotional expressivity, and coping) are then 
presented. In addition, the empirically validated models of psychological 
adjustment to breast cancer are described. Finally, the gap in the literature is 
identified and the way the proposed study is expected to contribute to the existing 
body of knowledge is explicated.
Disease- related Influences on Adjustment to Breast Cancer
Epidemiological Characteristics
Breast cancer has a major impact on the health of women. Approximately 180,000 
new cases of invasive breast cancer are diagnosed each year among women in the 
U.S. and nearly 41,000 women die of the disease (American Cancer Society, 2007). 
In American women, breast cancer is the most frequently diagnosed cancer and the 
second leading cause of cancer death. In women aged 40 to 55, breast cancer is the 
leading cause of all mortality. There has been a slight decline in breast cancer 
mortality overall, which can be attributed both to the success of early detection 
programs and to advances in treatment, particularly developments in systemic
therapy. In Europe, more than 360,000 women are diagnosed each year with breast 
cancer, while 129,000 women die each year of the disease (IARC, 2004).
In Greece, 4,543 new cases of women with breast cancer are diagnosed each 
year, and 1,569 women die of the disease (IARC, 2004). According to Figure 3, 
however, the age- standardized incidence rate (ASR- per 100,000) of breast cancer in 
Greece (using the World standard population) is low, compared to that o f other 
countries in Northern or Western Europe. The same holds true for breast cancer 
mortality in Greece.
Figure 3. Age- standardized incidence rate (per 100,000) of breast cancer in 
selected European countries.
Staging o f  Breast Cancer
Staging refers to the grouping of patients according to the extent of their disease. It 
is the process physicians use to assess the size and location of a patient’s cancer. 
Staging is useful in (1) determining the choice of treatment for individual patients,
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(2) estimating their prognosis, and (3) comparing the results of different treatment 
programs. Several tests may be performed to help stage breast cancer including 
clinical breast exams, biopsy, and certain imaging tests such as a chest x-ray, 
mammogram, bone scan, computed tomography (CT) scan, and magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) scan. Blood tests, used to evaluate a woman's overall health and 
detect whether the cancer has spread to certain organs, often follow imaging tests.. 
Currently, staging of cancer is determined by the American Joint Committee on 
Cancer (AJCC, 1997), which is jointly sponsored by the American Cancer Society 
and the American College of Surgeons. The AJCC system is a clinical and 
pathologic staging system and is based on the TNM system, in which T refers to 
tumor size, N to palpable nodes, and M to metastasis. The TNM system classifies 
the tumour by its size, site and spread.
Tumor size (T). The letter T followed by a number from 0 to 4 describes the 
tumor's size and whether it has spread to the skin or chest wall under the breast. 
Higher T numbers indicate a larger tumor and/or more extensive spread to tissues 
surrounding the breast. For example, T1 indicates a tumor of 2 cm or less in 
diameter, while T3 indicates a tumor of more than 5 cm in diameter.
Palpable nodes (N). The letter N followed by a number from 0 to 3 indicates 
whether the cancer has spread to lymph nodes near the breast and, if so, whether the 
affected nodes are fixed to other structures under the arm. For example, N1 indicates 
that cancer has spread to the movable ipsilateral axillary lymph nodes (underarm 
lymph nodes on same side of breast cancer), while N3 indicates that cancer has 
spread to the ipsilateral mammary lymph nodes or the ipsilateral (same side of body 
as breast cancer) supraclavicular lymph nodes.
Metastasis (M). The letter M followed by a 0 or 1 indicates whether or not 
the cancer has metastasized (spread) to distant organs (i.e., the lungs or bones) or to 
lymph nodes that are not next to the breast, such as those above the collarbone.
Numerical Stages o f Breast Cancer
The stage of a breast cancer describes its size and the extent to which it has spread. 
The staging system ranges from Stage 0 to Stage IV (International Union Against 
Cancer, 2002). The numbers 0 ,1, II, III and IV are used to denote the grouping of 
Ts, Ns, and Ms into stages, and each number refers to a possible combination of 
TNM factors (Table 1).
Table 1
Staging system for breast cancer
Stage Tumor (T) ; Node(N) i Metastasis (M) i
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Stage 1 T1 NO MO |
Stage IIA  j TO NO MO 1
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Stage 0. Cancer is localized, has not spread to any surrounding tissues and 
there is no evidence of cancer cells breaking out of the part of the breast in which it
started, or invading neighboring normal tissue.Stage I. The primary (original) cancer 
is 2 cm or less in diameter and has not spread to the lymph nodes. Stage I breast 
cancer treatment usually consists of breast conserving therapy (BCT), that is 
lumpectomy (removal of cancerous lump and small margin of surrounding normal 
tissue) and axillary node dissection (removal of underarm lymph nodes) followed by 
radiation, or modified radical mastectomy (removal of the affected breast) and 
axillary node dissection.
Stage II. The primary tumor is between 2 and 5 cm in diameter and has not 
spread to the lymph nodes (Stage IIA) and either has spread to the axillary 
(underarm) lymph nodes; or the primary tumor is over 5 cm and has not spread to the 
lymph nodes (Stage IIB). Common treatment for Stage II breast cancer is usually the 
same as Stage I treatment (lumpectomy and axillary node dissection or modified 
radical mastectomy), though radiation therapy is often necessary if the tumor is large 
or has already spread to the lymph nodes.
Stage III. Primary breast cancer has spread to the axillary (underarm) lymph 
nodes and to axillary tissues (Stage IIIA) or has spread to the pectoral (chest) lymph 
nodes (Stage IIIB). Standard Stage IIIA breast cancer treatment is modified radical 
mastectomy with or without breast reconstruction. Lumpectomy may be performed 
if the tumor may be cut free with one incision. Radiation and systemic therapy such 
as chemotherapy or hormonal therapy often follows surgery. If the tumor is large, 
neoadjuvant chemotherapy (combination of anticancer drugs administered prior to 
surgery to shrink the size of a tumor) may be provided, with or without hormonal 
therapy.
Stage IV. The primary cancer has spread out of the breast to other parts of the 
body (such as bone, lung, liver, brain). The treatment of Stage IV breast cancer
focuses on extending survival time and relieving symptoms. Systemic treatment 
(treatment that affects the entire body) such as chemotherapy, hormonal therapy or 
both is often recommended.
Breast Cancer Survival Rates by Stage
Health care professionals are able to predict patients’ mean survival rate based on the 
determined stage of breast cancer. Table 2 presents the 5- year survival rate for each 
stage of breast cancer, that is the percentage of patients who live at least 5 years after 
being diagnosed. Percentages will vary depending on individual medical situations.
Table 2
Survival rates fo r  various breast cancer stages
Stage
5-year Relative j 
Survival Rate j
s
0 100% 1
I 100% 1
J!
IIA 92% 1
i
IIB 81% |
IIIA 67% |
IIIB 54% |
!V 20% |
After seven years, the survival rate decreases for each stage. The average 
Stage I breast cancer survival rate is 92%. The Stage II survival rate is 71%, Stage
Ill survival rate is 39%, and the Stage IV survival rate is 11%. It is important to 
remember that these survival rates are based on averages. Some women with 
advanced breast cancer live significantly longer than seven years.
Prognostic and Predictive Factors
Some of the key decisions in the current management of primary breast cancer 
involve the need for prognostication and optimal selection of therapy. A prognostic 
factor is defined as a biologic or clinical measurement that is associated with disease- 
free or overall survival in the absence of adjuvant systemic therapy. A predictive 
factor is any measurement associated with response or lack of response to a 
particular therapy. Estrogen receptor status has been clearly shown to be a predictive 
factor for hormonal therapy, in both the adjuvant and metastatic disease settings. 
Prognostication is especially important in identifying patients whose prognoses are 
so favourable that adjuvant systemic therapy is unnecessary. Prognostic factors can 
also be useful in identifying patients whose prognoses with conventional treatment 
are so poor as to warrant consideration of more aggressive investigational therapies 
(Fitzgibbons et al., 2000; International Union Against Cancer, 2006).
The most established prognostic factor is the number of positive axillary 
lymph nodes. An adequate axillary dissection usually contains at least ten lymph 
nodes. As the number of involved lymph nodes increases, relapse rates increase, and 
survival rates decrease (Saez, MvGuire, & Clark, 1989).
Tumor size, one of the first prognostic variables accurately quantified, is also 
a valuable prognostic factor. Tumor size refers to the maximal size of the invasive 
component measured on microscopic sections. Tumor size correlates with the 
number of histologically involved nodes, but has independent prognostic
significance. Tumor size is particularly useful in patients with pathologically 
negative nodes. Patients with negative nodes and tumor size less than 1 cm have a 
favorable prognosis with a 10- year disease- free survival rate of about 90%. This 
appears true even for patients with mammographically detected cancers, except 
perhaps those showing casting-type calcifications (Tabar et al., 2000).
Tumor grade is commonly provided on pathology reports, and several 
investigators have demonstrated that it is an important prognostic factor in individual 
series. Histopathologic grade ranges from 1 (well- differentiated), through 2 
(moderately differentiated), 3 (poorly differentiated) to 4 (undifferentiated). Breast 
carcinoma tumors with a low- grade cytology have a more favourable prognosis.
The use of tumor grade, however, has been limited by poor reproducibility (Dalton, 
Page, & Dupont, 1994).
Among clinical factors, young patient age has been reported to be an adverse 
prognostic factor by some (Albain, Allred, & Clark, 1994), but not all, investigators. 
In two large studies, breast cancer patients younger than 35 years of age had a worse 
prognosis than older patients. In both studies, young patients were more likely than 
older patients to have adverse prognostic factors, but young age remained a 
significant prognostic factor in multivariate analysis. At the 1998 sixth International 
Conference on Adjuvant Therapy of Breast Cancer, young patient age was first 
recognized as an adverse prognostic factor (Goldhirsch et al., 1998).
Of the biochemical measurements, the most important is hormone receptor 
status, that is the presence or absence of estrogen receptors (ER) and progesterone 
receptors (PR) in the tumor. Although hormone receptor status correlates with 
prognosis, it does so only weakly. Furthermore, several studies have reported that
ER are a prognostic factor for 5-year disease-free survival, although curves tend to 
merge with longer follow-up (Adami, Graffman, Lindgren, & Sallstrom, 1985).
Quality o f Life and Supportive Care Issues
A growing emphasis has been placed on quality-of-life issues in women with breast 
cancer, and efforts have been made to minimize the physical and psychological side- 
effects that accompany breast cancer treatment. Modified radical mastectomy is still 
the most common surgical treatment for patients with invasive breast cancer. The 
term modified radical mastectomy is used to describe a variety of surgical 
procedures, but all involve complete removal of the breast, the underlying pectoral 
fascia, and some of the axillary nodes. However, breast conserving surgery has 
become more common. The goal of breast-conserving surgery is to minimize the 
risk of local recurrence while leaving the patient with a cosmetically acceptable 
breast. The most common form of breast-conserving surgery is referred to as 
lumpectomy. The surgical technique of lumpectomy differs from that used for 
mastectomy in that lumpectomy is not an en bloc cancer operation. Quadrantectomy 
is another type of breast-conserving surgery that is designed to remove an anatomic 
segment of breast tissue and frequently includes removal of the overlying skin and 
underlying pectoral fascia. Because excision of a large amount of breast tissue is the 
major factor responsible for a poor cosmetic outcome after BCT, lumpectomy is 
considered the appropriate initial surgical approach in the United States. Other 
surgical factors that influence the cosmetic appearance are size and placement of 
incision, management of lumpectomy cavity, and extent of axillary dissection 
(Coates et al., 1987; Tao & Ganz, 2000; Winer, 1994).
Many of the newer chemotherapy and hormonal agents have fewer side 
effects (such as nausea, vomiting, bone marrow depression, alopecia, ulceration, 
diarrhea), or at least a more manageable side-effect profile than agents that were 
available a decade ago. In many ways, the emphasis on single-agent therapy can be 
viewed as a step forward from a quality-of-life standpoint. There is also an ongoing 
effort to make breast cancer treatment more convenient for patients. Virtually all 
therapy is administered in the outpatient setting, and there is a growing interest in the 
development of oral chemotherapeutic agents. Patient surveys have documented a 
strong preference for oral treatment, but only if the oral therapy can be administered 
without compromising efficacy (DeMario & Ratain, 1999).
With heightened interest in quality-of-life issues, there has also been a greater 
emphasis on supportive care measures. There is a growing awareness of fatigue, its 
relationship with anaemia, and potential benefits of treatment with erythropoietin 
(Demetri, Kris, Wade, & Celia, 1998). Nausea and vomiting, while still a problem 
with many chemotherapy regimens, are far better controlled with judicious use of 
some of the newer antiemetic agents (Gralla et al., 1999). While availability of these 
newer supportive care measures represents a major advance in the care of women 
with breast cancer, the clinician needs to weigh carefully the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these supportive care interventions.
Psychosocial Dimensions of Breast Cancer
Breast cancer is a major public- health problem for women internationally. The 
extraordinarily stressful aspects of the disease and its treatment have made research 
on its psychological effects a high priority. Early research on the psychological
effects of breast cancer dealt with a disease that typically had a relatively poor 
prognosis and was treated with aggressive forms of surgery (e.g., total mastectomy) 
and adjuvant therapies (e.g., chemotherapy) that were accompanied by debilitating 
negative side effects. The picture of psychological adjustment to breast cancer 
offered by early studies was, not surprisingly, one characterized by significant 
distress and trauma. Notable advances in early detection, diagnostic methods, and 
surgical and medical treatments have improved the prognosis of the disease, and new 
forms of treatment (e.g., anti-emetic medications) have dramatically reduced adverse 
side effects that formerly plagued many patients. Approximately 50% of women 
with breast cancer can now expect to survive at least 15 years, and over 95% of 
women with localized disease will survive five years or more (American Cancer 
Society, 2001). Despite these advances, however, the diagnosis of, treatment of, and 
recovery from breast cancer remain highly stressful. Psychological research has 
played an essential role in helping investigators understand the impact of breast 
cancer on the lives of patients and their families, identify predictors of adjustment to 
breast cancer, develop interventions to decrease distress and enhance quality of life, 
and understand possible relationships between psychological factors and biological 
disease processes. In addition, research on the psychological aspects of breast cancer 
provides a valuable paradigm for studying coping with health-related stress in 
general.
Psychological Impact o f Breast Cancer
In her now classic review, Meyerowitz (1980) delineated the psychosocial impact of 
breast cancer in three broad areas: psychological discomfort (anxiety, depression and 
anger); changes in life patterns (including insomnia, recurrent nightmares, loss of
appetite, inability to concentrate, difficulty in returning to usual household chores, 
changes in intimate relationships, consequent to physical discomfort, marital, or 
sexual disruption, and altered activity level); and fears and concerns (mastectomy/ 
loss of breast, fear of loss of femininity, fear of recurrence and death). Although 
women diagnosed today may have many more treatment options, the psychological 
concerns remain the same. In addition to these variables, the life stage at which the 
cancer occurs, previous emotional stability (personality and coping style), and the 
presence of interpersonal support should be included.
The psychological effects of breast cancer have been documented by using 
patients’ self-reported mood and psychological symptoms to assess their 
psychological distress, sexual functioning, and overall quality of life; more rarely, 
investigators have used structured diagnostic interviews to assess psychiatric 
diagnoses. Findings indicate that diagnosis of breast cancer is associated with 
heightened levels of negative emotions and psychological distress, especially 
symptoms of anxiety and depression. Elevated symptoms of anxiety and depression 
near the time of diagnosis are typically reported in 30% to 40% of patients, a rate that 
is approximately three to four times that found in the general population (e.g., 
Epping-Jordan et al., 1999). Rates of psychiatric diagnoses among breast cancer 
patients are less clear, as studies have varied widely in the methods used. Evidence 
suggests, however, that the rates of psychiatric diagnoses may not differ from those 
found in community studies. For example, Andrykowski, Cordova, Studts, and 
Miller (1998) found that rates of posttraumatic stress disorder (6% current and 4% 
lifetime) among newly diagnosed patients were comparable to rates in the general 
population. There is considerable evidence that breast cancer and its treatment are 
associated with problems concerning body image, sexuality, and sexual functioning.
For example, a recent study reported that women who had received simple 
mastectomy with reconstructive surgery had better body image than women who had 
undergone simple mastectomy without reconstruction and women who had received 
conservative surgery (Nicholson, Leinster, & Sassoon, 2007). These findings are 
consistent with results of a meta-analysis that found that lumpectomy (which 
conserves the breast) was associated with small but significant advantages in body 
image and sexual adjustment compared with mastectomy (Moyer, 1997). Prospective 
studies in which symptoms of psychological distress are measured at multiple points 
during treatment have provided a relatively consistent picture of the course of 
adjustment to breast cancer: Psychological distress is highest near the time of 
diagnosis and declines over the ensuing months (e.g., Carver et al., 1993; Epping- 
Jordan et al., 1999). The steepest drop in distress occurs during the first 3 months 
after diagnosis and surgery, or before the completion of adjuvant therapy for most 
patients. However, although the mean level of distress generally declines over the 
course of treatment and recovery, some patients continue to experience high levels of 
anxiety and depression many months or even years after diagnosis.
Medical Variables Affecting Psychosocial Impact to Breast Cancer 
The stage of breast cancer at diagnosis, the treatment required, the prognosis, and the 
rehabilitative opportunities available constitute the medical variables that influence 
psychological adjustment. Central, however, is the relationship to the supportive 
surgeon, radiotherapist, or oncologist, who, ideally, is sensitive to the concerns of 
the patient, communicates clearly, and monitors emotional as well as physical . 
well-being. Both the expanded length and intensity of treatments and recognition that 
women treated for breast cancer must be followed for the remainder of their lives
have placed an added burden on health care providers who are expected to provide 
support across the course of care, often involving years of follow-up.
Mastectomy. Because it was for so long the standard treatment for breast 
cancer, and still continues to be recommended for large numbers of women, there is 
considerable research on the impact of loss of one or both breasts on women's 
physical, social, and emotional functioning. Among the effects documented 
are feelings of mutilation and altered body image, diminished self-worth, loss of a 
sense of femininity, decrease in sexual attractiveness and function, anxiety, 
depression, hopelessness, guilt, shame, fear of recurrence, abandonment, and death 
(Lewis & Bloom, 1978). While mourning for the loss of a cherished body part 
and the threat to life are universal, the extent to which other sequelae are 
experienced appears variable. Early research indicated that anywhere from 10% 
to 56% of women studied one to two years after mastectomy experienced some 
degree of social or emotional impairment (Maguire et al., 1978). However, a large 
prospective study found that women who are well adjusted before they have a 
mastectomy, and whose disease is in an early stage, can expect at one year to have a 
quality of life equal to that of unaffected peers, a finding since replicated in other 
controlled studies (Hughson, Cooper, McArdle, & Smith, 1988). In addition to more 
advanced disease, other predictors of poorer adaptation in this study were additional 
concurrent illness or stress, expectation of poor support from others, and a tendency to 
perceive events in life as less under one's own control. Research projects suggest that 
while most women report improvement in emotional and physical well-being over 
time, for a significant minority (20%-25%) problems may persist beyond two 
years post treatment (Irvine et al., 1991).
Adjuvant chemotherapy. The news that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed 
demands psychological adjustment to yet another mode of treatment). This 
involves a lengthened treatment period, and awareness of the threat to life implicit 
in the need for systemic therapy. Some women in this group describe their early weeks 
of treatment as having been characterized by "one piece of bad news after 
another." Deciding whether or not to undergo adjuvant treatment, and if  more 
than one treatment is proposed choosing which drugs or protocol, constitutes the 
third decision point in the course of cancer (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984).
Anticipation of chemotherapy can be difficult. Women's fears of the side effects 
arise from knowledge of the distressing sequelae of chemotherapy. Since many 
women with node-negative early stage breast cancer now receive some form of 
adjuvant therapy, the association of these treatments with "more serious disease" has 
diminished. Women anticipating and undergoing adjuvant therapy are told the 
specific drugs they will receive, and the transient nature of drug side effects. Despite 
having fears, few women refuse treatment, and most comply with their regimen 
(Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984). Reactive anxiety and depression identified 
should be treated to assist in the woman's adjustment.
Meyerowitz and colleagues (1983) studied women with breast cancer during 
chemotherapy and two years after completing it. Among those disease free at two 
years, 23% reported difficulty with personal and family relationships during treatment, 
and 44% had continuing physical problems two years later.. Despite this, 89% stated 
they would recommend adjuvant chemotherapy to friends in a similar situation. Many 
reported that they had coped with treatment by "staying busy," "getting information 
about the treatment," and "keeping a positive, hopeful outlook." In this study, 41% 
of women reported that the treatment had been easier than they expected. Clinical
experience suggests that some women cope with the short-term adverse psychological 
effects by focusing on delayed benefits (e.g. reassurance that they have done everything 
possible to eradicate their disease).
Nausea and vomiting, once common side effects of adjuvant chemotherapy, 
feared and dreaded by patients, are now well-controlled with pharmacologic and 
behavioral interventions. However, three additional troublesome side effects of 
adjuvant therapy that have psychological consequences have received less attention. 
These include hair loss, weight gain, and problems with concentration. While 
anticipated, the impact of alopecia for women undergoing chemotherapy is often 
devastating. Some women report this as more distressing than the breast surgery itself, 
in part because it is a visible indicator of disease but also because it is overtly 
disfiguring. Early discussion of the expected changes, information about wigs, and 
referral to the American Cancer Society sponsored Look G ood . . . Feel Better 
program can all help reduce distress caused by hair loss (Manne, Girasek, & 
Ambrosino, 1994).
Difficulty with concentration and memory are also reported by many women 
undergoing chemotherapy. Not well researched or clearly documented, these 
symptoms may be associated with the stress of illness, antiemetic drugs, and the 
chemotherapy itself, and possibly with hormonal changes secondary to chemotherapy- 
induced menopause (Wieneke & Dienst, 1995).
A final troublesome effect of chemotherapy in younger women is premature 
menopause (Schover, 1994). The threatened or actual loss of fertility and acute onset 
of menopause anticipated with adjuvant treatment often causes distress in the woman 
who is premenopausal at diagnosis. The hot flashes, nightsweats, and vaginal dryness 
and atrophy caused by chemotherapy-induced menopause produce severe discomfort.
The latter symptoms may lead to dyspareunia. While instruction in the use o f vaginal 
lubricants is helpful, thinning of the vaginal mucosa may still result in irritation on 
intercourse. A further effect of chemotherapy is loss of libido likely associated with a 
reduction in circulating androgens (Kaplan, 1992). For many women loss of desire is 
the most difficult sequela to treat.
Comparisons between Cancer Patients and Healthy Women regarding Psychological 
Well- being and Quality o f life
In a meta- analytical review of the literature on psychological and psychiatric 
problems in patients with cancer, Van’t Spijker, Trijsburg, and Duivenvoorden 
(1997) concluded that, with the exception of depression, the amount of psychological 
and psychiatric problems in patients with cancer does not differ significantly from 
the normal population. In a longitudinal study, Schroevers, Ranchor, and Sanderman 
(2006) examined the long- term impact of a diagnosis of cancer on physical and 
psychological functioning, by comparing 8-year cancer survivors with breast, 
colorectal, lung, or gynaecological cancer, to a randomly selected sample of similar- 
aged references without cancer in the Netherlands. They found that cancer survivors 
and references did not differ significantly in the level of depressive symptoms, 
anxiety, life satisfaction, self- esteem, social support, and marital satisfaction. 
However, survivors reported more physical symptoms (e.g., fatigue, arm problems, 
decreased sexual interest) and those with a recurrence of cancer also reported more 
limitations in household and social activities. The qualitative data of this 
longitudinal study also demonstrated a fear of recurrence in survivors as well as the 
experience of positive consequences (e.g., taking life less for granted). In
interpreting their results, these authors suggested that adult cancer survivors may be 
remarkably resilient in the face of adversity.
Komblith et al. (2003) studied the long- term impact of breast carcinoma and 
its treatment in 153 breast cancer survivors previously treated on a randomized trial, 
a median of 20 years after entry to the trial. Although the majority of breast 
carcinoma survivors demonstrated a remarkable recovery from their cancer diagnosis 
and treatment, a subset of survivors reported a range of cancer- related emotional 
problems that included posttraumatic stress disorder (4.6%) due to physical 
problems. Survivors also experienced sexual problems (29%) attributed to cancer 
such as feeling sexually unattractive and decreased sexual interest and activity.
Long- term consequences also included conditioned responses of nausea and 
vomiting or distress due to experiencing reminders of their treatment in terms of 
smell (8%), sight (17%) or taste (7%), and long- term medical sequelae of 
lymphedema (39%) and numbness (33%) in the hands, chest, or feet, as a result of 
mastectomy and axillary lymph node dissection, or due to chemotherapeutic 
regimens.
Dorval et al. (1998) compared eight year breast cancer survivors with 
population controls on long-term quality of life. They found that no significant 
differences existed between survivors and controls with respect to psychologic (i.e., 
psychologic distress and symptoms) and social dimensions. However, survivors 
reported more arm problems (swelling, loss of sensation) and dissatisfaction with 
sexual life.
In another investigation, Tomich and Helgeson (2002) studied quality of life 
and psychological well- being of breast cancer survivors 5 years post- diagnosis, in 
comparison to age- matched healthy control women. Cancer survivors perceived the
world as less controllable and more random compared to healthy women. A sense of 
purpose was associated with better mental functioning in cancer survivors. Having a 
sense of purpose in life was the strongest correlate of quality of life for both 
survivors and healthy women.
Thus, long- term breast cancer survivors demonstrate a remarkable 
psychological recovery from their illness. The impact of breast cancer on survivors’ 
adjustment is minimal. Any long- term psychologic sequelae on adjustment relate to 
the side- effects of cancer treatment (e.g., lymphedema, conditioned nausea and 
emesis, fatigue, sexual dysfunction).
Predictors o f Adjustment to Breast Cancer
The process and course of adjustment to breast cancer have been studied in relation 
to five broad factors: characteristics of the disease, characteristics of the patient, 
social relationships and interpersonal resources, cognitive appraisals and attributions 
(e.g., perceptions of the disease and its causes, sense of control over the course of the 
disease), and coping methods. These factors have been examined in prospective 
studies to determine their contribution to increases or decreases in psychological 
symptoms and quality of life over the course of diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. 
There is little evidence of a direct association of psychological distress with disease 
prognosis and type of treatment (e.g., surgical procedures, chemotherapy). The 
association between disease characteristics and psychological distress is far from 
simple, however, as it may change over the course of treatment and recovery. For 
example, one study (Compas et al., 1999) found that cancer stage (as an indicator of 
severity of the disease) was not associated with distress near the time of diagnosis, 
but was related to distress 6 months later. These findings suggest that patients’
prognoses may become more salient once treatment is completed, as patients with a 
positive prognosis may recover psychologically more rapidly than patients with a 
poor prognosis and greater risk of recurrence. Patients’ characteristics that have been 
examined as predictors of distress include demographic factors (e.g., age, education) 
and personality characteristics (e.g., optimism). There is consistent evidence that age 
is inversely related to distress, such that younger women report more symptoms of 
anxiety and depression than older women (Stanton et al., 2000). Less formal 
education is associated with poorer psychological adjustment, including attempts to 
cope with the stress of breast cancer by avoiding emotions, thoughts, or information 
related to the disease (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999). Among the various personality 
characteristics that have been studied, dispositional optimism, or the tendency to 
expect positive outcomes, has been most consistently associated with lower 
symptoms of anxiety and depression and higher quality of life (e.g., Carver et al., 
1993; Epping-Jordan et al., 1999). In addition to patients’ personal characteristics, 
social relationships and interpersonal resources available to patients are associated 
with the course of adjustment to breast cancer. Foremost among these resources is 
the quality of social support available to women during their treatment and recovery. 
Emotional support (other individuals’ verbal and nonverbal communication of caring 
and concern for the patient) shows the most consistent relationship to lower distress 
and higher quality of life. Evidence for beneficial effects of emotional support has 
been stronger in descriptive studies of naturally occurring support in patients’ lives 
than in studies of the effects of peer-led support groups (Helgeson & Cohen, 1996). 
Cognitive processes, including the patient’s thoughts concerning her control over the 
disease or role in causing it, are also central in adaptation to breast cancer. As we 
have already noted, holding relatively optimistic beliefs about future outcomes is
associated with better psychological adjustment (Carver et al.5 1993). The tendency 
to attribute one’s cancer to one’s own stable characteristics (characterological self­
blame) or to one’s behavior is related to higher current psychological distress, and 
characterological self-blame is uniquely related to increases in distress over time.
The ways that patients attempt to cope with their disease and the effects of treatment 
are central in determining the course of psychological distress and adjustment. 
Coping methods that involve disengagement from (avoidance of) the source of stress 
or one’s negative emotions are predictive of poorer psychological adjustment and 
poorer health outcomes (e.g., Carver et al., 1993; Epping-Jordan et al., 1999). In 
contrast, coping methods that reflect engagement with the stressor and one’s 
emotions are generally related to more positive psychological outcomes (e.g., Carver 
et al., 1993; Stanton et al., 2000). Furthermore, coping responses function as both 
mediators and moderators 3 of the effects of other factors on adjustment. At least two 
prospective studies have found that coping mediates the relationship between 
optimism and distress—optimism is associated with greater acceptance and humor, 
and pessimism is associated with greater avoidance and wishful thinking (Carver et 
al., 1993; Epping- Jordan et al., 1999), and these differences in coping style are in 
turn associated with different levels of distress. Coping also moderates the 
association between perceptions of personal control and distress in adjustment to 
breast cancer (Osowiecki & Compas, 1999). Distress is lowest when patients who 
have a sense of personal control over their cancer cope by using active, problem- 
oriented methods of coping. Research on predictors of adjustment to breast cancer 
has identified a set of processes that warrant attention in research on adaptation to 
other health-related stressors.
Intrusive thoughts. Diagnosis of breast cancer is accompanied by a host of 
concerns and problems, which can include side effects from treatment, fear of 
disease progression or recurrence, worries about dependency on others, disruption to 
family and social life, and threats to self- esteem and body image. The breast cancer 
experience consists of a series of events beginning with cancer detection and 
diagnosis, proceeding through active medical treatment, and concluding with post­
treatment recovery and monitoring. Following completion of active treatment and 
recovery, patients face uncertainty about the future, about recurrence and cancer 
progression. Intrusive thoughts about cancer diagnosis or recurrence, recurrent 
imagery associated with having experienced cancer treatment or its side- effects 
(e.g., mutilation, hair loss, pain, lymphedema, nausea) are often reported (Smith, 
Redd, Peyser, & Vogl, 1999). Moreover, diagnosis of breast cancer may differ from 
other types of traumatic events, such as surviving a natural disaster, in depleting 
stress- buffering resources such as optimism or global meaning. Having a life- 
threatening illness such as cancer engages the sufferer in ongoing threat, anchored in 
the present and future (e.g. recurrence, metastasis, progressive deterioration, and 
ensuing death), rather than in the past, while the threat arises from one’s own body, 
rather than from an external source, thus contributing to its perceived inescapability 
(Gurevich et al., 2002). Furthermore, breast cancer may have unique psychological 
effects, since its course is often unpredictable, its prognosis is uncertain, and its 
treatment can include visible disfigurement, pain or disability.
According to Glinder, Beckjord, Kaiser, and Compas (2007) negative 
intmsive thoughts are involved in adaptation to the stress of diagnosis and treatment 
of breast cancer. They are automatic involuntary responses to stress experienced by 
many breast cancer patients (Andrykowski et al., 2000; Primo et al., 2000), can occur
rapidly, and typically, are experienced by the patient as uncontrollable. Intrusive 
thoughts and rumination are oriented toward the source of stress by attending to and 
processing threat- relevant information, and are characterized by engagement with 
the source of stress. Intrusive thoughts, as automatic engagement stress responses 
are associated with increased emotional distress and have been shown to be 
maladaptive (Andrykowski et al., 1998). Intrusive thoughts related to breast cancer 
were correlated positively with anxiety and depression symptoms, and 
disengagement coping (e.g., denial, wishful thinking), while they were correlated 
negatively with positive affect, and primary and secondary control engagement 
coping (e.g., emotional expression, cognitive restructuring, positive thinking)
(Glinder et al., 2007). In that study, fewer reports of intrusive thoughts were also 
correlated with greater attentional bias to supraliminally presented cancer- related 
words (a bias that was regarded as adaptive).
Existential meaning. Coming to terms with meaning issues is an important 
factor in the theoretical approaches to illness and health (e.g., Park & Folkman,
1997). However, existential meaning has also been the focus of empirical 
investigation. A number of research studies have provided validation for the 
inclusion of existential meaning in theoretical models of health and illness (Park & 
Folkman, 1997; Vickberg et al., 2000). In regard to cancer patients, several 
investigations found cancer patients frequently mentioning that existential meaning 
was an important issue for them during the illness (Coward, 2000; Ryff & Singer,
1998). One study reported that "finding meaning in life" was identified as a concern 
by 42% of cancer patients, and that "the meaning of life" was an issue for 28% of 
patients (Moadel et al., 1999). Mast (1998) showed that women with a breast
cancer diagnosis who reported a cognitive reappraisal of life meaning and values 
had lower levels of emotional distress than women who had not re-appraised the 
diagnosis. Aside from qualitative accounts, several quantitative studies reported 
existential meaning to be an important factor in a person's psychological well-being, 
efforts at prevention of illness, and successful life transitions (Fife, 1995; Reker, 
Peacock, & Wong, 1987; Shek, 1992). On the contrary, the absence of meaning and 
purpose in life has been associated, among others, with higher levels of depression 
(Wong, 1998) and suicidality (Harlow, Newcomb, & Bentler, 1986). Even though 
empirical findings about existential meaning and illness are not abundant, most 
studies reported a positive relationship between having a high sense of existential 
meaning and better overall psychological well-being (Reker & Chamberlain, 2000).
Since most of the research on meaning has focused on a lack of meaning or a 
threat to meaning level, it could easily be assumed that a challenge to a person's 
sense of existential meaning always implies that the person has to struggle with a 
lack of meaningfulness. However, some researchers have reported findings to the 
contrary. Even though the common assumption in the field of psycho-oncology is 
that having breast cancer causes significant psychological distress for women (Suinn 
& VandenBos, 1999), researchers have also identified a positive effect of a cancer 
diagnosis on a person's overall sense of existential meaning. Pelusi (1997) reported 
that the experience of cancer can actually add to perceived meaning in life for the 
patient. This potentially "positive" effect of an illness could be explained by 
research showing that successfully living through a life-changing or traumatic 
experience did increase meaning levels for individuals (Wong & Fry, 1998).
Thus, existential meaning has been considered as an important variable to be 
included in the study of psychosocial adaptation to cancer. Nicholas and Veach
(2000) proposed one of the most comprehensive models in psycho-oncology. So far, 
this model has theoretical and clinical support, but more empirical data are needed 
for it. The authors suggested convergence of three broad classes of variables on 
current psychosocial adaptation: patient-derived variables (past history, 
demographics, intra-and interpersonal variables) interact with cancer-derived 
variables (type, stage, prognosis, clinical course, disability) and life context (culture, 
health-related schema, developmental stage) to determine the patient's overall 
reaction to cancer-related stressors. Thus, improved psychosocial adaptation 
contributes to overall quality of life.
Empirical findings. Theories on illness, health, and coping have addressed 
the importance of meaning issues for individuals (Coward, 2000; Janoff-Bulman & 
McPherson, 1997; Park & Folkman, 1997). Even though in past models existential 
meaning was not included as a variable, studies in other areas such as trauma, 
substance abuse, and aging (Reker & Chamberlain, 2000) have revealed that there is 
a strong connection between levels of existential meaning and psychological well­
being. In fact, psychological well-being was positively correlated with level of 
existential meaning in most of the previous studies on meaning as summarized by 
Wong and Fry (1998). Wong (1998) studied 335 adults of all ages in a study with the 
Personal Meaning Profile and the Perceived Well-Being scale (PWB) (Reker & 
Wong, 1984). PWB scores showed a significant positive correlation with Personal 
Meaning Profile (PMP) scores. The study concluded that personal meaning played a 
mediating role in psychological well-being in this study.
Further support for the mediating role of existential meaning can be drawn 
from two cancer studies. Vickberg et al. (2000, 2001) conducted two studies with a 
global meaning factor. One of these studies investigated the level of psychological
distress in leukemia patients after bone marrow transplantation. Eighty-five patients 
were interviewed by phone and regression analyses revealed that after controlling for 
physical functioning, stressor severity, and gender, it was global meaning that was 
significantly negatively correlated with overall and surgery-related distress. On the 
other hand, global meaning and emotional and social functioning dimensions were 
positively correlated at r= .30 (p < .01). The instrument used to assess meaning in 
this study was the LAP-R (Reker, 1999).
In the second study, Vickberg et al. (2000) conducted phone interviews with 
61 breast cancer patients two to fifteen years past diagnosis and in every stage of the 
disease to test the hypothesis that the global meaning level moderates the effect of 
intrusive thoughts on psychological well-being. Researchers employed the LAP-R 
(Reker, 1992) for their study. They used hierarchical regression analyses to control 
for potentially confounding variables, such as marital status and income level. 
Consistent with the research hypothesis, intrusive thoughts were positively 
correlated with psychological distress in a group of patients who had endorsed low 
meaning. For the high meaning group, there was no correlation between intrusive 
thoughts and psychological distress. Unfortunately, both studies had fairly small 
sample sizes and could only mark the beginning of the study of existential meaning 
in cancer populations. Therefore, there is need to continue and expand the empirical 
investigation of existential meaning in relation to psychological well-being and 
quality of life in breast cancer patients.
Emotional expressivity. Diagnosis and treatment of cancer significantly alter 
patients’ lives, causing them to question core beliefs about themselves and the world 
in which they live, often resulting in significant psychological distress. Intrusive
thoughts and images surrounding stressful health- related events inevitably begin to 
suffuse conscious awareness, breaking through avoidance- based coping mechanisms 
(Horowitz, 1986). Confrontation with intrusive thoughts and images tied to the 
stressful events is necessary for effective adaptation. Confrontation avails the 
opportunity to reinterpret, contemplate confusing and threatening aspects of the 
stressful experience, consequently fostering harmonization of present information 
and preexisting schemas. One way to actively confront intrusive cognitions and 
engage in cognitive processing is through emotional expression (Lepore, 2001). 
Repeated emotional expression accompanying recurrent intrusive thoughts may lead 
to habituation and distress reduction. Another possible mechanism that could 
account for distress reduction due to emotional expressivity is provision of social 
support. Expressing one’s emotions may make available informational resources 
regarding the stressful experience, by eliciting helpful responses form others 
(Zakowski et al., 2001).
Empirical findings. Expressive coping has been found to predict 
psychological adjustment to breast cancer. In a sample of 92 women diagnosed 
with Stage I or II breast cancer, recruited within 5 months after completion of 
medical treatment, Stanton et al. (2000) found that emotional expression was 
negatively associated with psychological distress. Moreover, expression of 
negative emotion has been found to moderate relations between intrusions and 
distress, in patients diagnosed and treated for cancer within five years since 
diagnosis (Quartana et al., 2006). Zakowski et al. (2001) argued that emotional 
expressivity might moderate relations between intrusive cognitions and 
psychological distress. Barriers to emotional expression may be regarded as
internal constraints that may inhibit cognitive processing of traumatic events, thus 
leading to poor mental health and adjustment.
Coping. Whenever an individual faces an illness such as breast cancer, 
demands for coping are also immediately placed on the individual (Stanton et al., 
2000). In their seminal study on coping and cancer patients, Weisman and Worden 
(1976) defined coping as "what one does about a perceived problem in order to bring 
about relief, reward, quiescence, or equilibrium" (p. 27). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) 
extended this definition to include "the constantly changing cognitive and behavioral 
efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as 
taxing or exceeding the resources of the person" (p. 141). Flowever, aside from the 
seminal work by Lazarus and Folkman, other theoretical approaches to coping have 
included a look at coping as a defensive ego mechanism (Vaillant, 1977), a 
personality trait, a result of the cognitive appraisal of a specific situation (Aldwin, 
1994), and coping as a perceptual style (Roth & Cohen, 1986).
The inclusion of coping as a construct in this study posed a challenge as well 
as it provided a promise. The challenge was methodological and the promise 
theoretical in nature. One of the widely acknowledged difficulties with the construct 
of coping is that it has been operationalized and defined in several different ways 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Goldstein & Antoni, 1989; Holland, 1998). Thus, 
results of coping studies with breast cancer patients oftentimes cannot be compared 
to each other due to the use of different constructs. Therefore, it seems important to 
choose a coping construct that has been extensively used and validated in the psycho­
oncology literature.
Many of the psychosocially oriented studies on breast cancer have made use 
of either the Mental Adjustment to Cancer scale (MAC) (Watson et al., 1988) or the 
Ways of Coping Inventory (WOC) (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Even though the 
WOC scale has been equally as widely used as the MAC, one of the main 
advantages of the MAC is that it measures styles of coping with cancer, that are 
relatively enduring and characteristic ways of responding to stressful situations 
pertaining to cancer.
However, MAC has been used to measure a diversity of concepts ranging 
from patients’ adjustment to cancer (Osbome et al., 1999) to coping strategies 
(Schwartz et al., 1992). In the present study, a shortened version of MAC was used 
to measure styles of coping with cancer.
Empirical findings. In regards to psycho-oncology and coping, coping 
models abound in the literature on breast cancer (Suinn & VandenBos, 1999). 
Depending on the particular coping model in use, findings on coping strategies in 
breast cancer patients vary. Research identified avoidant coping as a negative 
mechanism in that it is associated with increased levels of psychological distress 
(Aldwin & Revenson, 1987). However, in another study, emotionally expressive 
coping was positively correlated with improved psychological and physical 
adjustment to breast cancer (Stanton et al., 2000). The construct of coping has been 
employed both as a predictor and a mediator variable in models of psychosocial 
adjustment to cancer (Stanton et al., 2000). Other studies supported the mediating 
role of coping in psychological adjustment to breast cancer. Carver et al. (1993) 
investigated the relationship between optimism and mood disturbance. No d irect. 
association was found between the two constructs, yet they were indirectly related 
through mediation by coping processes (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989).
Zabalegui (1999) provided yet another strengthening argument for the mediating 
role of coping. Studying 132 patients with advanced breast, lung, colorectal, and 
other cancers, the author found that lower levels of psychological distress were 
clearly associated with particular coping styles. Positive correlations were reported 
between psychological distress and cognitive and behavioral escape avoidance, but 
negative correlations between distress and distancing confirmed previous findings of 
the positive effect of coping through distancing (Dunkel-Schetter et al., 1992). Some 
studies employed coping as a predictor rather than a mediator (Clutton, Pakenham,
& Buckley, 1999; Ell et al., 1989; McCaul et al., 1999). One of these studies 
(McCaul et al., 1999) showed the primacy of coping processes when predictors of 
psychological distress and quality of life were concerned. In fact, it was those women 
who used mostly avoidant coping who were the most distressed as well.
Coping as measured by MAC has been associated with better psychological 
adjustment to breast cancer (Schnoll et al., 1998a) and less distress and improved 
quality of life (Schnoll et al., 1998b). In a sample of women with metastatic or 
recurrent breast cancer, fighting spirit was found to be associated with better 
adjustment (Classen, Koopman, Angell, & Spiegel, 1996). Cotton et al. (1999) found 
that anxious preoccupation and helplessness/ hopelessnesss were negatively 
correlated with quality of life in a sample of women diagnosed with invasive breast 
cancer or with a recurrence or metastatic disease. In a Japanese study with breast 
cancer patients, three months after diagnosis of first recurrence, Okano et al. (2001) 
found that the presence of a history of major depression was associated with lower 
levels of fighting spirit and higher levels of helplessness/ hopelessness. In a study 
with women mostly diagnosed with early stage breast cancer and treated for their 
disease, Schou et al. (2005) found that fighting spirit and helplessness/ hopelessness
mediated the relationship between optimism and psychosocial functional status. 
Optimistic women appeared to respond to greater degree with fighting spirit, which 
was associated with better emotional functioning and global health quality of life. 
While, pessimistic women responded with a greater degree of helplessness/ 
hopelessness, which was associated with poorer emotional and social functioning and 
global health quality of life.
Regardless of the particular role given to coping in research studies 
(predictor versus mediator), all of the reviewed studies showed a strong association 
between coping processes and either quality of life or psychological well-being.
Most studies harbored support for the mediating over the predictive role of coping in 
psychological adjustment to breast cancer. Therefore, the approach taken by this 
study hypothesized that coping processes will function as a mediator for the effects 
of predictor variables (intrusive thoughts and negative psychological responses to 
cancer).
Empirically Validated Models of Psychological Adjustment to Breast Cancer
As the previous review of individual factors in adjustment already indicated, 
research on psychological adjustment of breast cancer patients has relied extensively 
on studies with several related variables. Research in psycho-oncology has moved 
from studying linear relationships among two or three factors to investigating 
integrated models of complex interactions among a large number of factors affecting 
a patient’s well-being (Schnoll et al., 1998b; Stanton & Snider, 1993). For purposes 
of this study, these models were categorized into models without a meaning or 
expressivity component and models that included a meaning and expressivity 
component. On another trajectory, existing models were classified according to the
design and statistical techniques used to study the experience of breast cancer. The 
vast amount of literature on factors of psychosocial adaptation precluded exhaustive 
discussion on each variable to be included in the proposed models. Therefore, only 
those variables and findings relevant to the development of the proposed structural 
model of psychosocial adjustment to breast cancer are discussed here.
The only model in the literature that explicitly focused on an existential 
meaning variable (termed global meaning by the authors) and cancer was developed 
by Vickberg et al. (2001). Studying 85 survivors, who had undergone bone marrow 
transplantation for the treatment of leukemia, the authors investigated the relation of 
global meaning to several indicators of psychological adjustment, including 
psychological distress symptoms (depression, anxiety, somatization, obsessive- 
compulsive), symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, mental health status, and 
days hospitalized as an indicator of stressor severity. Results obtained through a 
series of regression analyses indicated that global meaning was positively related to 
the mental health status and negatively related to psychological distress. In another 
study, Vickberg et al. (2000) investigated global meaning as a moderator variable 
between intrusive thoughts and psychological distress in breast cancer survivors. 
Results obtained through regression analyses confirmed the hypothesis that global 
meaning functioned as a moderator in this model. These authors found a strong 
positive association between intrusive thoughts and psychological distress only 
among patients with lower global meaning. Both studies employed multiple 
regression methods to analyze the data. Findings indicated that global meaning 
could be considered an important intervening variable between psychological 
adjustment and predictor variables, such as psychological distress symptoms.
Two other models of psychosocial adaptation were identified that employed 
regression techniques. Cotton et al. (1999) studied spiritual well-being in relation to 
quality of life and psychological adjustment in women with breast cancer. 
Correlational analyses revealed that greater spiritual "well-ness" was positively 
associated with specific adjustment styles (e.g., fighting spirit) while it was 
negatively associated with other maladaptive styles (e.g., anxious preoccupation, 
helplessness/ hopelessness) in breast cancer patients. Classen et al. (1996) studied 
coping styles in relation to psychological adjustment to advanced breast cancer. 
Regression analyses revealed that fighting spirit was negatively associated with 
mood disturbance, the latter being a measure of psychological adjustment.
Aside from regression models, several researchers employed path analysis 
and structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate complex relationships among 
variables believed to influence psychosocial adaptation to breast cancer. Epping- 
Jordan et al. (1999) developed a path model of psychological adjustment in newly 
diagnosed women with Stages I-IV breast cancer. The process of adjustment was 
examined at diagnosis, and at 3- and 6- month follow- ups. This model showed 
different significant pathways across these times. At six months postdiagnosis, 
optimism had a direct effect on anxiety and depression symptoms, and partially 
mediated this relationship through emotion- focused disengagement coping.
Intrusive thoughts positively predicted anxiety and depression symptoms at 
diagnosis and three months postdiagnosis. Among the limitations of the study is its 
less demographically varied sample, preventing the generalizability of findings to 
more diverse economic and ethnic groups.
In a previously established path model, Carver et al. (1993) found similar 
results for the mediating role of coping. In early stage breast cancer patients, coping
style mediated the effects of optimism on psychological distress surrounding the 
illness. Both Epping- Jordan et al. (1999) and Carver et al. (1993) used a path 
analysis, which is a special case of structural equation modeling (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 1996).
Another model was proposed and tested by Schnoll, Harlow, Stolbach, and 
Brandt (1998b). In one of the most comprehensive attempts at studying structural 
relationships between biomedical and psychosocial factors and psychological 
adjustment in breast cancer patients, the authors included stage of the disease, age, 
and coping styles, as predictors of psychological adjustment. Five different models 
of adjustment were tested with a sample of 100 breast cancer patients diagnosed with 
Stage II and IV disease, undergoing oncologic care (e.g., chemotherapy, radiation 
therapy). Coping was assessed with the Mental Adjustment to Cancer (MAC) Scale 
(Watson et al., 1988), and psychological adjustment was assessed with subscales of 
the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983) and the 
Functional Living Index-Cancer (FLIC) (Schipper, Clinch, & McMurray, 1984). 
Structural equation modeling analyses revealed that the model with the best fit was a 
mediational model. In this model, coping style was significantly related to 
psychological adjustment and mediated the relationship between the combined 
effects of age and disease stage on psychological adjustment. Age and disease stage 
(Stage II and IV breast cancer) were directly related to coping style but not directly 
associated with psychological adjustment. Women with Stage II breast cancer 
showed more usage of adaptive coping styles than women with Stage IV breast 
cancer. Based on their results, Schnoll et al. (1998b) argued that it is the type of 
coping a woman with breast cancer uses that contributes more to how she adjusts to 
her medical situation, than her age or the stage of her disease. However salient
these findings may be, research is needed to replicate and expand this model 
proposed by Schnoll et al. (1998b). In particular, more predictors should be tested 
in relation to coping processes, and meaning-based coping should be included in a 
new or revised model.
Schnoll, Knowles, and Harlow (2002) examined demographic, clinical, and 
psychosocial correlates of adjustment among a sample of cancer survivors, who were 
in remission, were not receiving any type of cancer treatment, and their mean time 
since diagnosis was 61 months. Using SEM, they found that higher levels of social 
support, optimism, and meaning in life as well as lower levels of avoidant coping 
were associated with better adjustment. Among the study limitations, it should be 
noted that participants were recruited as a convenience sample and the response rate 
(28%) was lower than was desired.
Hirai et al. (2002) employed SEM in order to examine the relation between 
self- efficacy, physical condition and psychological adjustment to advanced cancer. 
Their findings suggested that a strong positive relationship existed between self- 
efficacy (symptom coping efficacy, activities of daily living efficacy, affect 
regulation efficacy) and psychological adjustment (with anxiety and depression as 
measures of emotional distress). Moreover, these authors suggested that self- 
efficacy might mediate the effects of physical condition on psychological adjustment, 
so that patients with high self- efficacy would be able to overcome poor adjustment 
caused by physical condition severity. One of the limitations of the study was that 
participants were receiving intense palliative care, and their symptoms had been 
controlled comparatively well.
Vos, Garssen, Visser, Duivenvoorden, and de Haes (2004) examined 
associations between psychosocial adjustment and biodemographic variables, coping,
and social support in newly diagnosed early stage breast cancer patients, by using 
SEM. The main conclusion of this study was that coping was of major importance in 
predicting psychosocial adjustment. Women who expressed an optimistic way of 
coping reported less distress and saw their body as less disfigured than women who 
did not use optimistic coping strategies. Optimistic coping was also associated with 
social adjustment and less limited social interactions. This study had a few 
limitations. Models were tested cross- sectionally, while a longitudinal design would 
allow for drawing firm conclusions about causal relationships.
After reviewing available models of psychological adjustment, it appears 
that in the past 10 years, several structural models of psychological adjustment to 
cancer have been proposed and investigated (Cotton et al, 1999; Epping-Jordan et 
al., 1999; Hanson-Frost et al., 2000; Schnoll et al., 1998b; Vos et al., 2004; Schnoll 
et al., 2002). Currently, researchers appear to find strong support for mediatiortal 
factors between psychosocial variables and psychological well-being as outcome 
variable (Carver et al., 1993; Cotton et al., 1999; Stanton et al., 2000).
Nevertheless, each of the aforementioned models needs to be replicated with larger 
sample sizes, different predictor variables, and a variety of instruments measuring 
similar constructs. Only by ways of testing and re-testing these models will 
researchers gain more certainty in how different factors in a woman's life relate to 
adjustment to breast cancer.
Summary and Conclusions
Although we see substantial advances in understanding adjustment to chronic 
disease, such as breast cancer, progress is uneven, and many questions remain. 
First, little is known about the mechanisms for the effects of variables such as
existential meaning or emotional expressivity on adjustment to breast cancer. For 
example, existential meaning may moderate the effects of adverse psychological 
responses (e.g., intrusions) on adjustment. Moreover, moderated effects are not 
distinguished from mediated ones. Examination of moderated or mediated relations 
in research on predictors of adjustment can suggest variables on which to target and 
tailor interventions. Second, there is much more attention in the literature to 
issues surrounding adjustment to breast cancer in some disease phases than others 
and in some subpopulations of patients than others. The majority of existing 
research was conducted with patients who are at early-stage breast cancer, or are 
under treatment. Systematic research with breast cancer survivors who live longer 
than five years after diagnosis is missing. Third, little of the research 
identifying predictors of disease-related adjustment has the potential for being 
translated directly into interventions.
Directions for Research
Gaps apparent in the existing literature make way for further research on adjustment to 
breast cancer. Relatively neglected populations such as breast cancer survivors merit 
greater inclusion. Since structural models have become an accepted and well- 
utilized approach in psycho-oncology, this study proposes investigation of structural 
models to further and deepen investigation of psychological issues faced by breast 
cancer patients. These models were developed based on available theoretical, 
empirical, and clinical accounts reviewed above. The main variables of interest to 
the present study are existential meaning and emotional expressivity. Existential 
meaning and expressivity levels can be hypothesized as important factors in a 
patient's adjustment to an illness, such as breast cancer. However, quantitative
approaches to the understanding and measurement of psychosocial adaptation in 
breast cancer patients seem to have largely ignored existential meaning and 
expressivity as relevant constructs (Coward, 2000). Therefore, one possible next step 
in expanding the available literature on psychosocial adaptation to breast cancer 
would be to incorporate the meaning and expressivity variables into already existing 
models and study psychosocial adjustment to this illness from a meaning-making 
and emotional processing perspective.
Whereas it has been shown that theories of illness and health certainly do 
incorporate existential meaning as an important factor, researchers have only rarely 
included this factor in their models (Holland, 1998). Future quantitative research 
should focus on meaning as another important variable. Research on the 
psychological effects of breast cancer in general has flourished, however, and many 
results that could be linked to meaning have been publicized (Schnoll et al, 1998a; 
Stanton et al., 2000; Stanton & Snider, 1993). This study, therefore relies on 
previously developed models and findings in order to place meaning into an already 
existing framework. There appear to be two reasons why the field of breast cancer 
research can provide fertile ground for research on existential meaning and 
adjustment to illness: First, theoretical and clinical accounts about breast cancer 
identified meaning issues as an important factor for the ill person. Second, and most 
important, empirically validated models of psychosocial adaptation to breast cancer 
have provided findings on variables hypothesized to be related to existential meaning, 
such as coping and psychological well-being. These models can now be used to test 
new variables such as existential meaning. Therefore, existential meaning should be 
added as additional factors to be tested in already established models.
Regarding emotional expressivity, although theories of adjustment to cancer 
have incorporated emotional processes as an important factor (Lepore, 2001), 
researchers have only rarely included this factor in their models (Stanton et al.,
2000). Future quantitative research should focus on expressivity as another important 
variable in the adjustment to cancer process. This study, therefore, tried to place 
expressivity into an already existing framework. Research on expressivity and 
adjustment to cancer can guide the application of supportive- expressive therapy to 
patients with cancer (Giese- Davis et al., 2002).
Moreover, authors (Holmbeck, 1997) have suggested that a clear distinction 
should be made between moderators and mediators in the relationship between 
psychological responses to cancer and psychological adjustment to it. For example, 
global meaning has been considered as a moderator between intrusive thoughts and 
psychological distress in breast cancer patients (Vickberg et al., 2000). Coping style 
or predisposing factors such as optimism have been considered as mediators between 
medical and psychological stress variables and psychological adjustment to cancer 
(Epping- Jordan et al., 1999; Schnoll et al., 1998b). Thus, in the present study, 
separate analyses for examining moderating and mediating effects were employed.
CHAPTER 4 
Method
The following chapter provides detail about how the data for this study were 
collected and analysed. Initially, the research hypotheses are presented. Details 
concerning participants, inclusion and exclusion criteria, sample size, statistical 
power, and data collection procedures, are then discussed. Detailed information is 
provided concerning the validity and reliability of the instruments used to collect 
data. The chapter ends with an explanation of the data analyses used in this study, 
including data preparation techniques, regression analyses employed for testing 
moderation effects and SEM analyses employed to test mediation effects and model 
fit. Finally, ethical considerations such as informed consent, confidentiality and 
anonymity are discussed.
Research Hypotheses
The purpose of this study is to expand the empirical research base on existential 
meaning and emotional expressivity as it relates to psychological adjustment of 
breast cancer patients. The aim is twofold: First, to test the moderated effects of 
existential meaning and emotional expressivity on the relationship between intrusive 
thoughts and psychological adjustment to breast cancer. Second, to test the mediated 
effects of existential meaning and emotional expressivity on the relationship between 
psychological responses to cancer (e.g., intrusive thoughts, helplessness) and 
psychological adjustment to breast cancer.
In order to achieve this aim, the following research questions were addressed:
Hypothesis 1: Existential meaning will serve as a protective factor against the 
effects of psychological response to breast cancer (intrusive thoughts) on 
psychological adjustment to it.
Hypothesis 2: Emotional expressivity will serve as a protective factor against 
the effects of psychological response to breast cancer (intrusive thoughts) on 
psychological adjustment to it.
In order to test these hypotheses, it was assumed that the moderators (high 
levels of existential meaning or expressivity) could weaken the effect of the predictor 
(intrusive thoughts) on the outcome (psychological adjustment to breast cancer).
Hypothesis 3: Psychological responses to cancer will influence existential 
meaning, which, in turn, will influence psychological adjustment to cancer.
Hypothesis 4: Psychological responses to cancer will influence emotional 
expressivity, which, in turn, will influence psychological adjustment to cancer.
In order to test these hypotheses, it was assumed that the higher the intensity 
of the adverse psychological responses to cancer (e.g., intrusive thoughts, 
helplessness), the lower a patient’s existential meaning or emotional expressivity 
levels (mediators), which would, in turn, be associated with higher levels of 
psychological maladjustment.
In this case, two structural models were tested and compared for better fit.
The primary structural model with a direct path from psychological responses to 
breast cancer to psychological adjustment, differed from the alternative model, 
without such a direct path.. It was assumed that the primary model would show better 
overall fit than the alternative model, given that the other paths (linking existential 
meaning, emotional expressivity, and coping, to psychological adjustment) would
remain active in both cases. In these analyses, coping was added as an intervening 
variable, given that previous empirical studies have shown the significant link 
between coping and adjustment to cancer.
Participants
The sample consisted of a consecutive series of 208 women recruited from the Breast 
Clinic of a public cancer hospital in Athens, Greece. Data were collected cross- 
sectionally when they visited for their medical follow- up between February 2004 
and March 2005. Inclusion criteria for subjects were: female of Greek nationality, 
who could speak and read Greek, older than 30 years of age but under 80 years, with 
a diagnosis of breast cancer confirmed by the histological result of an excisional 
biopsy, after having completed their cancer treatment at least 3 months ago, with no 
prior malignancy and no previous or concurrent psychiatric history (assessed by no 
admission to a psychiatric clinic or not being under psychiatric therapy). Metastatic 
(stage IV) terminal cases were excluded from the study. Metastatic spread from the 
carcinoma of the breast can be present at various distant sites including the nervous 
system, the lungs and the liver, resulting in non-metastatic complications such as 
metabolic and endocrinologic disturbances, and paraneoplastic syndromes, affecting 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioural functioning (Posner, 1979). The restriction of 
the completion of chemotherapy or radiation therapy was imposed, in order to avoid 
the immediate negative consequences of active treatment to the cognitive, emotional, 
behavioural and physical functioning of the patient (Posner, 1979). The age 
restriction was chosen for two reasons: First, there are very few women younger than 
age 30 being diagnosed, since most newly diagnosed breast cancer cases are in the 
middle- aged and older age population (Rowland, 1989). Inclusion of a younger age
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group of patients would result in a disproportionately small number of young patients 
and an unequal balance between very young, middle- aged, and older patients. 
Second, the cut- off point of 80 years of age was chosen because the older patients 
get, the more likely it is that co-morbid illnesses and disorders influence a patient’s 
life (Vellas et al., 1994). Thus, psychological adjustment and quality of life data 
would possibly be confounded by distress due to illnesses other than breast cancer. 
However, patients up to 80 years of age were eligible to participate in this study 
because, as a group, women over 65 years of age comprised the majority of breast 
cancer patients treated at our breast cancer centre.
Of the 208 patients approached, 14 failed or refused to provide data during 
the interview, due to their very low educational level, poor hearing, lack of available 
free time, or disinterest in participating in the study. As a result, the initial subject 
pool consisted of 194 patients in Stage 0 to Stage III of breast cancer, who agreed to 
participate and were contacted by mail. There were 41 patients who did not return 
the questionnaires or provided incomplete data. Thus, the final subject pool of 
eligible participants who provided complete data for analysis was 153 breast cancer 
patients. Demographic and medical information about the 194 breast cancer patients, 
obtained either from themselves or from the hospital registry, was used to compare 
participants in this study to non- participants. T-tests and chi- square tests revealed 
that the responder group was similar to the non-responder group of patients in terms 
of age [t( 181 )= 0.19, p= .850], stage at diagnosis [%2 (6)= 10.48, p= .106], type of 
surgical treatment [x2 (2)= 3.59, p= .165] and time since surgery [t(188)= -0.258, p= 
.797].
Sample size
The target population was outpatient female breast cancer patients, having completed 
their cancer treatment, and without a metastatic disease. The number of patients to 
be selected for the present study had to be large enough to allow for an adequate 
sample size, taking into consideration expected response rate. An adequate sample 
size provides some assurance that the criterion of statistical power has been met 
(Pedhazur, 1997). Statistical power refers to the level of probability that actual group 
differences will be detected in a particular study (Cohen, 1977). Statistical power is 
equal to 1 -0, where beta symbolizes the Type II error (the probability of failing to 
reject Ho when it is in fact false while the alternative hypothesis H] is true). If 
statistical power is too low, a researcher could accept the null hypothesis when in 
fact it should be rejected. One factor affecting power is sample size. Reasonably 
large sample sizes are a necessity in order to have a high power (> .80). Therefore, 
one of the essential steps in research studies is an analysis of statistical power to 
ensure adequate sample size.
In the case of multiple regression and SEM, the statistical techniques 
employed in this study, statistical power was examined using the <Power & Sample 
Size calculation> subroutine of the statistical software programs <NCSS- PASS> 
(Hintze, 2000) and <Statistica> (StatSoft, 2001) respectively. For determining 
sample size for multiple regression, the question to be answered was the following: 
How large a sample size would we need, to have a power value of at least .80 and a 
5% probability of rejecting Ho when in fact it is true (i.e. the Type I error termed 
alpha), in a situation where there are 10 predictor variables (such as emotional 
expressivity, purpose and meaning in life, coping styles, psychological responses to 
breast cancer, as well as demographic and medical variables)? One method for
determining sample size in multiple regression analysis is to specify expected or 
meaningful values of the squared multiple correlations both with and without the 
specific predictors of interest (Maxwell, 2000). Given that the proportion of variance 
(R2) expected to be explained by all the predictor variables was hypothesized to be 
50%, a sample size (N) equal to 153 was estimated to be sufficient, in order to 
achieve a power of 100%, assuming that the four demographic and medical variables 
would explain 10% of the variance in psychological adjustment, while the remaining 
six psychological variables would explain 40% of the overall variance. The above 
mentioned figures about R are based on the work of Schnoll et al. (1998b) with 
breast cancer patients, where demographic and medical variables (e.g. age and 
disease stage) explained only a very small amount of variance (4%) in psychological 
adjustment, while psychological variables (e.g. coping style) explained 56% of the 
variance.
In the case of SEM, a goodness of fit index, such as chi- square, allows the 
researcher to make decisions about the fit of a model. But chi-square is sensitive to 
sample size. Therefore, choosing an appropriate sample size directly influences 
acceptance or rejection of a model in SEM. The sample size is partially dependent 
on the number of observed outcome and predictor variables used to define latent 
variables, and partially on the total number of independent parameters estimated (i.e. 
gamma, phi, beta, lambda y, theta epsilon, psi, etc). The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) which represents a “badness of fit” index, can be used in 
assessing power and sample size in SEM (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). 
If we want the hypothesis that the RMSEA < .05 cannot be rejected, then the 
question is “How large a sample size would be required to assure a power of at least 
.80 when the population RMSEA is at least .08?” Based on the number of these
parameters, a power of .80, an alpha (the Type I error) equal to .05 and a population 
RMSEA= .08, a null RMSEA equal to .05, for 80 degrees of freedom (df) for the 
expected chi-square statistic, aN=153 results. Stevens (1996) and Schumacker and 
Lomax (1996) provided a relatively conservative estimate of at least 15 subjects per 
observed variable. Following this conservative estimation, an adequate sample size 
for 10 variables would have been at least 150 participants. The sample of the present 
study consisted of 153 participants, thus surpassing the suggested sample size of 150 
participants in SEM.
Data Collection Procedures
The method of collecting the information combined personal interviewing and a mail 
survey. After their medical visit, the attendant physician suggested to all patients to 
proceed to the researcher and be informed about their possible participation in a 
research project regarding the illness experience. During this brief contact, the 
purpose and methods of the study were explained to patients, while minimal 
demographic and medical data were gathered. Research packets containing the 
psychosocial questionnaires were delivered in person, and returned by mail. Since 
the main problem with mail surveys is that of getting an adequate response rate, 
every effort was made to secure a high response rate (i.e. > 70%). If the response 
rate is not high enough to eliminate the possibility of serious unrepresentativeness of 
the sample, then non- respondents may differ significantly from the respondents, so 
that estimates based on the latter are biased and the findings may be of limited 
generalizability.
In order to raise the response rate, Dillman’s (2000) Tailored Design Method 
was partially applied, where five steps with two complete research survey mailings
are involved in the data complete collection procedure. These steps consist of an 
introductory letter stressing the importance of the information that will be collected, 
the mailing of the first research packet, a reminder postcard to all in the sample who 
have not yet completed the survey reemphasizing the importance of the individual’s 
participation, the mailing of a second packet, and another final reminder postcard to 
non-respondents. However, two concerns shortened the five- contact process: First, 
breast cancer patients might be considered a sensitive population and ethically the 
researcher chose to restrict requests for their participation to the minimum number 
necessary to conduct this study. Second, since the initial contact with patients was 
made directly, during the face- to- face interview, the mailing of the introductory 
letter was omitted. Therefore, participants received one mailing including a letter to 
non-respondents, inviting them to respond to the survey. Out of 194 eligible 
participants, 153 returned complete research packets. Therefore, the response rate 
for the present study was assessed at 78.9%.
Measures
Each participant in this study completed a demographic and medical questionnaire 
and five self- report measures.
Demographic and Medical Questionnaire
A demographic questionnaire was designed to gather demographic and medical 
information from patients (see Appendix A). Items included were current age, 
educational level, employment status, marital status, parity and number of children, 
economic level, place of residence (capital city, rural/ provincial area), stage at 
diagnosis, cancer metastasis, time since diagnosis, time since operation, type of 
surgery (lumpectomy, partial mastectomy, simple mastectomy, modified radical
mastectomy), other cancer treatments applied (radiation therapy, chemotherapy, 
hormonal therapy), family history of cancer, and perceived seriousness of disease (1 = 
no serious, 4= extremely serious).
The Life Attitude Profile- Revised (LAP- R)
The LAP- R (Reker, 1999) is a 48- item self- report multidimensional measure of 
discovered meaning and purpose in life and the motivation to find meaning and 
purpose in life. Each item is rated on a 7- point Likert scale of agreement, ranging 
from “strongly agree” (7) to “strongly disagree” (1). The LAP- R profile consists of 
six dimensions and two composite scales. The six dimensions, all of which comprise 
eight items are:
• Purpose (PU), having life goals, a mission in life, a sense of direction 
to one’s life,
• Coherence (CO), having an integrated and consistent understanding of 
self, others, and life, a clear sense of personal identity, and a sense of order and 
reason for existence,
• Choice/ Responsibility (CR), the perception of freedom to make life 
choices, the exercise of personal responsibility, personal decision making, and 
internal control of life events,
• Death acceptance (DA), the absence of fear and anxiety about death 
and the acceptance of death as a natural aspect of life,
• Existential vacuum (EV), having a lack of meaning in life, lack of 
goals, lack of direction, and feelings of indifference,
• Goal seeking (GS), the desire to get away from the routine of life, to 
search for new experiences, to welcome new challenges.
Each subscale generates one score by adding the individual scores of 8 items. 
A high score on each dimension reflects a high degree of the attribute in question. 
However, the LAP-R also features one composite scale that was labeled personal 
meaning index (PMI). The PMI was developed to provide a more focused measure 
of personal meaning. It consists of 16 items and is derived by summing the PU and 
CO subscales, including statements such as “I have discovered a satisfying life 
purpose”, “My past achievements have given my life meaning and purpose”, “I have 
a philosophy of life that gives my existence significance”, “I have a framework that 
allows me to make sense of my life”. The current study used only the PU, CO and 
CR subscales, as being more proximal measures of personal meaning and personal 
decision making about life choices.
The LAP- R was normed on a sample (n= 750) comprised of three age 
groups: young adults, middle- aged adults, and older adults, as well as differentiated 
for gender. Alpha coefficients were satisfactory, ranging from .75 to .88 for the six 
subscales. Test- retest reliability coefficients (estimated at a 4-6 week interval) 
ranged from .77 to .90 for the subscales. The two composite scales showed 
coefficients of internal consistency ranging from .88 to .91. Regarding validity, the 
LAP- R scores of the normative sample were subjected to principal components 
analysis with varimax rotation. Five interpretive factors emerged, accounting for 
47% of the variance. The PU and CO dimensions loaded on the same factor, which 
strengthens the argument for combining them into the PMI index. Concurrent 
validity of the LAP-R was established with eight other measuring instruments, such 
as the Sense of Coherence scale (Antonovsky, 1987), the Purpose in Life Test 
(Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1969), Ryff s Purpose in Life (Ryff, 1989), and the Life 
Regard Index Framework (Battista & Almond, 1973). High correlations were found
between the LAP-R and these meaning measures. It can be concluded that the LAP- 
R is a reliable and valid measure of meaning and purpose in life, the instrument 
shows scores predictive of certain outcome variables such as psychological well­
being, life satisfaction, and the absence of depression, lending support to the notion 
that the LAP-R is a generalized measure of quality of life.
The Greek version of LAP-R was obtained by following standard translation 
procedures. The first step of the translation process involved forward translations of 
the original English questionnaire into Greek by two translators who were native 
speakers of Greek but with a high level of fluency in English. Each translator 
independently produced one translation of the LAP-R items and established a list of 
translations of the response choices. Translators were to place emphasis on 
conceptual and culturally sensitive rather than literal equivalence. Differences in 
translations were discussed, alternatives were documented and a target translation 
was produced. The forward- translation was given to two translators who were 
native speakers of English, but with a high level of fluency in Greek, who translated 
the questionnaire back into English. The translations were discussed for equivalence 
and modifications were made to some translations. The English translation was 
compared to the original English document, and differences were resolved until the 
back translation was sufficiently similar to the original document. Finally, the 
forward translation was pilot- tested in a small group of breast cancer patients 
(N=12), before being field tested in a large sample. During pilot- testing, structured 
interviews were conducted with each patient individually and then a focus group 
discussion took place. The interview was directed to each item separately to 
determine and comment whether any of the translated items were difficult to answer, 
confusing, upsetting, or difficult to understand. Confusing or difficult items were
rephrased, the translated document was revised as needed, and a final version of the 
questionnaire was derived.
The Emotional Expressivity Scale (EES)
The EES (Kring et al., 1994) is a 17- item self- report measure of the extent to which 
people outwardly display their emotions, regardless of emotional valence (positive or 
negative) or channel of expression (facial, vocal, or gestural). It is a unidimensional 
scale assessing a general disposition toward expressing different emotions across 
various channels. EES includes items such as “I display my emotions to other 
people”, “I am able to cry in front of other people”, “I can’t hide the way I’m 
feeling”, “I think of myself as emotionally expressive”. The response format for the 
EES is a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “always true” (1) to “never true” (6), 
allowing ratings of the extent to which each item applies to each participant. 
Reliability coefficients (Cronbach alpha) are high, with an average of .91 across 
seven administrations (Kring et al., 1994). Based on factor analytic results, a single 
general factor predominates that accounts for 23.3% of the variance. An examination 
of the convergent (when the scale is related to conceptually similar measures) and 
discriminant (when the scale is unrelated to conceptually dissimilar constructs) 
validities showed that the EES is related to measures that assess more specific 
aspects of expressivity (such as the Family Expressiveness Questionnaire -  
Halberstadt, 1986; the Affectometer 2- Diener, 1984; the Emotional Expressivity 
Questionnaire- King & Emmons, 1990) but is not related to self- esteem, or the 
agreeableness and conscientiousness factors of the Big Five Personality Attributes. 
Thus EES is a reliable and valid measure of emotional expressivity.
The Impact o f Event Scale (IES)
The IES is a 15- item self- report scale that has been used for exploring the 
psychological responses to stressful or traumatic life events (Horowitz et al., 1979). 
Two major response sets are recorded by this instrument: intrusion (7 items) and 
avoidance (8 items). Intrusion is characterized by unbidden thoughts and images, 
troubled dreams, strong waves of feelings about the traumatic event, especially when 
the individual is exposed to stimuli that serve as reminders of the original trauma. 
Avoidance responses include denial of the meaning and consequences of the event, 
blunted sensation, awareness of emotional numbness. Participants are directed to 
indicate the frequency with which each item has been experienced within the past 
month, as a result of their illness, and rate their response on a 4- point scale ranging 
from “rarely/ never” (1) to “often” (4). Cronbach’s alpha is high and equal to .78 for 
the intrusion subscale and .82 for the avoidance subscale. Twelve studies examined 
the IES’ dimensionality and 10 of these replicated the two- factor structure of 
intrusion and avoidance, despite considerable differences between the samples and 
elapsed time since the traumatic event (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002). This current 
study used only the intrusion scale, as one of the measures of the psychological 
responses to cancer.
The Mini- Mental Adjustment to Cancer (Mini-MAC) Scale
The Mini-MAC (Watson et al., 1994) is a self- report 29- item questionnaire derived 
from the original 40- item MAC questionnaire (Watson et al., 1988). It was designed 
to operationalize and measure the concept of mental adjustment to cancer, which is a
term used to describe the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses the patient 
makes to the diagnosis of cancer. Although the MAC was originally developed for 
assessment of responses to cancer, authors have used the scale as a measure of 
coping strategies or coping styles (Schwartz et al., 1992; Schnoll et al., 1998b). 
Questionnaire instructions ask patients to indicate how far each statement applies to 
them and responses are given on a four- point Likert scale ranging from “definitely 
does not apply to me” (1) to “definitely applies to me” (4). The five subscales are 
measuring
• Fatalism (F) (5 items) where the patient puts herself in the hands of 
God, while she takes one day at a time,
• Fighting spirit (FS) (4 items) characterized by a determination to fight 
the illness and the adoption of an optimistic attitude,
• Helpless- hopeless (HH) (8 items) characterized by feelings of giving
up and engulfment by knowledge of the diagnosis and a pessimistic attitude,
• Anxious preoccupation (AP) (8 items) characterized by constant 
preoccupation with cancer and feelings of devastation, anxiety, fear and 
apprehension, and
• Cognitive avoidance (CA/ AY) (4 items) where the patient distracts
herself and avoids thinking about the illness.
These factors emerged after principal components analysis with orthogonal 
rotation (n=573) and accounted for 38.4% of the variance (Watson et al., 1994). For 
the mini-MAC, internal consistency reliability (Cronbach alpha) estimates ranged 
from .62 to .88. This instrument has been validated into Greek (Anagnostopoulos et 
al., 2006) and proved to be a valid instrument for coping styles in cancer patients. 
These validation studies suggest that two Mini-MAC factors (HH and AP) may be
indicators of maladaptive illness representations, while the other three factors (FS, F, 
AV) may be indicators of an adaptive coping style. Thus, the former scales were 
used as indicators of psychological responses to cancer, while the latter were used to 
indicate coping styles.
The Short Form 36 (SF- 36) Health Survey
The SF-36 is the most widely used health status questionnaire. It includes multi- item 
scales measuring each of eight generic health concepts: physical functioning (PF), 
role limitations due to physical health problems (RP), bodily pain (BP), general 
health perceptions (GH), vitality (VT) tapping energy levels and fatigue, social 
functioning (SF), role limitations due to emotional problems (RE), and mental health 
(MH) capturing feelings of nervousness, unhappiness, and sadness (Ware et al.,
1998). In the present study, only the four last scales that measure mental health 
status, have been used. In this way, 14 items were selected, measuring VT (4 items), 
SF (2 items), RE (3 items) and MH (5 items). For each scale, responses to items 
were coded, summed and transformed into a scale ranging from 0 (worst possible 
health status) to 100 (best possible health status). Missing values were substituted 
according to the method suggested by the developers for gaining scores for missing 
values (Ware, Kosinski, & Gandek, 2003). The standard version of the SF-36 was 
administered to our sample, asking patients to report on their metal health status over 
the past four weeks. This instrument has been validated into Greek 
(Anagnostopoulos et al., 2005), while satisfactory reliability coefficients (Cronbach 
alphas) have been reported for the four mental health subscales, ranging from .79 to 
.92 (Pappa et al., 2005).
As far as the five- item MH scale is concerned, it has demonstrated sufficient 
criterion validity with respect to the presence of depression in community- dwelling 
elderly American patients (Friedman, Heisel, & Delavan, 2005), satisfactory 
predictive validity in screening for depressive disorders in older Swedish women 
(Silveira, Taft, Sundh, Waem, Palsson, & Steen, 2005), satisfactory validity to detect 
mood disorders in German general populations (Rumpf, Meyer, Hapke, & John,
2001), and usefulness to screen for depressive symptoms in the general population of 
Japan (Yamazaki, Fukuhara, & Green, 2005). The performance of the MH scale in 
terms of predicting mental health problems is similar to that of GHQ-12 (Hoeymans, 
Garssen, Westert, & Verhaak, 2004). This scale has been used to measure mental 
health status in large surveys conducted within the Eurobarometer Multi- national 
Health monitoring programmes (European Opinion Research Group [EORG], 2003).
The MH, RE, and SF scales have been shown to be the most valid of the SF- 
36 scales as mental health measures. Moreover, the VT scale has noteworthy 
correlations with both physical and mental functioning (Ware, 2000). Lower levels 
of the VT scale have been associated with mood and anxiety disorders (Bijl & 
Ravelli, 2000). Thus, the VT scale has been supposed to act as an indicator of 
mental well- being and positive mental health (Lehtinen, Sohlman, & Kovess- 
Masfety, 2005).
Data Analysis
Data Preparation and Screening
Data entry was first checked for accuracy, through examination of basic descriptive 
statistics (e.g. ranges) and of frequency distributions. Values that were out of range 
or improperly coded were detected and corrected. Procedures to handle missing 
observations were then applied. In the case of multi- item scales, scale scores were
obtained by substituting average scores (computed across completed items in each 
particular scale) for any missing item of the same scale. This algorithm was applied 
when the respondent answered at least 50% of the items in each scale and the 
proportion of respondents with missing data was low (<10%). Replacement 
(imputation) of missing observations with estimated scores requires the assumption 
of data missing at random, meaning that the probability of the presence versus 
absence of scores on some variable is unrelated to subject’s true status on that 
variable. This implies that subjects with missing observations differ only by chance 
from those who have scores on that variable. Next, outliers (i.e. cases with extreme 
scores more than three standard deviations away from the mean) that could 
contribute to non- normality of the distribution of variables, were detected and dealt 
with (e.g. by making their scores less extreme through changing their values to equal 
a less extreme score).
Data were analyzed using bivariate correlation analysis to answer research 
question 1 (that there were significant relationships between psychological 
adjustment to breast cancer and biomedical and intrapersonal variables). Curvilinear 
relations between variables were explored by inspecting scatterplots. No strong 
nonlinear relations were found between variables.
Since the LAP-R and the IES had not been validated in the Greek version, an 
exploratory factor analysis of these instruments was conducted, to establish subscales 
appropriate for our sample. The main objective of this analysis was to determine the 
minimum number of hypothetical common factors that would satisfactorily produce 
the observed correlations among the items. The Kaiser- Meyer- Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy as well as the partial correlation coefficients and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity were computed to evaluate appropriateness of the factor
model. The number of factors necessary to represent the data was determined by 
inspection of Catted’s scree plot and the eigenvalue greater than 1 criterion. Having 
found some underlying dimensions in the data, factor- based scales were constructed 
by classifying each item to one scale according to its highest factor loading. Scale 
scores were computed by combining and summing the raw scores of all those items 
with relatively substantial loadings (>0.30) in each scale, and ignoring the remaining 
items with minor loadings.
Regression Analyses
Hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was employed to answer research 
questions 1 and 2 about moderating effects that the moderators (existential meaning 
or expressivity) could weaken the effect of the predictor (intrusive thoughts) on the 
outcome (psychological adjustment to breast cancer). To draw inferences about 
population values based on sample results, the following assumptions are needed: (a) 
normality and equality of variance, that is for any fixed value of each independent 
variable, the distribution of the dependent variable is normal, and with a constant 
variance, (b) independence, meaning that observations are not interdependent (e.g. as 
if they are based on repeated measurements), (c) linearity, that is the mean values of 
the dependent variable for the values of a given independent variable all lie on a 
straight line. Possible violations of assumptions were checked using (a) the normal 
probability (P-P) plot, comparing the observed distribution of residuals (i.e. the 
differences between the observed values and the values predicted by the regression) 
to that expected under the assumption of normality, (b) the standardized residual 
scatterplots, plotting the residuals against the predicted values, (c) the casewise plot 
of studentized residuals, plotting residuals against the sequence variable (e.g.
corresponding to the order in which participants received therapy). In our case, no 
critical violations were noted.
One problem facing multiple regression is multicollinearity, which refers to 
high correlations (e.g. >.85) between two or more independent variables, as in the 
case where any independent variable is a perfect linear combination of other 
independent variables. Multicollinearity was checked by inspection of the tolerance 
levels, the conditioning index, and the variance proportions associated with each 
variable for each root. Very small levels of tolerance (<.10), at least two large 
variance proportions (> .50) for a given root number and a large conditioning index 
(> 30) signaled multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
Assessment of the relative importance of each independent variable was 
based on the magnitude of the standardized regression coefficient and the change in 
the square of the multiple correlation coefficient (R ) when all independent variables 
except the variable of interest were in the equation. The latter indicates how much 
R increases when a variable is added to the regression equation. The type of 
multiple regression that was applied was sequential (hierarchical) regression, where 
the independent variables entered the equation in an order specified by the researcher 
(e.g. first the demographic and medical and then the psychosocial variables). The 
analysis proceeded in steps, and separate variables or blocks of variables were 
entered in each step. The squared semipartial correlations (which express the unique 
contribution of the independent variables to the total variance of the dependent 
variable) were estimated and their significance levels were used in evaluating the 
importance of the added independent variables.
Testing Moderated Effects through Regression Analyses
A moderator is a variable that affects the direction (sign) or strength of the relation 
between two variables, X (predictor) and Y (outcome) (Baron & Kenny, 1986). For 
example, a moderator may reduce the correlation between X and Y. In the case 
where both the predictor and moderator affect the outcome variable in the same 
direction and together have a stronger than additive effect, the interactions are called 
enhancing. When the moderator variable weakens the effect of the predictor variable 
on the outcome, the interactions are called buffering. When the predictor and 
moderator have the same effect on the outcome but the interaction is in the opposite 
direction, the interactions are called antagonistic (Frazier et al., 2004). Although 
there may be significant main effects for the predictor and the moderator, what is 
important is the significance of the interaction between the predictor and the 
moderator. Holmbeck (1997) has suggested that conceptual clarity is lacking when a 
proposed mediator (e.g. coping) represents a response to a predictor such as illness 
stress. He argues that when coping strategies are viewed as buffers or protective 
factors of the stress- adjustment relationship, then a moderational perspective is 
preferable. From this perspective, high levels of stress are expected to produce poor 
adjustment outcomes, only when the level of the protective factor is low. To 
examine such protective effects, one should test the significance of the interaction 
between stress and the protective factor, after entering the main effects. Only when 
the investigator provides predictions that certain specific coping strategies (e.g. 
fighting spirit, denial, fatalism) are expected to be more (or less) likely to be used 
when the level of an illness stressor is higher, does a model become mediational.
The investigator would also need to propose that higher (or lower) levels of 
adjustment are expected when this particular coping strategy is employed with
greater (or lesser) frequency. Unless the investigator can articulate a complete 
rationale for how these variables could serve a mediational function, he should 
analyze relationships between variables within a moderator model.
So, in order to test the above mentioned moderated effects, the following 
procedures were undertaken: Initially, the predictor and moderator main effects (and 
any covariates, such as demographic variables) were entered into the regression 
equation first, followed by the interaction of the predictor and the moderator, in a 
hierarchical fashion. The interaction term was represented by the product of the two 
main effects and only became the interaction when its constituent elements were 
partialled out. To eliminate problematic multicollinearity effects between first- order 
terms (i.e. the independent variable and the moderator) and the higher order terms 
(i.e., the interaction terms), the independent variable and the moderator were 
“centered” before testing the significance of the interaction term (Frazier et al.,
2004). To center a variable, scores are put into deviation score form by simply 
subtracting the sample mean from all individuals’ scores on the variable, thus 
producing a revised sample mean of zero. The centered predictor and moderator 
terms are multiplied to form the interaction term. When variables are centered, the 
first- order effect of one variable represents the effect of that variable at the average/ 
mean level of the other variables.
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Analyses
In this study, SEM was used to answer the research questions 3 and 4 about 
mediating effects that psychological responses, to cancer (e.g., intrusive thoughts, 
helplessness) could influence existential meaning or emotional expressivity, which, 
in turn, could influence psychological adjustment to cancer. SEM is a collection of
statistical techniques that allow examination of a set of relationships between one or 
more independent variables and one or more dependent variables. The independent 
(predictor) and the dependent variables can be either observed (measured) or latent 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The basic statistic in SEM is variance or covariance. 
Thus, the main goal of SEM is to understand patterns of correlations among set of 
variables and to explain as much of their variance as possible with the model 
specified by the researcher. SEM is particularly designed to accommodate models 
that include measurement errors in both dependent and independent variables, 
multiple dependent variables, reciprocal causation, simultaneity, and 
interdependence. Measurement error (or unique variance) in an observed variable 
(presumed to measure or tap into a latent, unobserved variable) indicates the variance 
in it unexplained by the latent variable (factor). Measurement error represents both 
random error (unreliability due to luck in guessing the correct answer, or fatigue) and 
systematic error (due to the particular measurement method used such as self- 
report). This allows the modeler to explicitly capture the unreliability of 
measurement in the model, which allows the structural relations between latent 
variables to be accurately estimated.
One of the advantages of SEM is that the technique allows an estimation of 
underlying latent constructs which are measured by a set of observed variables 
(indicators). Another advantage of SEM lies in its ability to show total, direct and 
indirect effects among variables. Indirect effects involve one or more intervening 
variables that transmit some of the effects of prior variables onto subsequent 
variables (McDonald & Ringo Ho, 2002).
In typical applications of SEM, a number of endogenous (latent dependent) 
and exogenous (latent independent) variables are used, and a model that attempts to 
explain how these variables are associated, is specified. Part of this explanation may 
include presumed causal effects, where a variables Y is considered as the direct 
consequence (result) of another variable X. Other parts of the explanation may 
reflect presumed noncausal relations such as a spurious association between 
variables due to common causes. If the model fits the data well and is not rejected, it 
cannot automatically be concluded that the hypotheses about causality are correct. 
The inference of causality requires more than just acceptable correspondence 
between the model and the data. To reasonably infer that X is a cause of Y, all the 
following conditions must be met (Kline, 1998):
a) There is time precedence, that is X precedes Y in time.
b) The direction of the causal relation is correctly specified, that is X causes Y, 
instead of the reverse, or that X and Y cause each other (reciprocal 
causation).
c) The relation between X and Y does not disappear when external variables 
such as common causes of both are held constant (partialed out).
Condition (a) above is satisfied if longitudinal studies are implemented. It may be 
problematic to infer causality in cross- sectional studies. For such an inference to be 
valid, a researcher must take one of two positions (MacCallum & Austin, 2000): (i) 
one option is to argue that the time lag during which the causal influence operates is 
essentially instantaneous, (ii) another option is to assume that the causal variables 
under study do not change over the time period of interest, i.e., between the time the 
causal effect occurs and the time the causal variable is measured. If these 
assumptions or arguments are not valid, estimates of directional effects obtained in a
cross- sectional design may be biased. Of course, temporality is just one criterion 
used to distinguish causal from noncausal associations. Other criteria used include 
consistency, specificity, plausibility, coherence, and experimental evidence (Hill,
1965). But these criteria are saddled with reservations and exceptions (Rothman & 
Greenland, 2005).
Regarding condition (b), even if X does indeed cause Y, the magnitude of 
their observed correlation may be low if the interval between their measurement is 
either too short (e.g., effects on Y take time to materialize) or too long (e.g., the 
effects are temporary and have dissipated). Thus, the specification of directionality 
requires a clear rationale. Condition (c) can be met when experimental manipulation 
of variables is applied. Statistical control (such as that represented by hierarchical 
multiple regression) is another way to address the third condition listed earlier. 
However, the potential biasing effects of omitting relevant and important variables or 
variables confounded with a manipulated independent variable, cannot disappear and 
may change the value of the paths between variables.
Thus, SEM can be considered to consist of descriptive models (which simply 
describe relationships) instead of causal models (which purport to give causal 
explanations) (Loehlin, 1998). Directional effects in SEM can be considered as 
causal effects in a loose sense, wherein a change in one variable somehow results in 
a change in another variable. Model selection should not be purely data- driven but 
should be based on a clear theoretical justification (theory- driven). Thus, it is 
usually only with the accumulation of the following types of evidence that 
researchers can even begin to think that the results of a SEM analysis may indicate 
causality (Kline, 1998): (i) replication of the model across independent samples, (ii) 
corroborating evidence from experimental studies of variables in the model that are
manipulable, and (iii) the accurate prediction of the effects of interventions. Without 
such evidence, structural models are best seen as “as i f ’ models of causality.
A recent approach to SEM assumes that there is an underlying mechanism 
that leads to an observed covariance structure between a series of variables (Halpem 
& Pearl, 2005). The objective is to specify, identify and test a model that captures 
the essence of this underlying mechanism. Each distinct mechanism can be 
represented by a structural equation (which describes the values of endogenous 
variables) while a set of such equations can be used to define relations among 
variables. This structural- model approach to actual causes uses equations to model 
counterfactuals (i.e., conditional statements indicating what would be the case if its 
antecedent were true) and yields a plausible account of causation.
Kline (1998) has suggested the following steps in testing SEM models: (1) 
specify the model, which means that the researcher’s hypotheses are expressed in the 
form of a structural equation model; (2) determine whether the model is identified 
(each parameter in the model has a unique estimate); (3) select measures of the 
variables represented in the model; (4) analyze the model to derive estimates of the 
model’s parameters; (5) evaluate model fit which means to determine how 
adequately the model accounts for the data; (6) re-specify the model and evaluate the 
fit of the revised model to the same data. These steps were applied to the present 
study. First of all, the literature was searched to formulate a theory and specify a 
model for analysis. The theory used was coping theory expanded by Park and 
Folkman (1997) to include a meaning component. The proposed meaning model in 
the present study was based on existing empirically validated models of psychosocial 
adaptation to breast cancer (Schnoll et al., 1998). A computer programme such as 
LISREL (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) conducted step 4 regarding the statistical
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analysis. Goodness- of - fit indices were computed and the model fit was interpreted 
(step 5). Finally, suggestions were made for a re-specification of the models under 
investigation (step 6).
Goodness-of-Fit Criteria
For the proposed models to be interpretable, goodness-of-fit criteria had to be 
established to compare observed relationships in the data to the proposed structural 
models. Goodness of fit is a major consideration for research utilizing structural 
equation modeling. Unfortunately, finding the correct fit index for a study is one of 
those "gray" areas in statistical science that has sparked much debate among 
statisticians in the past 20 years. Tanaka (1993) reported that a number of fit indices 
are available to the researcher to assess the theoretical accuracy of a structural 
equation model, with each fit index having distinct advantages and disadvantages in 
regard to acceptance or rejection of a model. He distinguished between classic fit 
indices, which are based on a centrality assumption (Chi-square, Goodness of Fit 
Index ), relative fit indices, which compare a model to its underlying null model, 
and parsimony fit indices, which estimate best model fit with the least amount of 
parameters necessary.
Schumacker and Lomax (1996) classified fit indices into three types. First of 
all, there are fit indices that compare observed and latent covariance matrices. The 
Chi-Square index and the goodness of fit index fit into this category. Second, 
several fit indices (Comparative Fit Index, Normed Fit Index) have been developed 
to compare a model with a null model. Finally, there are indices like the Parsimony 
Goodness of Fit Index to assess the parsimony of a model, with parsimony being the 
least required number of coefficients to achieve a good fit. For the sake of 
parsimony in research studies, several authors including Keith, (1996) and Loehlin
(1998) have suggested use of at least one fit index from each category proposed by 
Schumacker and Lomax (1996). This practice appears to be an appropriate response 
to the lack of specific goodness of fit conventions in the statistical sciences. The 
following six fit indices (one or more for each of the five categories) were chosen 
for the present study: Chi-square and GFI were chosen as absolute or classic fit 
indices for this study. With Chi-Square, a non-significant value indicates that 
observed and estimated matrices do not differ statistically, which means that the 
proposed model fits the data. In order for a model to be accepted as having good 
empirical fit, Chi-Square should not be significant. If the Chi-Square value <.05, 
the researcher's model is rejected (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996). Even though Chi- 
Square is not considered the best fit index to evaluate comparative fit across different 
models, Hoyle (1995) attested to the fact that it is a useful index when models are 
proposed a priori as is the case in this study. The Goodness of Fit (GFI) index is 
based on a ratio of the sum of the squared differences between the observed and 
reproduced matrices to the observed variances (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996). Hu 
and Bentler (1995) recommended reporting relative Chi-Square with the Satorra- 
Bentler correction as well, since relative Chi-Square is less driven by sample size 
considerations than the Chi-Square index.
Two other fit indices are reported in this study, the Adjusted Goodness of Fit 
index (AGFI) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990). AGFI, like GFI, 
assesses the variance and covariance accounted for by the model (Marsh, Balia, & 
McDonald, 1988). The AGFI is a version of the GFI but includes an adjustment by 
degrees of freedom relative to number of variables in a model. GFI and AGFI are 
routinely performed by the LISREL statistical program and will generally fall 
between 0 and 1 (Marsh et al, 1988). GFI and AGFI are recommended fit indices
because they are believed to be relatively independent of sample size. Both GFI and 
AGFI should be at least .90 to denote good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) is non-centrality based and measures 
improvement in a target model over a baseline model, most often the null model (Hu 
& Bentler, 1995). CFI values range from 0 to 1. A CFI value of .80, for instance, 
indicates that the tested model is 80% better than the null model (Kline, 1998).
The third category of fit indices takes into consideration the need for 
parsimony in SEM. As Raykov and Marcoulides (1999) suggested, the best SEM 
models have both good empirical fit and parsimony, with parsimony referring to the 
least number of parameters necessary to achieve adequate model fit. The 
Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) is used to compare models with different 
degrees of freedom (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996). It is employed when a researcher 
wants to achieve a high degree of fit with few degrees of freedom and favors the 
most parsimonious model.
Last but not least, researchers have utilized the Standardized Root-Mean- 
Square Residual index (SRMR) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
index (RMSEA) (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The SRMR assesses the difference between 
observed and implied covariance residuals (Kline, 1998). A model with perfect fit 
has a SRMR value of zero. The RMSEA is based on population and not sample size 
characteristics (Loehlin, 1998), which enables the researcher to make inferences on 
whether or not a particular model fits for a particular population. Unlike the SRMR, 
the RMSEA tests for differences between two competing models. The 
recommended cut-off value for the RMSEA is .06. Perfect fit is indicated by an 
RMSEA value of zero.
Goodness-of-fit indices are important in the decision-making process about 
the acceptance or rejection of proposed SEM models (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996). 
Two main criteria have to be met to accept a model as fitting the collected data: 
goodness of fit and parsimony, thus absolute, relative, and parsimony fit indices 
were computed for this study. Table 3 contains recommended and cut-off values for 
the fit indices utilized in this study.
Following guidelines provided by Schumacker and Lomax (1996), GFI and 
AGFI values > .90 would be desirable for good model fit. In regard to the PGFI, no 
fit is indicated by 0 and perfect fit is indicated by 1; thus, the closer the value comes 
to 1 and the farther it is away from 0, the better the model is expected to fit. In terms 
of the SRMR, the acceptable level was defined as (0 equals perfect fit, up to .3 is 
good fit), and in regard to the RMSEA, a value of < .06 indicated good model fit.
Values for^2 will be dependent on the number of variables in the model and 
this study will be guided by standard values for model fit at the p<.05 level. In regard 
to parsimony, only variables that made a statistically significant contribution to the 
overall model at alpha=.05 level were deemed important to the model.
Mediation Effects Analyses 
Testing Mediated Effects through SEM
In this study, regression analyses were employed to testing possible mediated 
effects of meaning and emotional expressivity in the relationship between impact of 
cancer (intrusions) and psychological adjustment.
Table 3
Recommended values and interpretation for selected Goodness- of- f i t  indices
Index Range of
values
Recommended level and 
interpretation
Chi- square (yf) See Chi- 
square tables for 
nonsignificant 
values for p> .05
Nonsignificant values 
represent good model fit
Goodness- of- Fit 
Index (GFI)
From 0 
(poor fit) to 1 
(perfect fit)
Values >.90 represent good
fit
Adjusted GFI 
(AGFI)
From 0 
(poor fit) to 1 
(perfect fit)
Values >.90 represent good
fit
Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI)
From 0 
(poor fit) to 1 
(perfect fit)
Percent improvement 
between two models
Root Mean 
Square Error of 
Approximation 
(RMSEA)
From 0 
(perfect fit) to 1 (no 
et)
Values <.06 reflect good 
fit, values <.08 correspond to 
acceptable fit
Standardized 
Root Mean Squared 
Residual (SRMR)
A zero value 
represents perfect 
model fit
Comparison of observed 
with implied covariance matrix. 
Favorable values <.10
Non- Normed Fit 
Index (NNFI)
From 0 (no 
improvement) to 1 
(substantial 
improvement)
Proportion in the 
improvement of the overall model 
fit relative to a null model. Values 
>.90 represent satisfactory 
improvement
Once a relationship between two variables (psychological responses to cancer and 
psychosocial adjustment to cancer) has been established, it is common for a
researcher to consider the role of a third variable (e.g. existential meaning) in this 
relationship.
Mediator (M) 
(e.g., meaning)
Independent 
variable (X) 
(e.g., psychological 
responses to cancer)
Outcome 
variable (Y) 
(e.g., psychological 
adjustment)
Figure 4. A three- variable mediation model.
In examining a mediational hypothesis, the relationship between an 
independent variable (X) and a dependent (outcome) variable (Y) is decomposed into 
two causal paths, as shown in Figure 4. One of these paths (with regression weight 
“t”) links the independent variable to the dependent variable directly, and the other 
links the independent variable to the dependent variable by means of an intervening 
variable (a mediator M). Given that the variables are standardized, this indirect 
effect of X on Y through M is equal to the product of associated regression weights, 
a*b. Then, the total effect of X on Y equals the direct effect plus the indirect effect, 
that is (a*b) + 1. According to Baron and Kenny (1986) a variable functions as a 
mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the independent 
(predictor) variable and the outcome variable. In order for a variable to serve as a 
mediator it has to meet the following conditions. First, X has a direct effect on M 
(i.e. a^O). Second, M has a direct effect on Y, controlling for X (i.e. b^O). Third, if
M completely mediates the X-Y relation, the direct effect of X on Y (controlling for 
M) must approach zero (i.e. t« 0). Alternatively, if M only partially mediates the 
relation, t may not approach zero. Nevertheless, an indirect effect of X on Y through 
M must be present (i.e. a*b ^0) and the independent variable must be shown to 
significantly affect the dependent variable, so that there exists an effect to be 
mediated. These conditions can be tested with three multiple regression analyses. 
Use of SEM, however, is preferable when we have multiple indicators for the latent 
variables under investigation as well as when measurement error in the predictor and 
mediator variable is taken into account.
Applying the SEM strategy, and assuming that there is a latent predictor 
variable (A), a hypothesized latent mediator variable (B), and a latent outcome 
variable (C), the fit of the direct effect (A —► C) model is assessed at first (Holmbeck, 
1997). Assuming an adequate fit, the fit of the overall A —► B —► C model is then 
tested. Assuming that the overall model provides an adequate fit, the A —> B and B 
—> C path coefficients are examined. These should be significant in the directions 
predicted. The final step in assessing whether there is a mediational effect is to assess 
the fit of the A —*■ B —► C model under two conditions : (a) when the A —> C path is 
constrained to zero, and (b) when the A —> C path is not constrained. The second 
model would then be examined as to whether it provides a significant improvement 
in fit over the first model. Improvement in fit is assessed with a significance test on 
the basis of the difference between the two model chi- squares. If there is a complete 
mediational effect, the addition of the A —► C path to the constrained model should 
not improve the fit. In other words, the previously well- fitted model with the 
significant A —► C path is not improved, when the mediator is taken into account, 
while the A —► C path is reduced to nonsignificance (near zero). If there is a partial
mediation, the addition of the A —► C path to the constrained model should improve 
the fit, but the A —> C path will take a value that is different from zero, but 
significantly smaller than that when the model would not include the mediator.
Testing Mediated Effects through Bootstrapping
The SEM approach to testing mediation effects uses the product of unstandardized 
path coefficients (e.g., a, b) and their standard errors (e.g., sa, Sb), to test for the 
significance of the indirect effects. The corresponding formula (known as the Sobel 
test) is :
Sab= (a X by V (a2 sb2 + b2 sa2 + sa2 sb2), 
where the numerator is the product of the unstandardized coefficients for paths a and 
b, and the denominator is the square root of the quantity inside the parentheses. This 
formula is then used to test whether the indirect effect is different from zero (through 
z statistics and corresponding probability levels) and to construct confidence 
intervals around the estimate of the indirect effect. For example, the 95% confidence 
interval for the indirect effect is:
(a X b )±  (1.96) Sab.
Using the product of coefficients for making inferences about the indirect 
effects, involves the implicit assumption that the sampling distribution of the indirect 
effect (i.e., of the product a X b) is normal. There are reasons to suspect that this 
assumption does not hold when the null hypothesis that a X b = 0 is false, that is 
when mediation is present. Although the sum of two normally distributed variables 
will have a normal shape, their product will not be normal. Indeed, products of 
normal variables with positive means tend to have a positive skew, and products of 
normal variables with means of opposite signs will tend to have a negative skew
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). The implication of this is that the usual test of the indirect 
effect will lack statistical power to reject the null hypothesis that a X b = 0. Thus, 
bootstrapping, a nonparametric resampling procedure, is being recommended (Shrout 
& Bolger, 2002). To bootstrap the sampling distribution of (a X b) we take a sample 
of size n cases with replacement from the original sample. Using this new resample 
of size n, reestimate a and b and then calculate (ab)*, the product of a and b but 
derived in this resampled data set. This process is repeated a total of k times, where k 
is preferably at least 1,000, yielding k estimates of the specific indirect effect of the 
predictor on the outcome variable through the mediator. The mean of the k values of 
(iab)* can be used as the bootstrap estimate of the size of the indirect effect, and their 
standard deviation functions as an estimate of the standard error of ab. The bootstrap 
Cl for the population indirect effect is derived by sorting the k values of (ab)* from 
low to high. Values cutting off the lower and upper 100 (a/2)% of the distribution of 
(ab)* are then found and taken as the lower and upper limits of g= 100 (1- a)% Cl 
for the population indirect effect. For example, if a = 0.05, then g = 95, generating a 
95% Cl. With k = 1,000 bootstrap samples, the upper and lower bounds of the
th  tViinterval would be the 25 and 976 values of (ab)* in the sorted distribution of 
bootstrap estimates.
Modeling Procedure
The statistical program LISREL 8 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) was used to test 
hypotheses 3 and 4 and analyze the proposed mediation model. In order to reduce 
error variance in these models, input variables (predictors) were kept to a minimum. 
Models were tested as maximum likelihood models as recommended by Kline
(1998). Descriptive data were calculated using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS, Version 10.0). Means, standard deviations, and correlations among 
variables were computed and bivariate correlation analyses were performed. Raw 
data in the data matrix were then transferred from SPSS to PRELIS 2 (Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1996) in order to obtain the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated 
variances, covariances or correlations. Since all variables were continuous, the 
product- moment correlation was computed from all complete pairs of observations. 
This matrix was then processed to LISREL.
Two models were developed and tested in this study. The primary model to 
be tested (Figure 1) was a model with paths between the hypothesized predictor 
“psychological responses to cancer” (Psyc Res), and meaning, emotional expressivity 
(Emot exp), and coping, as well as individual paths from these three constructs to 
psychological maladjustment (Psyc mal). Psychological responses to cancer had 
three indicators (intrusions, helplessness, anxious preoccupation), meaning has three 
indicators (purpose, coherence, choice), coping had also three indicators (fatalism, 
fighting spirit, avoidance). Emotional expressivity was measured by three indicators- 
items (“I don’t express my emotions to other people”, “Even when I am experiencing 
strong feelings”, “I don’t express them outwardly, I hold my feelings in”). 
Psychological maladjustment had four indicators (mental health, vitality, social 
functioning, role emotional). An alternative model, without a direct path from 
“psychological responses to cancer” to psychological maladjustment was developed 
to test whether or not the effect of psychological responses to cancer was indirectly 
exerted to psychological maladjustment through meaning and expressivity. Both 
models were theoretically based because of the proposed relationships between
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psychological responses to cancer, existential meaning, emotional expressivity and 
coping style.
sr
HH
UT
CHo i c eP u r p o s e
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I n t r u s
Figure 5. Conceptual path diagram for the Primary Model.
Ethical Considerations
There are practical and ethical difficulties when doing research involving people with 
cancer and it is important to protect the rights of all study participants. One 
important factor that must be considered is fatigue, both mental and physical. For 
this reason, the aim was to diminish respondent burden by focusing data collection 
on specific issues (i.e. domains of adjustment to cancer). Patient medical records 
were reviewed and liaison with relevant physicians was arranged prior to
approaching suitable patients. Identified patients were approached by the researcher 
and, were provided with a detailed information sheet about the purpose of study and 
were asked to sign a consent form. All participants were informed that their 
participation was voluntary, that they would be able to withdraw from the research at 
any time and without giving reasons and without detriment to their care. Participants 
were also informed that the investigator is a research student based at the School of 
Health Science, University of Wales, Swansea, and permission to contact them and 
use their personal data (name, address, telephone number) had been obtained from 
their physician. They were assured that all data from this project would be 
confidential and would be used only for research purposes and that anonymity of 
collected data would also be preserved. Moreover, ethical approval was sought and 
gained from the ethics committee of the hospital.
CHAPTER 5 
Factor Analyses of the Measures Used
In this chapter the internal consistency reliability as well as the content validity of the 
psychological measures is explored, based on factor analytic results.
Factor Analysis of the Life Attitude Profile- Revised (LAP- R)
For factor analysis of the LAP- R, the principal component algorithm was used for 
factor extraction, and retained factors were obliquely rotated to make them more 
interpretable. The six- factor solution that emerged from analysis of the 48 items 
accounted for 51.6% of the total variance and was then submitted to an oblique 
rotation with the Promax method with Kaiser normalization (Table 4). Factor 1 
consisted of 12 items that referred to purpose and coherence and accounted for 
21.4% of the variance. Factor 2 consisted of eight items that reflected death 
acceptance, and accounted for 8.6% of variance. Factor 3 was an eight item choice 
factor that accounted for 7.9% of variance, factor 4 contained eight items related to 
goal- seeking and accounted for 5.5% of variance, while factor 5 seemed to contain 
four items that reflected purpose and coherence and accounted for 4.4% of variance. 
The sixth factor with eight items appeared to correspond to existential vacuum, and 
accounted for 3.8% of variance.
Table 4
Factors derived from the LAP-R, sample items, Cronbach’s alphas, and item factor 
loadings
Factors Variables/ Items Factor
loadings
Factor 1 A philosophy of life gives my existence 0.731
Purpose and significance ,
coherence, A framework that allows me to make sense of my 0.715
p II bo oo life
In my life I have very clear goals and aims 0.710
Factor 2 Even though death awaits me, I am not 0.896
Death acceptance, concerned about it
p II 00 oo Some people are very frightened of death, but I 
am not
0.851
Death makes little difference to me 0.805
Factor 3 My life is in my hands 0.738
Choice/ It is possible for me to live my life in terms of 0.735
responsibility, what I want to do
a= .79 I determine what happens in my life 0.732
Factor 4 I hope for something exciting in the future 0.681
Goal seeking, I am eager to get more out of life 0.652
a= .72 A new challenge in my life would appeal to me 
now
0.643
Factor 5 I am living the kind of life I want to live 0.619
Purpose and I know where my life is going in the future 0.574
coherence,
a=.70
My personal existence is orderly and coherent 0.480
Factor 6 I have experienced the feeling that while I am 0.465
Existential vacuum, destined to accomplish something important, I
<x= .78 cannot put my finger on just what it is
I daydream of finding a new identity and a new 
place for my life
0.454
I try new areas of interest and then these soon 
lose their attractiveness
0.346
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Structures found by factor analysis were viewed as only suggestive, indicating some 
clustering in the data. Based on magnitudes of factor loadings, six factor- based 
scales could be developed. Since some of the purpose and coherence items loaded 
on factor 1, while some other purpose and coherence items loaded on factor 5, two 
separate scales were created, by rearranging the items in these two factors. 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the six scales were all satisfactory 
ranging from .70 to .88. This factor structure was quite similar to the original 
published (Reker, 1999).
Inter- scale correlations were almost all relatively high and statistically 
significant, ranging from r= -.45 to .79 (Table 5). Goal seeking was the scale with 
non- significant correlations with the remaining scales, except with existential 
vacuum (r= .307, p< .01).
Table 5
Correlation coefficients among the six LAP-R scales (n= 148)
Scales 1 2 3 4 5
1. Purpose 1.000
2. Coherence .789** 1.000
3. Choice .605** .475** 1.000
4. Death 441** .338** .388** 1.000
acceptance
5. Existential _ 415** -.455** -.226** -.197* 1.000
vacuum
6. Goal seeking -.027 .003 .036 -.076 .307**
*p< .05. **p< .01.
B a s e d  o n  t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  t h e  p e r s o n a l  m e a n i n g  i n d e x  ( P M I )  w a s  c o m p u t e d  b y  
s u m m i n g  s c o r e s  i n  t h e  P u r p o s e  a n d  C o h e r e n c e  s c a l e s .  P M I  s c o r e s  r a n g e d  f r o m  3 2  t o  
1 1 2  ( F i g u r e  6 ) ,  w i t h  a  m e a n  v a l u e  o f  8 7 . 9  ( S D =  1 3 . 0 3 ) .
imsmmi
P  Ml
Figure 6. F r e q u e n c y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P M I  s c o r e s .
Factor Analysis of the Impact of Event Scale (IES)
F o r  f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  I E S ,  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  c o m p o n e n t  a l g o r i t h m  w a s  u s e d  f o r  f a c t o r  
e x t r a c t i o n ,  a n d  r e t a i n e d  f a c t o r s  w e r e  o b l i q u e l y  r o t a t e d  t o  m a k e  t h e m  m o r e  
i n t e r p r e t a b l e .  T h e  t w o -  f a c t o r  s o l u t i o n  t h a t  e m e r g e d  f r o m  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  1 5  i t e m s  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  5 8 . 6 %  o f  t h e  t o t a l  v a r i a n c e  a n d  w a s  t h e n  s u b m i t t e d  t o  a n  o b l i q u e  
r o t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  P r o m a x  m e t h o d  w i t h  K a i s e r  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  ( T a b l e  6 ) .  F a c t o r  1  
c o n s i s t e d  o f  7  i t e m s  t h a t  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n t r u s i o n  a n d  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  4 6 . 5 %  o f  t h e  
v a r i a n c e .  F a c t o r  2  c o n s i s t e d  o f  8  i t e m s  t h a t  r e f l e c t e d  a v o i d a n c e ,  a n d  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  
1 2 . 1 %  o f  v a r i a n c e .  C r o n b a c h ’ s  a l p h a s  f o r  t h e  s c a l e s  o f  i n t r u s i o n  a n d  a v o i d a n c e  w e r e  
e q u a l  t o  . 9 2  a n d  . 8 0  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
1 ly
Table 6
Factors derived from the IES, Cronbach’s alphas, and sample item factor loadings
Factors Variables/ Items Factor
loadings
Factor 1 (Intrusion, a= Any reminder brought back feelings .850
.92) about it
I was aware that I still had a lot of 
feelings about it but I didn’t deal with 
them
.830
I had waves of strong feelings about it .825
My feelings about it were kind of numb .824
I had trouble falling asleep or staying 
asleep because of pictures or thoughts 
about it that came into my mind
.803
Other things kept making me think about 
it
Pictures about it popped into my mind
.800
.747
Factor 2 (avoidance, a= 
.80)
I tried not to think about it .806
I tried to remove it from memory .799
I avoided letting myself get upset when I 
thought about it or was reminded of it
.738
I tried not to talk about it .729
I stayed away from reminders of it .558
I felt as if it hadn’t happened or it wasn’t 
real
.539
Factor Analysis of the Mini Mental Adjustment to Cancer (Mini- MAC) scale
For factor analysis of the Mini-MAC, the principal component algorithm was used 
for factor extraction, and retained factors were obliquely rotated to make them more 
interpretable. The six- factor solution that emerged from the analysis of the 29 items
accounted for 68.2% of the total variance and was then submitted to an oblique 
rotation with the Promax method with Kaiser normalization (Table 7). Factor 1 
consisted of eight items that referred to helpless- hopeless and accounted for 32.9% 
of the variance. Factor 2 consisted of eight items that reflected anxious 
preoccupation, and accounted for 17.1% of variance. Factor 3 was a four item 
fighting spirit factor that accounted for 7.5% of variance, factor 4 contained four 
items which were related to cognitive avoidance and accounted for 5.7% of variance, 
while factor 5 seemed to contain five items that reflected fatalism and accounted for 
5% of variance.
Factors derived from the Mini-Mac, Cronbach’s alphas, and item factor loadings
Table 7
Factors Variables/ Items Factor
loadings
Factor 1 (helpless- 
hopeless, a= .94)
I feel there is nothing I can do to help 
myself 
I can’t cope
.886
.862
I feel completely at a loss about what to do .853
I can’t handle it
I am not very hopeful about the future 
I feel that life is hopeless 
I feel like giving up 
I think it is the end of the world
.850
.836
.832
.804
.800
Table 7 
Continued
Factor 2 (anxious 
preoccupation, a= .94)
It is a devastating feeling
I feel apprehensive 
I am upset about having cancer 
I suffer great anxiety about it 
I feel very angry about what has happened 
to me
I am a little frightened 
I worry about the cancer returning or 
getting worse
I have difficulty in believing that this 
happened to me
.878
.863
.845
.844
.832
.821
.748
.698
Factor 3 (fighting spirit, 
a= .84)
I see my illness as a challenge .878
I am very optimistic .868
I try to fight the illness .859
I am determined to beat this disease .742
Factor 4 (cognitive I deliberately push all thoughts of cancer .895
avoidance, a= .88) out of my mind
I distract myself when thoughts about my 
illness come into my head
.863
Not thinking about it helps me cope .858
I make a positive effort not to think about 
my illness
.730
Factor 5 (fatalism, a=.70) I’ve put myself in the hands of God .686
I count my blessings .671
At the moment I take one day at a time .654
Since my cancer diagnosis I now realize 
how precious life is arid I’m making the 
best of it
.581
I’ve had a good time; what’s left is a bonus .493
111
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the five scales were all satisfactory 
ranging from .70 to .94. Inter- scale correlations were almost all relatively high, 
ranging from r= -.209 to .633 (Table 8).
Table 8
Correlation coefficients among the five Mini-MAC scales (N= 144)
Scales 1 2 3 4 5
1. Helpless- 1.000
hopeless (HH)
2. Anxious .633** 1.000
preoccupation
(AP)
3. Fighting spirit -.166* .036 1.000
(FS)
4. Cognitive -.056 .026 .503** 1.000
avoidance (AV)
5. Fatalism (F) -.209* -.053 .429** .422** 1.000
*p< .05. **p< .01.
Factor Analysis of the Emotional Expressivity Scale (EES)
The EES was a 17- item unidimensional scale, with a satisfactory reliability 
coefficient (a= .91). EES scores ranged from 28 to 100 (Figure 7), with a mean 
value of 63.98 (SD= 16.51).
IZJ
Figure  7 .  F r e q u e n c y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  E E S  s c o r e s .
Factor Analysis of the Mental Health Component of SF- 36
C o n c e r n i n g  t h e  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  c o m p o n e n t  o f  t h e  S F - 3 6 ,  p r e v i o u s  c o n f i r m a t o r y  f a c t o r  
a n a l y s e s  h a v e  r e v e a l e d  a  f o u r -  f a c t o r  s t r u c t u r e  ( A n a g n o s t o p o u l o s  e t  a h ,  2 0 0 5 ) ,  
m e a s u r i n g  v i t a l i t y  ( V T ) ,  s o c i a l  f u n c t i o n i n g  ( S F ) ,  r o l e  e m o t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n i n g  ( R E ) ,  
a n d  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  ( M H ) .  F o r  t h e s e  s c a l e s ,  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  a l p h a  r e l i a b i l i t y  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  w e r e  e q u a l  t o  . 8 2 ,  . 7 9 ,  . 9 2  a n d  . 8 3  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e s e  s c a l e s ,  f r e q u e n c y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  w e r e  a n a l y z e d .  W h e n  
d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  n o r m a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w e r e  e v i d e n c e d ,  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  w e r e  
p e r f o r m e d .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  s c a l e ,  a  s q u a r e -  r o o t  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,  a f t e r  
a  r e f l e c t i o n ,  w a s  p e r f o r m e d .  R e f l e c t i o n  ( l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  r e v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  o r d e r i n g  o f  
t h e  s c a l e  v a l u e s )  w a s  a l s o  p e r f o r m e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s o c i a l  f u n c t i o n i n g  a n d  v i t a l i t y  
s c a l e s ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  a  c u b e d -  r o o t  a n d  a  l o g a r i t h m i c  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
( s i n c e  d a t a  w e r e  i n i t i a l l y  n e g a t i v e l y  s k e w e d ) .  T h r o u g h  t h e s e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,  
o r i g i n a l  d a t a  w e r e  c o n v e r t e d  t o  s e t s  o f  d a t a  t h a t  f i t t e d  m o r e  c l o s e l y  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  
o f  n o r m a l i t y  a n d  h o m o g e n e i t y  o f  v a r i a n c e  u n d e r l y i n g  s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  d u r i n g  a n a l y s i s  
o f  v a r i a n c e .
CHAPTER 6
Results
The aim of this study was twofold. First, to test the moderated effects of existential 
meaning and emotional expressivity on the relationship between intrusive thoughts 
and psychological adjustment to breast cancer. Second, to examine the mediated 
effects of existential meaning and emotional expressivity on the relationship between 
psychological responses to cancer (e.g., intrusive thoughts, helplessness) and 
psychological adjustment to breast cancer. In this case, two models were tested: the 
primary conceptual model with psychological adjustment being directly influenced 
by existential meaning, expressivity, and psychological responses to cancer, and the 
alternative model with psychological adjustment being influenced by existential 
meaning and expressivity, which in turn were hypothesized to be influenced by 
psychological responses to cancer. The first section of this chapter describes the 
characteristics of the sample including the demographic and medical characteristics 
of the participants, means and standard deviations for all psychological measures and 
intercorrelations among demographic, medical and psychological well- being 
measures. The next section of this chapter provides results which answer the four 
research hypotheses.
Descriptive Statistics
The demographic and medical characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 
9. The sample had a mean age of 58.4 years (SD= 10.1, range= 33- 80). The 
majority of participants (41.3%) had an elementary educational level, 66.9% were 
married, and 87.2% had children. Fifty six percent were housekeepers, and
described their economic status as moderate (53.3%). Almost 73% had undergone 
lumpectomy, 56% reported no family history of cancer, 50.8% had been diagnosed in 
either Stage 0 or Stage I of breast cancer, while the mean years since breast surgery 
were 5.2 (SD= 4.7). Regarding other forms of treatment used in conjunction with 
surgery, 60.3% were administered radiation therapy, 38.6% were administered 
chemotherapy and 32.9% were prescribed hormonal therapy.
Table 9
Demographic and medical characteristics o f  the sample
Variable %
Education
Elementary 41.3
High school 17.4
Lyceum 23.3
University 18.0
Marital status
Single 5.4
Married 66.9
Widowed 18.9
Divorced 8 .8
Type of surgery
Lumpectomy 72.6
Simple mastectomy 9.5
Modified radical mastectomy 17.9
Stage of disease at diagnosis
0 9.3
1 41.5
IIA 32.3
IIB 14.4
IIIA 2.5
Table 10
Mean values, standard deviations and scores range psychological measures
Variable Mean SD Value Range
Mental health (MH) 64.88 24.19 4- 100
Vitality (VT) 63.76 23.68 0 - 1 0 0
Role- emotional (RE) 58.51 42.71 0 - 1 0 0
Social functioning (SF) 71.03 28.93 0 - 1 0 0
Coherence 45.02 6.62 20- 56
Purpose 42.90 7.15 12- 56
Choice 43.31 7.61 17- 56
Personal meaning index 87.91 13.03 32- 112
(PMI)
Helplessness (HH) 13.25 5.01 8-32
Anxious preoccupation 18.85 5.83 8-32
(AP)
Fatalism (F) 15.99 2.75 5- 20
Fighting spirit (FS) 13.13 2 .6 6 4- 16
Avoidance (AV) 11.70 3.06 4- 16
Intrusions 17.83 13.18 0- 45
Emotional expressivity 63.98 16.51 28- 1 0 0
Table 10 presents mean values, standard deviations and scores range for all 
psychological measures. Regarding the four SF- 36 scales, SF had a relatively higher 
mean value, while RE had a relatively low mean value. Regarding the LAP- R scales, 
PMI had a mean value toward the upper limit of its value range.
Correlations among Variables
Bivariate Pearson correlation analyses were conducted examining possible 
relationships between psychological adjustment and demographic and medical 
variables. Analysis results are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Correlations among biomedical and psychological variables
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. MH 7 5 ** 4 7 ** .6 6 ** .13 .1 2 .01 -.06 _ 3 2 **
2. VT 4 9 ** .67** .13 .05 .0 2 -.07 -.36**
3. RE .52** .15 .07 .06 - . 0 2 -.24**
4. SF .1 0 .06 .01 -.18* -.25**
5. Age -.26** .06 .36** -.30**
6 . Education - .1 0 -.15 .0 2
7. Disease stage .08 .1 2
8 . Time since diagnosis -.2 1 *
9. Perceived illness 1 .0 0
severity
* p< .05, ** p< .01
No statistically significant correlations were found between the four scales of the 
mental component of SF- 36 (MH, RE, VT, SF) and age, education or disease stage. 
Only SF was significantly negatively correlated with time since diagnosis. However,
significant negative correlations emerged between these four scales and perceived 
illness seriousness.
Moderated Effects tested through Regression Analyses
If we seek to test the hypothesis that the moderators (existential meaning or 
expressivity) could weaken the effect of the predictor (intrusive thoughts) on the 
outcome (psychological adjustment to breast cancer), then a test of moderating 
effects would be appropriate (Figure 8 ). In other words, existential meaning or 
expressivity may act as buffers or protective factors of the relationship between 
psychological response to cancer (intrusive thoughts) and psychological adjustment 
to it. From this perspective, strong adverse responses to cancer are expected to 
produce poor outcomes (i.e. psychological maladjustment) only when the level of the 
protective factor (i.e. meaning) is low. To examine such protective effects, one 
would test the significance of the interactions between the psychological response to 
cancer and meaning, after entering their main effects.
Meaning
Psychological Response
Psychological
maladjustment
Psychological Response
Meaning
Figure 8. Moderating effects of meaning.
To test the moderating effect of existential meaning (as measured by the 
personal meaning index) in the relationship between psychological response to 
cancer (in the form of intrusive thoughts) and psychological maladjustment (in the 
form of poor mental health), a series of multiple regression analyses were used. The 
main effects of psychological response and existential meaning were entered first, 
while the interaction term was entered afterwards. The results are presented in Table 
12.
Table 12
Hierarchical multiple regression results, with psychological maladjustment as the 
dependent variable
Model Variables Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
B S.E.
Standardized
Coefficients
(Beta)
t P R
square
1 Intrusions .457 .089 .368 5.138 <.001 .420
Meaning -.066 .011 -.412 -5.753 <.001
2 Intrusions .459 .089 .369 5.130 <.001 .421
Meaning -.065 .012 -.408 -5.58 <.001
(Intrusions) X -.002 .007 -.022 -.322 .748
(Meaning)
As can be seen in Table 12, the main effects of intrusive thoughts and existential 
meaning on psychological maladjustment are significant. Intrusive thoughts are 
positively associated with psychological maladjustment (B= .459), and meaning is 
negatively associated with psychological maladjustment (B= -.065). The regression 
coefficient for meaning (the moderator) represents the regression of psychological
maladjustment (the outcome) on meaning, when intrusions (the predictor) is at its 
average level (its mean value). However, the interaction term does not add new 
variance explained in psychological maladjustment (R square change= 0.001, F- 
change (1,131)= 0.104, p= .748). Thus, no significant moderator effect exists. The 
same holds true, after controlling for the effects of age, education and time since 
cancer diagnosis, when entered in the first step of the regression equation. In order 
to avoid any interpretational problems caused by multicollinearity (occurring when 
variables are very highly correlated), Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest that the 
moderator be uncorrelated with both the predictor and the outcome variable. The 
collinearity diagnostics data obtained from regression analyses were therefore 
examined. No multicollinearity was evident, since tolerance values were not too low 
(instead, they were >.83), while no condition index was >30, and only one of the 
variance proportions was greater than .50.
Table 13 summarizes results obtained after examining the effects of multiple 
moderators (i.e., intrusions, existential meaning and emotional expressivity). 
However, performing a large number of statistical tests in this manner, may lead to 
an inflated Type I error (Cohen et al., 2003). To help control for this type of error, 
all moderator effects being considered were entered in a single step, after all of the 
predictor and moderator variables from which they were based, had been entered in 
previous steps.
Table 13
Hierarchical multiple regression results, with psychological maladjustment as the 
dependent variable, with all intervening variables included
Model Variables Unstandardized Standard 95% t P R
Coefficients ized Cl for B square
B S.E. Coeffici
ents
(Beta)
1 Intrusions .643 .093 .517 .459, .827 6.921 <.001 .268
2 Intrusions .443 .091 .356 .263, .623 4.869 <.001 .423
Meaning -.068 .012 -.424 -.091,-.045 -5.887 <.001
Expressivity -.004 .009 -.034 -.022, .013 -.504 .615
3 Intrusions .441 .091 .355 .260, .621 4.835 <.001 .429
Meaning -.066 .012 -.413 -.090, -.043 -5.592 <.001
Expressivity -.003 .009 -.030 -.021, .014 -.434 .665
(Intrusions) X -.002 .007 -.023 -.016, .011 -.334 .739
(Meaning)
(Intrusions) X .005 .005 .077 -.004, .015 1.143 .255
(Expressivity)
The unstandardized regression coefficient for emotional expressivity was B= -.003, 
which was not significant at the .05 level. The unstandardized regression coefficient 
for meaning was B= -.066 (p < .001) suggesting that there was a significant negative 
relation between personal meaning and psychological maladjustment in the sample. 
The unstandardized regression coefficient for psychological response (intrusions)
was B= .441 (p < .001) suggesting that there was a significant positive relation 
between adverse psychological responses and psychological maladjustment. 
Unstandardized regression coefficients for both interaction terms (intrusions X 
meaning and intrusions X expressivity) were not significant. The 95% confidence 
intervals for both interaction terms included zero, which meant that we could not 
reject the null hypothesis that these unstandardized regression coefficients differed 
from zero. The R square change associated with the interaction terms was .006 (p= 
.490). In other words, the interaction between intrusions and meaning, and between 
intrusions and expressivity, explained only an additional 0 .6 % of the variance in 
psychological maladjustment scores over and above the 42.3% explained by the first- 
order effects of meaning, expressivity and intrusions alone. Thus, no significant 
moderator effect existed.
Mediated Effects tested through SEM
If we seek to test the hypothesis that the psychological responses to cancer influence 
existential meaning and expressivity, which, in turn, influence psychological 
maladjustment, then a mediational analysis is appropriate. Under these conditions, 
we may advance the hypothesis that the higher the intensity of the adverse 
psychological stress responses to cancer, the weaker a patient’s personal meaning or 
expressivity, which would, in turn, be associated with higher levels of psychological 
maladjustment.
Potential mediators were first tested individually in path models, followed by 
models in which multiple mediators were tested simultaneously. In testing the 
mediational function of meaning in the relation between psychological responses and
1psychological maladjustment, a diagram of the model was developed, depicted in 
Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Path diagram showing the direct effect of psychological responses to 
cancer on psychological maladjustment.
In this diagram, observed variables are represented by rectangles, and latent 
variables are enclosed in ellipses. Path coefficient values appear as numbers in the 
middle of lines with one- way arrows, and errors in measured variables are at the end 
of one- way arrows. In order to establish the identifiability of the model, each latent 
variable had at least three indicators, each indicator loaded on only one latent 
variable, measurement errors associated with the indicators were not correlated, and 
the latent variables were allowed to covary. Thus, the “psychological responses to 
cancer” latent variable had three indicators (intrusions, helplessness, anxious 
preoccupation), while psychological maladjustment had four indicators (mental 
health, vitality, social functioning, role emotional). Meaning was assessed using 
three indicators (purpose, coherence, choice). Emotional expressivity was measured 
by three indicators- items (“I don’t express my emotions to other people”, “Even 
when I am experiencing strong feelings”, “I don’t express them outwardly, I hold my 
feelings in”).
During mediational analysis, four steps were followed. First, the fit of the 
direct effect model, involving the relationship between psychological responses to 
cancer and psychological maladjustment, was assessed (Figure 9). All fit indices 
were satisfactory (Satorra- Bentler scaled chi- square= 22.28, df= 13, p= .051, 
RMSEA= .078, NNFI= .97, CFI= .98, GFI= .95). The unstandardized path 
coefficient between the predictor (psychological responses) and the outcome variable 
(psychological maladjustment) was statistically significant and equal to 0.25 (SE= 
0.04, p< .05).
Assessing the fit of the overall model (Figure 10), all fit indices were 
adequate (Satorra- Bentler chi square = 49.64, df= 32, p> .01, RMSEA= .069,
NNFI= .97, CFI= .98, GFI= .92).
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Figure 10. Path diagram showing the direct and indirect effects of psychological 
responses to cancer on psychological maladjustment through meaning.
The direct path between psychological responses to cancer and meaning was 
significant (gamma= -0.72, SE= 0.17, p< .05) and the direct path from meaning (the 
mediator) to psychological maladjustment was significant as well (beta= -0.12, SE= 
0.03, p< .05). The path from psychological responses to cancer to psychological
maladjustment remained significant (gamma= 0.16, SE= 0.04, p< .05). The indirect 
effect of psychological responses on psychological maladjustment (through meaning) 
was also significant and equal to 0.09 (SE= 0.02, p< .05). When the path from the 
predictor (psychological responses) to the outcome variable (psychological, 
maladjustment) was constrained to zero (Figure 11), the value of the Satorra chi- 
square changed to 63.95, dF= 33, p< .001 (RMSEA= .09, NNFI= .95, CFI= .97, GFI= 
.90, RMR= 1.11).
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Figure 11. Path diagram showing the direct effect of psychological responses to 
cancer on meaning, and in turn, of meaning on psychological maladjustment.
Comparing chi square values between this last model and the previous one (where 
the predictor- outcome path was not constrained), we notice that Ax2= 14.31, df= 1 , 
p< .05. This means that the addition of the path between psychological responses 
and psychological maladjustment to the constrained model does improve the fit. 
However, the path coefficient is now reduced, from 0.25 to 0.16, which is a 
significant reduction, as indicated by the size (0.09) of the indirect effect of 
psychological responses on psychological maladjustment. This finding provides 
clear evidence of partial mediation.
The mediational function of emotional expressivity was then examined 
(Figure 12). Assessing the fit of the overall model, all fit indices were adequate 
(Satorra- Bentler chi square = 33.22, df= 32, p> .05, RMSEA= .018, NNFI= .96, 
CFI= .97, GFI= .92). However, the direct path between psychological responses and 
expressivity was not significant (gamma= -0.05, SE= 0.05, p> .05) and the direct 
path from expressivity (the mediator) to psychological maladjustment was not 
significant as well (beta= -0.08, SE= 0.19, p> .05). Not significant was also the 
indirect effect of psychological responses on psychological maladjustment, through 
expressivity (path= 0.001, SE= 0.01, p= 0.37). Only the path from psychological 
responses to psychological maladjustment remained significant (gamma= 0.25, SE= 
0.04, p< .05).
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Figure 12. Path diagram showing the direct and indirect effects of psychological 
responses to cancer on psychological maladjustment through emotional expressivity.
In the case of emotional expressivity, no support for a mediational effect is provided.
Once it was established that meaning can have a mediating effect, this effect 
was examined to see if it remained intact, after controlling for the effects of coping 
strategies and emotional expressivity. Including several mediators in one model 
allows determination of which mediators are more successful than others and to pit
13 /
competing theories against one another within a single model. The conceptual full 
model is presented in Figure 13, together with estimated unstandardized path 
coefficients.
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Figure 13. Path diagram showing the direct and indirect effects of psychological 
responses to cancer on psychological maladjustment through meaning, emotional 
expressivity, and coping.
This multiple- mediator model provided adequate fit to the data (%2 (94) = 
103.78, p = 0.23, RMSEA = .03, NNFI = .96, CFI = .97, RMR = .87, GFI = .90). 
The only significant direct paths were from psychological responses to meaning 
(gamma= -0.72, SE= 0.17, p< .05), from psychological responses to psychological 
maladjustment (gamma= 0.13, SE= 0.05, p< .05), from meaning to coping (beta=
0.18, SE= 0.04, p< .05) and from meaning to psychological maladjustment (beta= - 
0.15, SE= 0.04, p< .05). There were also significant indirect effects, from 
psychological responses to coping (via meaning) (path= -0.13, SE= 0.04, p< .05) and 
from psychological responses to psychological maladjustment (mainly via meaning) 
(path= 0.12, SE= 0.04, p< .05). Specifically, regarding the total effect of 
psychological responses on coping, although the indirect effect (via meaning) was 
negative and significant, the direct effect was positive and not significant (gamma= 
0.12, SE= 0.07, p> .05). This resulted in a nonsignificant (close to zero) total effect 
of psychological responses on coping (= -0.01, SE= 0.06, p> .05). Since the path 
from psychological responses to coping was initially not significant (gamma = 0.004, 
SE = 0.056, p = .073), this could not be a case of mediation. However, this could be 
a case of suppression, where the magnitude of the direct effect is similar to that of the 
indirect effect, but opposite in sign, resulting in a total effect close to zero (Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002). Moreover, the magnitude of the direct effect became larger (it 
increased from 0.004 to 0.12) when the third variable (i.e., meaning) was included in 
the model.
The value of the squared multiple correlations for the structural equation is a 
measure of the proportion of variance in the endogenous variables accounted for by 
variables in the structural equations. In the case of psychological maladjustment this 
value was equal to .58, indicating that 58% of the variance in psychological 
maladjustment was explained by the full model. Moreover, the squared multiple 
correlations for the observed independent and dependent variables ranged from .56 
(in the case of fighting spirit) to .85 (in the case of purpose), indicating that none of 
them was a poor measure of its latent variable.
When the path from the predictor (psychological responses) to the outcome 
variable (psychological maladjustment) was constrained to zero, the value of the 
Satorra chi- square changed to %= 108.74, df = 95, p= .16 (RMSEA = .035, NNFI = 
.95, CFI = .96, GFI = .8 6 , Standardized RMR = .069).
Since the total effect of psychological responses on psychological 
maladjustment was equal to 0.25, and the direct effect of psychological responses on 
psychological maladjustment was 0.13, it might be concluded that 52% (= 0.13/ 
0.25) of the covariance between them was accounted for by the direct influence of 
psychological responses and the remaining 48% being mediated through a 
combination of the intervening variables (namely, meaning, coping, emotional 
expressivity). However, the magnitude of the mediated effect is strongest for 
meaning alone [(-0.72) X (-0.15)= 0.108], which represents the largest proportion 
(63%) of the indirect effect of psychological responses on psychological 
maladjustment that is mediated by the intervening variables. Comparing the chi 
square values between this last model and the previous one (where the predictor- 
outcome path was not constrained), we notice that Ax (1) = 4.96, p< .05. This 
means that addition of the path between psychological responses and psychological 
maladjustment to the constrained model does improve the fit, which suggests that a 
partial mediational effect (of meaning) does exist.
Mediated Effects tested through Bootstrapping Procedures
Based on a SPSS macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2006), the type of analysis described 
earlier was conducted to estimate bootstrap standard errors and CIs for total and 
indirect effects, based on k — 5,000 bootstrap samples and adopting a a  = 0.01 
probability level, that generates 99% CIs. In these analyses, the predictor was
psychological responses, the outcome variable was psychological maladjustment, 
while meaning, coping, and emotional expressivity served as mediators.
Coping
Meaning
Expressivity
Psychological
maladjustment
Psychological
Responses
Figure 14. Conceptual diagram showing multiple mediator effects of Psychological 
Responses to cancer on Psychological maladjustment.
Values for these variables were obtained from LISREL, by estimating the factor 
scores for each latent variable depicted in Figure 14. The path from psychological 
responses to meaning was statistically significant (path = -0.762, SE = 0.103, p< 
.0 0 1 ), as was the path from meaning to psychological maladjustment (path = -0.178, 
SE = 0.026, p< .001). Regarding the total effect, of psychological responses on 
psychological maladjustment this was equal to 0.242 (p< .001) and the direct effect 
was equal to 0.096 (p = .002). The difference between total and direct effect is the 
total indirect effect exerted through the three mediators, with a point estimate of 
0.146 and 99% Cl of 0.094 to 0.211. Thus, it is possible to claim that the difference 
between total and direct effect of psychological responses on psychological 
maladjustment is different from zero, as its 99% Cl does not contain zero. Thus,
taken as a set, meaning, coping, and emotional expressivity do significantly mediate 
the effect of psychological responses on psychological maladjustment.
Table 14
Point estimates, standard errors, z- values, and 99% confidence intervals for direct 
and indirect effects o f  psychological responses to cancer on psychological 
maladjustment through meaning, coping, and emotional expressivity
Indirect effects Point estimate SE Z 
(Normal theory tests)
Bootstrap 99% Cl 
Lower Upper
Total 0.1459 0.0255 5.7248 0.0939 0.2113
Meaning 0.1357 0.0270 5.0235 0.0820 0.2169
Coping -0.0058 0.0061 -0.9531 -0.0339 0 .0 1 2 2
Expressivity 0.0160 0.0088 1.8139 -0.0013 0.0560
Meaning vs Coping 0.1414 0.0309 4.5807 0.0795 0.2447
Meaning vs 0.1197 0.0282 4.2370 0.0489 0.2086
Expressivity
Coping vs -0.0218 0.0115 -1.8989 -0.0673 0.0043
Expressivity
An examination of specific indirect effects indicates that only meaning is a 
significant mediator of the relationship between psychological responses and 
psychological maladjustment, as its 99% Cl does not include zero, suggesting that 
this specific indirect effect is statistically significant at the .01 level. Existential 
meaning accounts for a significant part of the relationship between psychological 
responses and psychological maladjustment, but not for all of it. Neither coping nor
emotional expressivity contribute to the indirect effect above and beyond meaning. 
The bootstrapped 99% Cl for the indirect effect of psychological responses on 
psychological maladjustment through meaning is (0.0820, 0.2169}. Relative to the 
99% Cl, that is (0.0663, 0.2051}, based on the product of path coefficients, the 
estimated standard error and assumption of normality, the lower confidence limit for 
the bootstrap Cl is further from zero, indicating higher power for bootstrapped CIs 
compared to normal- theory intervals. Examination of the pairwise contrasts of the 
indirect effects shows that the magnitude of the specific indirect effect through 
meaning is significantly larger than the specific indirect effect through either coping 
or emotional expressivity, because zero is not contained in the corresponding 
intervals. Directions of the significant paths are consistent with the interpretation that 
stronger psychological responses to cancer lead to lower existential meaning, which, 
in turn, leads to greater psychological maladjustment.
CHAPTER 7 
Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, the main findings are summarized and discussed in relation to the 
research hypotheses. Empirical evidence from other existing studies in support of 
the current findings is presented. Conclusions are drawn and the theoretical and 
practical implications of the results are discussed. Limitations of the present study 
are acknowledged and recommendations are suggested for future research.
Discussion
In summarizing briefly the background to the present study, breast cancer may be 
considered as a traumatic experience, challenging patients’ fundamental assumptions 
about purpose in life, and comprehensibility of the world. Finding meaning under 
these conditions, rebuilding of shattered beliefs, developing new world models and 
altering goal priorities, may lead to distress alleviation, and better prospects for 
adjustment. In addition to meaning making, emotional expressivity and disclosure of 
emotions can help cancer patients discharge cancer- related distress, a process which 
may promote adjustment. This study set out to explore the role of existential 
meaning and emotional expressivity in the psychological adjustment of breast cancer 
patients. Existing empirically tested models of adjustment to breast cancer have 
rarely included meaning and expressivity as important variables in the relationship 
between psychological responses to cancer (such as intrusive thoughts) and 
psychological adjustment to it. Moreover, in the existing literature, the mediated 
effects of meaning and expressivity have not been clearly distinguished from their 
moderated effects. Thus, the aim of this study was twofold: First, to test whether
existential meaning or expressivity (moderators) could weaken the effect of intrusive 
thoughts on psychological adjustment to breast cancer. Second, to test whether 
higher levels of the adverse psychological responses to cancer (e.g., intrusive 
thoughts, helplessness) could lower a patient’s existential meaning or emotional 
expressivity levels (mediators), which would, in turn, be associated with higher 
levels of psychological maladjustment.
The main findings of the study can be summarized as follows. First, the 
direct effect of psychological responses to cancer (intrusions) on psychological 
adjustment is negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that as 
unwanted, recurrent, and uncontrollable intrusive thoughts and memories about 
breast cancer become more disturbing, psychological adjustment becomes poorer. 
Second, existential meaning is positively and significantly related to psychological 
adjustment to cancer. This finding suggests that as sense of meaning, coherence and 
purpose in life becomes stronger, psychological adjustment to breast cancer is 
enhanced. Third, existential meaning partially mediates the relationship between 
psychological responses to breast cancer and psychological adjustment to it. This 
finding suggests that the higher the intensity of the adverse psychological responses 
to cancer (e.g., intrusive thoughts, helplessness), the lower a patient’s existential 
meaning levels (mediator), which are, in turn, associated with higher levels of 
psychological maladjustment. Fourth, no indication of moderating effects of 
emotional expressivity and existential meaning on psychological adjustment, is 
apparent. This suggests that neither high meaning nor expressivity levels can 
weaken the effect of intrusive thoughts on psychological adjustment to breast cancer. 
Fifth, neither direct nor indirect (mediating) effects of psychological responses to 
cancer on psychological adjustment to it through emotional expressivity can be
observed. Sixth, existential meaning partially mediates the relationship between 
psychological responses to breast cancer and coping with cancer. This finding 
suggests that the higher the intensity of the adverse psychological responses to 
cancer (e.g., intrusive thoughts, helplessness), the lower a patient’s existential 
meaning levels (mediator), which are, in turn, associated with lower levels of 
adaptive coping. Seventh, the primary structural model with a direct path from 
psychological responses to cancer to psychological adjustment better fits the data, 
than the alternative model without such a path.
With respect to the relationships found among intrusive thoughts, global meaning, 
and psychological adjustment
Results of this study pertaining to the hypothesized significant relationships among 
intrusive thoughts, global meaning, and psychological adjustment (Hypotheses 1 and 
3) are in line with those presented by Vickberg et al. (2001) who found that patients 
with cancer displayed global meaning scores that were inversely related to 
psychological distress and positively related to the mental health dimension of 
quality of life (emotional role functioning, mental functioning, vitality). These 
findings suggest that global meaning may be an important factor in the psychological 
adjustment of cancer patients. Mullen, Smith, and Hill (1993) also found that higher 
levels of sense of coherence in cancer patients were significantly associated with 
lower levels of psychological distress. Moreover, results of the current study are in 
line with those presented by Brewin et al. (1998a, 1998b) who found that the 
presence of intrusive memories in cancer patients predicted greater psychopathology 
(anxiety) and was strongly related to being depressed . Thus, existing research
studies provide confirmatory evidence of the link, found in the present study, 
between meaning and adjustment.
In interpreting the above mentioned research findings of the present study, 
two explanatory frameworks will be provided, regarding the significant relationships 
found among intrusive thoughts, global meaning, and psychological adjustment to 
cancer. Park and Folkman (1997) have provided a framework for understanding 
meaning making, either situational or global, in the context of stressful life events 
and illness conditions. According to their model, global meaning pertains to 
people’s assumptions about order (i.e., basic beliefs about justice, order and fairness 
of the world, about personal deservedness, about the benevolence, understandability/ 
comprehensibility, controllability, predictability of the world, as well as beliefs 
regarding self- worth), and about purpose (and the pursuit of goals in life). When a 
traumatic event occurs, finding meaning in such events can involve changing one’s 
fundamental belief systems or goals, which may entail the rebuilding of shattered 
global beliefs and the development of new world models, or drastically altering goal 
hierarchies (by revising old goals, abandoning them, rearranging priorities, or finding 
goal substitutes). If patients have not managed to reconcile their appraised (or 
reappraised) meaning of the event with their global meaning (global beliefs, values, 
and goals), then this incongruence and a related mismatch will persist, leading to a 
ruminative process (with intrusive thoughts) and worse prospects for adjustment. On 
the other hand, if patients are able to integrate appraised meaning of their illness with 
their global meaning and achieve reconciliation, either by assimilation or 
accommodation, of situational and global meaning, then distress will be alleviated 
and adaptive resolution of posttraumatic stress will be permitted. In this way, global
meaning can be associated with decreased intrusions and better adjustment to 
traumatic events.
In further interpreting the results of this study regarding the significant 
relationships found among intrusive thoughts, global meaning and psychological 
adjustment to breast cancer, the post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) theoretical 
framework can be drawn upon. According to PTSD theories, such as the cognitive 
processing theories of trauma (Horowitz, 1986; Janoff- Bulman, 1989), traumatic 
experiences threaten one’s preexisting schemas of the world and oneself within the 
world. In order to successfully process traumatic experiences, it is necessary to 
integrate the traumatic experience into one’s world and self- schemas. Intrusive 
thoughts constitute attempts on the part of the trauma victim to integrate, or make 
sense of, what has happened. While intrusive thoughts may actually facilitate the 
long process of integration, the experience of unwanted, recurrent, uncontrollable 
and unexpected thoughts, memories, or dreams about the trauma may be quite 
aversive. Intrusive thoughts may be a mechanism through which a stressful event 
can have a continuing impact on an individual’s level of psychological distress and 
well- being. Repetitive reliving or re-experiencing of the traumatic event or its 
aftermath (e.g., the side- effects of the treatment, waiting for the results of prognostic 
testing), or occurrence of persistent reminders of the disease (e.g., post-surgical 
scars, bodily symptoms, physical limitations, pain) can all contribute to prolonged, 
chronic stress. Thus, the experience of intrusive thoughts is linked to greater 
psychological distress and poorer quality of life, poorer psychological adjustment or 
mental health status (Cordova et al., 1995).
Regarding relationships among intrusive thoughts, global meaning, and 
psychological maladjustment, results here are partly consistent with that from
previous research. For example, Vickberg’s et al. (2000) findings lend support to 
those of the present study. These authors found that more frequent intrusive thoughts 
about cancer and its treatment were associated with more psychological distress in 
women who had been diagnosed with breast cancer. Moreover, according to these 
authors, a strong sense of global meaning was significantly associated with lower 
psychological distress. An explanation for the significant negative association 
between global meaning and psychological distress, found in the present study is that 
a patient who feels that life has purpose and coherence is possibly able to put 
intrusive thoughts (that result from an incongruence between global meaning and 
appraised meaning of the traumatic event) into perspective more easily, while the 
impact of intrusive thoughts may be softened in a way that the patient will not be 
enough distressed by them. However, contrary to Vickberg’s et al. results, this study 
found no moderating role of global meaning in the relation between intrusive 
thoughts and psychological distress (or psychological adjustment). One possible 
explanation for this is that the measure of psychological distress, in Vickberg’s 
study, included a psychopathological symptoms checklist, while the measure used in 
this study included items which tapped into mental health functioning. In addition to 
that, intrusive thoughts experienced by patients with high global meaning may be 
qualitatively different (e.g. less threatening) than those experienced by patients with 
low global meaning. Thus the strength of the relation between intrusive thoughts and 
global meaning may be variable, leading to the confounding of the true relationship 
between them, as well as between them and psychological distress or adjustment.
With respect to the relationships found among intrusive thoughts, emotional 
expressivity, and psychological adjustment
Results of the current study pertaining to the hypothesized relationships among 
intrusive thoughts, emotional expressivity, and psychological adjustment 
(Hypotheses 2 and 4) are in line with that presented by Stanton et al. (2000), who 
found that quality of life (including social, emotional and functional domains) of 
breast cancer patients was not predicted significantly by their emotional expression. 
Moreover, Zakowski et al. (2001) have found results similar to those of the present 
study, providing support for the view that no significant effects of emotional 
expressivity on either general distress (and the subsequent poor adjustment) or 
intrusions exist.
Regarding the nonsignificant effect of intrusions on emotional expressivity 
(EE) found in the present study, Zakowski et al. (2001) have proposed that the 
expression of emotion may not reduce the frequency of intrusive thoughts (as 
measured by the Impact of Event Scale) but rather by rendering these recurrent 
thoughts less distressing. Thus intrusion may be associated with EE through a 
different mechanism than that implied by the IES. Then, the nonsignificant 
relationship found between them does not come as a complete surprise and is rather 
expected.
Regarding interpretation of the nonsignificant effect of EE on psychological 
adjustment found in the present study, the theoretical framework of Kennedy- Moore 
and Watson (2001) posits that, in order for expression of emotions to alleviate 
distress, elicit positive outcomes, and to serve as a means of enhancing self­
acceptance, fostering self- understanding or improving social relationships, it must 
occur in the context of a supportive social relationship* with minimal social
constraints in talking about the cancer experience. Otherwise, distress expression 
may be risky, and can lead to expresser’s feelings of rejection, misunderstanding, 
embarrassment, and betrayal. Thus, patients’ unsupportive social relationships, not 
measured in the present study, may lead to obscurity of, or reverse any beneficial 
effects of EE on adaptation and psychological well- being.
Results of the current study are not confirmed by those presented by 
Zakowski et al. (2001). These authors reported that dispositional emotional 
expressivity moderated the relation between intrusive cognitions and distress, such 
that women who were more emotionally expressive might be less likely to be 
distressed by their intrusive cognitions about cancer, thus facilitating their emotional 
well- being and promoting their psychological adjustment. However, their sample 
consisted of healthy women who had family histories of breast cancer. This may 
partly explain the differences in study results, since the present study group consisted 
of female breast cancer patients.
Moreover, in contrast with the Quartana’s et al. (2006) study, whose sample 
consisted of patients of both sexes with various sites of cancer (e.g., breast, prostate, 
ovarian, colon), no statistically significant relations were found between emotional 
expressivity and psychological adjustment. Further to this, no significant interaction 
effect was found between intrusions and negative emotional expressivity which is 
thought to be predictive of general psychological adjustment. This can be explained 
by the fact that the measure of emotional expressivity used in this study (i.e., EES) 
assesses generalized expressivity, a dispositional tendency to display emotions 
outwardly, regardless of the specific situation that triggers these emotions, of any 
particular type of emotion (e.g., anger, anxiety, sadness, fear, happiness, joy, interest, 
contentment), emotional valence (positive or negative), mode/ channel of expression
(e.g., verbal, non- verbal) or intensity, duration, or context of emotional expression. 
So the emotional expressivity scale (EES) cannot distinguish between positive and 
negative emotional expressivity. Thus, it cannot determine if negative (but not 
positive) expressivity may moderate relations between intrusions and distress, or if 
positive (but not negative) expressivity is associated with distress, as Quartana et al. 
have suggested.
With respect to the relationships found among Coping, Intrusions, Global meaning, 
and Adjustment
Regarding coping with cancer, this study did not find any significant associations 
between coping and intrusions or adjustment, but found that existential meaning 
partially mediated the relationship between psychological responses to breast cancer 
and coping According to Janoff- Bulman (1992) and Horowitz (1986), a 
confrontation with an adverse event, such as a life- threatening illness, may have a 
shattering effect on a person’s assumptive world (that events are nonrandom, 
predictable, comprehensible, controllable, or perhaps to some extent justified). 
Through a cognitive- emotional process, that includes intrusive and avoidant states, a 
person tries to rebuild his assumptive world in a direction consistent with new 
trauma- related information. Rebuilding is attempted through cognitive assimilation 
of the traumatic memory within existing models of the world, or revision of existing 
schemas to accommodate the new information. Initially, cancer survivors may be 
concerned with issues of comprehension and sense making (e.g., by developing 
explanations for the event, attributing it to God’s will, or to lifestyle). Making sense 
of the event, by changing religious or spiritual beliefs or by perceiving the event as
predictable or as in some way justified, can facilitate coping with threats to one’s 
view of the world as meaningful.
However, over time, survivors come to raise issues of significance. Search 
for meaning- as- significance (that is deriving benefit from trauma, learning about 
one’s strength in the face of adversity, gaining insight into the meaning of life or the 
importance of relationships) is necessary for benefit finding and growth (Joseph & 
Linley, 2005). In the case of meaning- as- significance, revision of one’s life goals 
and reordering of priorities can facilitate coping with threats to one’s sense of self 
and self- esteem. The event is not the central focus of coping; rather, the emphasis is 
more directly on understanding the self in the context of adversity (Davis, Nolen- 
Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998). Efforts to cope are directed not towards the event per se 
but towards threats to a person’s self- concept. These coping efforts are influenced 
more strongly by an individual’s characteristic ways of responding to stress, which 
suggests the influence of dispositional factors (e.g., personality attributes such as 
optimism, or relatively stable global meaning).
Thus, characteristics of the event (such as psychological responses it elicits 
and intrusions that it causes) are not strongly associated with coping. Rather, coping 
is strongly associated with more stable individual’s characteristics, such as global 
meaning. The theorized relationship between coping and adjustment could not be 
detected in the present study. This finding could reflect the lack of a true 
relationship between coping with cancer and certain indices of psychosocial 
adjustment (such as mental health functioning). On the other hand, this finding could 
reflect shortcomings in the operationalisation of relevant concepts. The mental 
health component of the SF- 36 has been used to measure psychological and social 
aspects of adjustment and well- being of women with breast cancer (Hanson- Frost,
et al., 2000), the mental health component of health- related quality of life indicating 
mental functioning (Tomich & Helgeson, 2002; Tomich & Helgeson, 2004; Tomich 
& Helgeson, 2006), health- related psychological quality of life (Golden- Kreutz et 
al., 2005), the mental health dimension of quality of life as a component of 
psychological adjustment (Vickberg et al., 2001). Thus, there is a lack of conceptual 
clarity regarding this component of SF-36, which may lead to variability and 
discrepancies in the results of studies that use this construct. It may be that this 
component of SF- 36 measures something generic, that is not directly associated with 
disease- related coping efforts. The latter (i.e., coping) may be more strongly 
associated with psychological distress measures, such as those involving 
psychological symptoms that cause discomfort, like anxiety, depression, obsession- 
compulsion, paranoid ideation, and somatization, or with measures of mood states 
and emotional disturbance (e.g., being restless, nervous, sad, blue, miserable, 
helpless, worthless, bitter, annoyed, fatigued, confused). Thus, coping with cancer 
(operationalised by Mini- MAC) may not be related with adjustment (operationalised 
by SF- 36).
Limitations of the Study
Despite the important findings of this study, some limitations of this study need to be 
considered. First, the design of the study was cross- sectional, which prevented 
establishing the consistency of existential meaning and emotional expressivity over 
time and across different disease phases (e.g., the period surrounding diagnosis and 
medical treatment, the periods of disease recurrence and end- stage disease).
Although the Emotional Expressivity Scale and the Life Attitude Profile- Revised 
are supposed to measure relatively stable constructs, different psychosocial illness
phases may impose different adaptational tasks, may result in changing evaluations 
of the medical condition and quality of life (Addington- Hall & Kalra, 2001), and 
call upon different existential meaning types (e.g., situational vs global meaning, 
sense- making vs benefit- finding meaning) or different emotional expressivity 
modes (e.g., negative vs positive emotions). Moreover, assumptions about 
directionality of relationships cannot be made, since such assumptions should be 
based on longitudinal, prospective designs.
Second, essentially all structural equation models have equivalent versions 
that generate the same predicted associations among variables. Moreover, alternative 
models need to be specified based on competing theories. For example, the 
association between intrusions and adjustment could operate in the opposite direction 
from the paths tested in the models. That is, it is plausible that poor psychological 
adjustment (symptoms of anxiety, depression) lead to increased intrusive thoughts 
and weak existential meaning or low expressivity. Thus, alternative, theory- driven 
models need to be considered in interpreting the findings of the present study.
Third, results are subject to sampling or selection effects with respect to 
individuals, measures, and occasions. Thus, it should be acknowledged that 
limitations exist in the generalizability of the models tested beyond the studied 
population (female breast cancer survivors, on average five years after diagnosis, 
mostly of stages I and II, with no distant metastases).
Fourth, certain psychological factors such as personality attributes (e.g., 
optimism) or social support indices as predictors of adjustment or as moderators of 
the relation between psychological responses to cancer and psychological adjustment 
were not included in the present study. Omitted variables that may be correlated 
with variables already in the model, can cause estimates of model paths to be
Xdistorted and biased. Future studies should include these variables in models of 
adjustment to breast cancer.
Implications from this Study
As this study was one of the first to integrate existential meaning into models of 
adjustment to breast cancer, it provides important leads for future research, 
theoretical development, and counseling practice with breast cancer patients.
Implications for Meaning Research
The present study added new information and raised more questions for research in 
psycho-oncology and existential meaning. Significant advances have been made in 
the study of psychosocial adaptation to cancer. In the past seven to ten years, psycho­
oncology research has focused on developing integrated models to demonstrate 
patients' psychosocial adaptation to cancer (Holland, 1998; Nicholas & Veach,
2000). One of the most comprehensive models in psycho-oncology was proposed by 
Nicholas and Veach (2000) but has not been empirically validated. These authors 
suggested the convergence of three broad classes of variables on current 
psychosocial adaptation: patient-derived variables (demographics, intrapersonal 
variables) interact with cancer-derived variables (breast cancer type, disease stage, 
prognosis) and life context (culture, health-related schema, developmental stage) to 
determine the patient's overall reaction to cancer-related stressors. It is evident from 
the present study that existential meaning has its own place in adjustment models and 
needs to be included in future empirical studies on psychosocial adjustment to 
cancer.
The integration of psycho-oncology and meaning research in the present 
study proved useful for enhancing our understanding of the adjustment process of 
breast cancer patients. Patients tended to have a high sense of meaning and purpose 
in their lives, which positively influenced their psychological adjustment. It appears 
that cancer patients as a group can provide important information about the process 
of "meaning-making" during their illness. More qualitative and quantitative studies 
are needed to explicate the specific influence of a sense of meaning on overall 
adjustment.
Implications for Existential Theory
Results from this study on breast cancer patients strengthened previous findings that 
a sense of meaning and life purpose positively influences a person's overall sense of 
well-being and quality of life. Meaning has once more been shown to be an 
important part of a person's life, thus supporting its central role in existential thought 
and theory. Existential theorists suggested ways of how meaning is created by an 
individual (Frankl, 1963; Wong, 1998) and how its absence negatively influences the 
individual, yet they rarely explicated the benefits of a sense of meaning or the 
workings of it together with other psychological, phenomenological, and 
philosophical concepts. As research continues on meaning issues for individuals 
affected with a serious illness, existential theory needs to be expanded to include 
some of these research findings as well as providing more sound theoretical 
statements to be tested by researchers. Existential theory by nature is an abstract, 
philosophically based framework for understanding human functioning. At the 
present time, though, in order for theory and philosophy to drive science, theoretical 
statements have to be testable. Existential theory in its current status has a long way
to go before researchers can extract clear research questions and hypotheses from it. 
Thus, continued theoretical work in existential theory is needed, especially in the 
area of integration between illness and existential meaning issues.
For coping theory, results from this study did support Park and Folkman's 
(1997) theorized link between meaning (global or situational) and coping. No other 
studies on cancer patients have been conducted with this framework so that it is 
unclear whether these results are unique to the present study. However, the 
relationship found between coping and meaning calls for a more intense and focused 
research effort in this area that informs theoretical statements about meaning-making 
and coping.
Recommendations for Counseling with Breast Cancer Patients
The present study showed breast cancer patients five years on average after diagnosis 
as having a level of existential meaning, that positively influences their 
psychological adjustment. How can that be explained in light of the general 
consensus that breast cancer tends to cause significant psychological distress for 
women (Suinn & VandenBos, 1999)? Some researchers have identified a positive 
effect of a cancer diagnosis on a person's overall sense of existential meaning. Pelusi 
(1997) reported that the experience of cancer might actually add to perceived 
meaning in life for the patient. This potentially "positive" effect of an illness could 
be explained by research showing that successfully living through a life-changing or 
traumatic experience did increase meaning levels for individuals (Wong & Fry,
1998).
Existential meaning was significantly and positively related to a patient's 
overall adjustment. Therefore, mental health professionals working with breast
cancer patients need to address meaning issues with their patients as much as any 
other adjustment concerns. Existential meaning is a topic that can be included as part 
of many different psychotherapies, such as cognitive therapies and experiential 
therapies.
Models of cognitive- existential group therapy for cancer patients have 
already been proposed (Kissane et al., 1997). The goals of such therapies are for 
members to improve problem- solving, develop cognitive strategies to maximize 
coping, enhance a sense of mastery over life and re- evaluate priorities for the future. 
Spirituality- and meaning- centered group psychotherapy interventions (Breitbart, 
2002), as well as meaning- centered group psychotherapy (Greenstein & Breitbart, 
2000) have been applied to patients with advanced cancer. These groups focus on 
different aspects of meaning, including responsibility to others, creativity, 
transcendence, reframing of dying experiences, and ascertaining one’s values and 
priorities.
Existential meaning as a concept could be specifically explained and made a 
focus of therapeutic work. Spirituality and beliefs about the world and one's 
existence in it can be addressed via direct questions, creative arts activities (writing, 
drawing about the experience), and experiential activities (confronting the threat of 
the illness by role playing, meeting other survivors, guided imagery). Different 
interventions can accomplish the same goal, which is for the patient to work through 
. the emotional challenges of the illness and emerge as a stronger, more resilient 
person who has faced potential death and therefore embraces life.
Future Studies
The present study focused on whether or not meaning and emotional expressivity 
influenced overall psychological adjustment, yet it did not investigate the sources of 
meaning nor other pathways by which existential meaning is linked to adjustment 
(e.g., social support). Re-defining and re-testing the relationship between emotional 
expressivity and meaning would help clarify the role these constructs have in the 
adjustment of breast cancer patients.
Aside from re- testing the psychological constructs, future analyses in 
psycho- oncology need to be conducted to investigate possible direct relationships 
between the construct of existential meaning and new variables such as dispositional 
optimism, benefit finding, social constraints, and family support (provided especially 
from the spouse). More comprehensive model of adjustment to cancer should 
include the existential meaning variable and further investigate the role this construct 
has for holistic, integrated models of adjustment.
Finally, as existential meaning is still lacking attention and credit as an 
important predictor of a person's adjustment and quality of life, increasing the 
number of studies with existential meaning as a variable will greatly benefit the 
fields of psycho-oncology as well as positive psychology. These studies are needed 
to show the connection between a sense of purpose and a person's general 
functioning, not only in the population of breast cancer patients but in any population 
dealing with serious life stressors.
Conclusion
Illness provides not only an obstacle but also a challenge and an opportunity to re­
evaluate one's life. If mental health professionals can leam to open up the
conversation about these issues with their patients, they might be surprised about the 
extent to which individuals with a potentially life-threatening illness, such as breast 
cancer, have reflected on meaning issues. The breast cancer patients who participated 
in the present study told us clearly that out of adversity we can gain strength and a 
newly found appreciation of our lives. They told us that positive changes such as 
more meaningful interpersonal relationships, changed priorities, a richer existential 
life, can occur as a result of the stmggle with illness and the attempt at psychological 
survival. They showed us that joining them in the process of their “posttraumatic 
growth” and putting the meaning issue to discussion, can lead us to the ultimate 
fulfillment of our obligation as mental health professionals.
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A P P E N D I X
GENERAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire asks you to provide some general information related to your 
demographic or medical characteristics.
Please reply to the questions below putting a mark (X) to the relevant box.
Code Number: (it is completed by the researcher)...............
1. Date of birth: .................
2. Marital status
□ Single
□ Married
□ Divorced
□ Widowed
3. Number of Children:
□ 0
□ 1 •
□ 2 
□ >2
4. Educational level
□ Elementary
□ High School
□ Lyceum
□ College /University
5. Employment Status
□ Currently unemployed
□ Currently employed
□ Household
□ Retired
□ On medical leave
6. Income level (per month)
□ Less than Euro 880 (low)
□ Euro 880-2347 Euro (medium)
□ Over Euro 2347 (high)
7. Place of residence
□ Metropolitan area
□ Rural districts
8. Type of surgery
□ Lumpectomy
□ Simple mastectomy
□ Modified radical mastectomy
9. Date of breast surgery: ...........
10. Stage of disease at diagnosis
□ '0
□ I
□ II
□ III
□ IV
11. Treatments received
□ Surgery
□ Chemotherapy
□ Radiation therapy
□ Hormonal therapy
12. Family history of breast cancer
□ Positive
□ Negative
13. Perceived seriousness of disease
□ Not at all serious
□ A little bit
□ Moderately
□ Extremely serious
LIFE ATTITUDE PROFILE-REVISED (LAP-R^
(c) Gary T. Reker
This questionnaire contains a number of statements related to 
opinions and feelings about yourself and life in general. Read 
each statement carefully, then indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree by circling one of the alternative categories 
provided. For example, if you STRONGLY AGREE, circle SA following 
the statement. If you MODERATELY DISAGREE, circle MD. If you are 
UNDECIDED, circle U. Try to use the undecided category sparingly.
SA A MA U MD D SD
STRONGLY AGREE MODERATELY UNDECIDED MODERATELY DISAGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
1. My past achievements have given my SA A MA U MD D SD
life meaning and purpose.
2. In my life I have very clear goals SA A MA U MD D SD
and aims.
3. I regard the opportunity to direct SA A MA U MD D SD
my life as very important.
4. I seem to change my main objectives SA A MA U MD D SD
in life.
5. I have discovered a satisfying life SA A MA U MD D SD
purpose.
6. I feel that some element which I SA A MA U MD D SD
can't quite define is missing
from my life.
7. The meaning of life is evident in SA A MA U MD D SD
the world around us.
8. I think I am generally much less SA A MA U MD D SD
concerned about death than those
around me.
9. I feel the lack of and a need to SA A MA U MD D SD
find a real meaning and purpose
in my life.
10. New and different things appeal SA A MA U MD D SD
to me.
2SA A HA U HD D SD
STRONGLY AGREE HODERATELY UNDECIDED HODERATELY DISAGREE STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
11. My accomplishments in life are SA A HA U HD D SD
largely determined by my own
efforts.
12. I have been aware of an all SA A HA U HD D SD
powerful and consuming purpose
towards which my life has been 
directed.
13. I try new activities or areas of SA A HA U HD D SD
interest and then these soon lose
their attractiveness.
14. I would enjoy breaking loose from SA A HA U HD D SD
the routine of life.
15. Death makes little difference to SA A HA U HD D SD
me one way or another. j
16. I have a philosophy of life that SA A HA U HD D SD
gives my existence significance.
17. I determine what happens in my SA A HA U HD D SD
life.
18. Basically, I am living the kind of SA A HA U HD D SD
life I want to live.
19. Concerning my freedom to make my SA A HA U HD D SD
choice, I believe I am absolutely
free to make all life choices.
20. I have experienced the feeling that SA A HA U HD D SD
while I am destined to accomplish
something important, I cannot put 
my finger on just what it is.
21. I am restless. SA A HA U HD D SD
22. Even though death awaits me, I SA A HA U HD D SD
am not concerned about it.
23. It is possible for me to live my SA A HA U HD D SD
life in terms of what I want to do.
3SA A MA U MD D SD
STRONGLY AGREE MODERATELY UNDECIDED MODERATELY DISAGREE STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
24. I feel the need for adventure and SA A MA U MD D SD
"new worlds to conquer".
25. I would neither fear death nor SA A MA U MD D SD
welcome it.
26. I know where my life is going in SA A MA U MD D SD
the future.
27. In thinking of my life, I see a SA A MA U MD D SD
reason for my being here.
28. Since death is a natural aspect of SA A MA U MD D SD
life, there is no sense worrying
about it.
29. I have a framework that allows me SA A MA U MD D SD
to understand or make sense of my
life.
30. My life is in my hands and I am in SA A MA U MD D SD
control of it.
31. In achieving life's goals, I have SA A MA U MD D SD
felt completely fulfilled.
32. Some people are very frightened SA A MA U MD D SD
of death, but I am not.
33. I daydream of finding a new place SA A MA U MD D SD
for my life and a new identity.
34. A new challenge in my life would SA A MA U MD D SD
appeal to me now.
35. I have the sense that parts of my SA A MA U MD D SD
life fit together into a unified
pattern.
36. I hope for something exciting in SA A MA U MD D SD
the future.
37. I have a mission in life that gives SA A MA U MD D SD
me a sense of direction.
4SA A MA U MD D SD
STRONGLY AGREE MODERATELY UNDECIDED MODERATELY DISAGREE STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
38. I have a clear understanding of the SA A MA U MD D SD 
ultimate meaning of life.
39. When it comes to important life SA A MA U MD D SD 
matters, I make my own decisions.
40. I find myself withdrawing from life SA A . MA U MD D SD
with an "I don't care11 attitude.
41. I am eager to get more out of life SA A MA U MD D SD
than I have so far.
42. Life to me seems boring and SA A MA U MD D SD
uneventful.
43. I am determined to achieve new SA A MA U MD D SD
goals in the future.
44. The thought of death seldom enters SA A MA U MD D SD
my mind.
45. I accept personal responsibility SA A MA U MD D SD
for the choices I have made in my
life.
46. My personal existence is orderly SA A MA U MD D SD
and coherent.
47. I accept death as another life SA A MA U MD D SD
experience.
48. My life is running over with SA A MA U MD D SD
exciting good things.
The Im pact of Event Scale
Below is a list of com m en ts m ade by people after stressful life even ts. Using the  following scale, p lease  indicate 
with a \J how frequently  each  of th e se  com m ents w ere tru e  for you DURING THE PAST SEVEN DAYS.
Not a t all Rarely Som etim es Often
I th o u g h t ab o u t it when I d idn 't m ean to
I avoided letting m yself g e t up se t w hen I though t abou t it or 
w as rem inded of it
I tried  to  rem ove it from m em ory
I had trouble falling asleep  or staying asleep  because of pictures 
or th o u g h ts  abou t it th a t cam e into my mind
I had  w aves of strong  feelings abou t it
I had d ream s ab o u t it
I s tayed  aw ay from  rem inders of it
I felt as if it h ad n 't happened  o r w asn 't real
I tried  not to  talk  abou t it
P ictures ab o u t it popped into my mind
O ther th ings kept m aking m e th ink ab o u t it
I w as aw are th a t I still had a lot of feelings about it, bu t I didn 't 
deal with them
I tried  no t to  th ink  abou t it
Any rem inder brough t back feelings ab o u t it
My feelings abou t it w ere kind of num b
The Mini-MAC Scale.
P lea se  read  th e  following sta tem en ts  that might describe your reactions to having cancer, an d  tick the 
appropriate column tha t indicates the degree  to  which each  s ta tem en t applies to you a t p resen t.
Definitely 
does not 
apply to me
Does not 
apply to me
Applies 
to me
Definitely 
applies to 
me
1 feel like giving up.
1 feel th a t life is ho p eless .
1 feel com pletely  a t a  lo ss  ab o u t w hat to do.
1 can 't h an d le  it.
1 feel th e re  is nothing 1 can  do to  help myself.
1 think it is th e  en d  of th e  world.
1 can 't cope.
1 am  not very hopeful abou t th e  future.
1 am  u p se t ab o u t having cancer.
It is a  d ev asta tin g  feeling.
1 suffer g rea t anxiety  abou t it.
1 am  a  little frightened.
1 worry ab o u t th e  c a n ce r  returning 
or getting w orse .
1 feel very angry  abou t w hat h a s  h ap p en ed  to 
m e.
1 h av e  difficulty in believing th a t this 
h ap p e n ed  to  m e.
1 am  ap p reh en siv e .
1 am  determ ined  to b e a t this d ise a se .
1 s e e  my illness a s  a  challenge.
1 try to  fight th e  illness.
1 am  very optimistic.
1 m ake a  positive effort not to  think abou t my 
illness.
Not thinking ab o u t it help s m e cope.
1 deliberately  push  all tho u g h ts  of cancer out 
of my mind.
1 d istract m yself w hen  tho u g h ts  abou t my 
illness com e into my head .
I've had  a  good  life: w hat's  left is a  bonus.
I've put m yself in th e  h an d s  of God.
S ince my c a n c e r  d iagnosis 1 now realise how 
prec ious life is and  I'm m aking the  b es t of it.
1 coun t my b lessings.
At th e  m om ent 1 ta k e  one day  a t a time.
MENTAL COMPONENT OF THE MOS 36-ITEM SHORT-FORM 
HEALTH SURVEY (SF-36)
INSTRUCTIONS: This survey asks for your views about your health. This information will help 
keep track of how you feel and how well you are able to do your usual activities.
Answer every question by marking the answer as indicated. If you are unsure about how to answ er 
a  question, p lease give the best answ er you can.
1. During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your work 
or other regular daily activities as a  result of any emotional problems (such as  feeling 
depressed  or anxious)?
(circle one number on each line)
YES NO
a. Cut down the am oun t of tim e you spent on work or other 
activities
1 2
b. A ccom plished  le s s  than you would like 1 2
c. Didn't do work or other activities a s  carefully as usual 1 2
2. During the past 4 w eeks, to what extent has your physical health or emotional 
problems interfered with your normal social activities with family, friends, neighbors, 
or groups?
(circle one)
Not at a l l .................................................................................................................1
Slightly ...................................................................................................................2
M oderately.............................................................................................................3
Quite a b it............................................................................................................... 4
Extremely ..............................................................................................................5
3. These questions are about how you feel and how things have been with you during the past 4 
w eeks. For each question, please give the one answ er that com es closest to th e  way you have 
been feeling. How much of the time during the past 4 w eeks -
(circle one num ber on each line)
All of
the
Time
Most 
of the 
Time
A Good 
Bit of 
the 
Time
Some 
of the 
Time
A 
Little 
of the 
Time
None 
of the 
Time
a. Did you feel full of pep? 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. Have you been a very 
nervous person?
1 2 3 4 5 6
c. Have you felt so down 
in the dumps that nothing 
could cheer you up?
1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Have you felt calm and 
peaceful?
1 2 3 4 5 6
e. Did you have a lot of 
energy?
1 2 3 4 5 6
f. Have you felt 
downhearted and blue?
1 2 3 4 5 6
g. Did you feel worn out? 1 2 3 4 5 6
h. Have you been a happy 
person?
1 2 3 4 5 6
i. Did you feel tired? 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. During th e  p a s t 4 w e e k s , how  m uch of th e  tim e h a s  your physical hea lth  
or em otional problem s interfered with your social’activities (like visiting with
friends, rela tives, e tc .)?
(circle one)
All of the time ......................................................................................................1
Most of the time .................................................................................................2
Some of the tim e................. ■................................................................ ............... 3
A little of the time .............................................................................................4
None of the time ............................................................................................... 5
EM OTIONAL EXPR ESSIVITY  SCALE
DIRECTIONS: The follow ing statements deal with you and your em otions. Please select a number 
from the following scale that best describes YOU in each o f  the statements and place the number in 
the blank provided.
N ever Rarely Occasionally Usually A lm ost Always
True
1
True True True 
2 3 4
Alw ays
True
5
1 .____ I don't express my emotions to other people.
2 .____ Even when I'm experiencing strong feelings, I don't express them  outwardly,
3 .____ Other people believe me to be very emotional.
4. People can "read" my em otions.
5 . _____ I keep my feelings to  myself.
6 . _____ Other people aren't easily able to observe what I'm feeling.
7 . _____ I display m y emotions to other people.
8 . _____ People think o f  me as an unemotional person. .
9 . _____ I don't like to let other people see  how I am feeling.
10 .____ I can't hide the way I am feeling.
11.____ I am not very emotionally expressive.
12.____ I am often considered indifferent by  others.
13.____ I am able to cry in front o f  other people.
14.____ Even if  I am feeling very em otional, I don't let others see my feelings.
1 5 ._____ I think o f  m yself as emotionally exp ressive.
1 6 ._____ The way I feel is different from how others think I feel.
1 7 ._____ I hold my feelings in.
A P P E N D I X
CONSENT FORM
TITLE OF PROJECT:
NAME OF LEAD RESEARCHER:
PLEASE INITIAL YOUR CONSENT IN THE BOXES
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I confirm I 
have received information on how to contact the researcher.
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving reason, and without my medical 
care or legal rights being affected.
3 I understand that sections of my medical notes may be looked at by the 
researcher. I give permission for the researcher to have access to my 
records.
4 I understand that all data will remain confidential and used for 
research purposes only.
5. I wish to receive a summary of the study on completion
6. I agree to take part in this study.
Name of Patient
Signature of patient
Date ................................................................................................................
Name of Researcher
Signature of researcher
Date ........................................... ....................................................................
MINISTRY OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SOLIDARITY
St. S a w a s  Cancer Hospital
171, Alexandras Av. 115 22 Athens, Greece 
Tel. 210- 64.09.000
August 29, 2007
To: University of Wales Swansea 
Re: Research Project
This letter is in regard to the research project that has been proposed and 
implemented by Fotios Anagnostopoulos. The title of the project is 
Psychological Adjustment and Breast Cancer. This project was carried out 
over a one year period, starting approximately February 2004.
This project has been approved by the director of the Breast Clinic and ethical 
approval was granted.
Sincerely,
X*V«V*T
Minas Chryssochoou, MD / 
Co- Medical Director 
Breast Clinic ^
